Nolarbeit Theory Journal: Part Two of Three (1977-1978)

by Arthur T. Murray


                                                                24 AUG 1977

     The theory  which we are developing is that of the establishment of the
comparator as the mechanism basic to intelligence.
     In continuation of yesterday's thoughts,  we  were  reasoning  just now
about a  mental organism  momentarily deprived  of all input perception, but
still consisting of memory and  a  kind  of  "central  processor."   Because
lately we've  been reasoning that one's "level" of intelligence has a lot to
do with how many associative inputs ("tags") are available simultaneously to
impinge  serially  upon  one's  consciousness.    Because,  in  a  way,  how
intelligent one is, is a function of how likely one is to make a tenuous but
valid mental connection.
     We could  give a mind an intelligence test of walking down a street and
providing the names for all familiar human beings met on the street.
     We suspect pretty  strongly  that  physical  knowledge  of  the outside
world, such as of visual images, relies upon analysis by exact comparator at
any  level  of  detail   or  refinement.     Because   a  visual   image  is
incomprehensible unless  you start  dealing with  some small group of points
upon it.
     However, on the scratch-leaf  for this  paper of  today, we  wrote down
what we  got as  a parallel idea:  that coded things do not require the same
sort of comparator analysis, because coded structures are exact; they do not
have the variations and vagaries of visual images.
     So perhaps  the great  syncretism of  today Wednesday is to take up the
idea that both those  two  elements  go  to  make  up  an  intelligent mind:
comparators and coded structures.
     Comparators  would  be  necessary  for  vision and coded structures for
language.
     The comparator  system is  that with  which we  come to  know the outer
world; the  coded-structure system  is that with which we come to hold inner
mental concepts.

                              Scratch-Leaf                       24 AUG 1977

     - Idea:  That coded things can be on any level of a base-three 
expanding pyramid, because by definition they must be totally exact.  
Therefore language can have twenty-six letters or umpteen sounds or 
perhaps even 20,000 calligraphic characters.
     - The self-concept of "I" is made possible by means of the "coded 
structure."  Through the exact coded structure the word "I" has access to
any of the myriad associations needed to transform the word into the
concept.


                                                                 26 AUG 1977

                    Organization of Nolarbeit File System

- master file
     - not necessarily the original documents.
     - typewritten as much as possible.
     - Drawings and figures should be photocopied into the typewritten 
       material.
- manuscript storage file
     - not necessarily a complete file of all Nolarbeit material
     - serves as a Sammelpunkt for handwritten documents once their contents
       have become typewritten for the master file.
- safety file
     - a copy of the contents of the master file
     - to be kept at a place safely away from the master file, so that if 
       either is lost, it can be replaced by copying the other.
- attache file
     - main working file for developing new material.
     - to be carried about in attache case.
     - along with the other complete Nolarbeit files, must be thoroughly 
       indexed to facilitate new work.


                                                                 26 AUG 1977

     Two days  ago we  figured out a duality of comparator-system and coded-
structure theoretically necessary for high intelligence, that is, the use of
language.
     Today we were reading the work of 8 AUG 1976, and at a lot of points in
there the new significance of coded-structure makes sense.
     Although a brain gets to know the outer world through a geometric-logic
comparator  system,  it  is  the coded-structure system which makes possible
high-speed intelligent thought.   If  we  posit  this  theory,  we  attain a
tentative  answer  to  the  age-old  question  of  whether or not thought is
possible without using words.   The  answer  is  that,  over  a  spectrum of
thought, words are needed for the most intellectual levels.  By using a word
to name  any  outside  thing  or  action,  a  brain  establishes  a punctual
collector of  any associative tags that deal with the outside item, and thus
a concept takes root within the mind.  No matter  how long  the word  is, it
still operates as a single point.
     It  is  very  possible  that  the  "central  processor" of a mind would
contain the coded-structure which  would provide  access to  words stored in
memory along with their bundles of "valent" (stronger or weaker) associative
tags.  Of course, in a coding system for words, the address of a word-memory
is perhaps identical with its codical breakdown.
     Now the use of a word as, say, noun or verb, or, subject or object, has
to do  with a  processing structure.   Such  a processing  structure is like
nodes which  can contain  any element ad libitum.  So we should consider the
linguistic processor to be distinct from un-node-like memory.  It  may arise
in the  human infant just by the laying down of memory traces, in similar or
dissimilar material, but we don't know here yet.


                                                                 27 AUG 1977

       O O O          O O O          O O O          O O O
       O O O          X O O   ===>   O X O   =#=>   O O O
       X X X   ===>   O X X          O X X          O X X

       L H R

- Everything moves in relationship to the head, "H."
- We consider that the head wills and does the moving.
- The head has two arms, left (L) and right (R).
- It may have to have a way of "feeling" where an arm is at any time.
- Each arm can be moved around among only three spaces relative to the head.
  These spaces  are the side space, the front space, and the diagonal space 
  in between.
- The head can move an arm directly from side to front, or first to diagonal
  and then to front.
- The head can not move an arm behind its own back, so to speak.
- The head  will probably have to have an imaginary eye which must always be
  focused on some moveable point in the immediate image.
- The eye-focus can stay on the same point while the body moves,  only under
  certain circumstances.  The eye can not be caused to be looking behind the
  body or outside of the allowed visible field.
- There may perhaps be "sleep" during which the eye stops seeing.
- The head can move, and when it does so, ceteris paribus, it moves the  
  whole body, which retains its configuration.
- The head can move to any adjacent point except those three "behind" it.
- It would  be possible to make a logically valid mock-up of this microcosm 
  or pseudocosm by having a flat array of light bulbs  that could illuminate
  either points (or squares).  A lighted bulb would indicate the presence of
  an object.  A human could move a  bulb-object by  means of  a kind  of    
 "joystick," so  that pushing  the joystick forward or sideways would make   
  the corresponding move on the array.  The orientation of  arms could  be    
  controlled by  six pushbuttons,  three on each side of the joystick.  The   
  operative pushbutton on each side could be lighted by an  inside bulb.      
  Then if the arm configuration was to be changed during a move, the desired
  new configuration could be entered by pushbutton while the joystick  were  
  manipulated.
- As one  step, the body can revolve 45 degrees at a time with the head as  
  the axis, in either direction.


                                                                 28 AUG 1977

     The  bouleumatic  system  for  the  speech  pseudo-organs  will  be the
mechanism which engages in thought.
     This seems to be an important theory.
     Under  the  bouleumatic  theory  (q.v.)  both  motor  memory  and motor
volition are necessary to  initiate  a  motor  action.    VERBAL  THOUGHT IS
THEREFORE  THE  ACTIVATION  OF  VERBAL  MOTOR MEMORY WHILE WITHHOLDING MOTOR
VOLITION.
     One might  interject that  just to  run through  a train  of words from
memory is a kind of volition.  However, Nommultic theory renders a different
definition.  Under Nommultic theory an unspoken mental  thought which arises
is  a  spontaneous  linking  of  associative  tags  summoning  quasi-unitary
concepts or elements from  memory.    Therefore  a  nascent  thought  is not
willed, but  rather it  is like  the topmost point of the iceberg of all the
logical processing going on in the mind.
     A  thought  can  become  will  (volition)  by  tipping   a  bouleumatic
accumulator into  motor volition.   The accumulator prevents linear volition
while implementing a kind of two-dimensional volition.  Come to think of it,
that  reasoning  suggests  that  thought  is a linear component of volition.
Volition,  however,  is  non-linear,  so  it  takes  what   you  might  call
exponential thought to bring about motor volition.
     In the  night we  were theorizing on how the verbal motor memory system
would in itself constitute the mechanism of verbal thought in a brain.  That
is, there  would not  be a  separate mechanism  conveying its results to the
verbal motor system.  What we must now investigate is  whether or  not there
would probably  be a  kind of  superstructure of  extra processing equipment
involved with the verbal thought mechanism.
     What we are looking for is what we might call a "habit" mechanism.  The
human mind  has the  ability consciously or unconsciously to train itself to
create sentences in manifold ways.
     Under Nommultic theory, the basic semantic  ingredients for  a sentence
just come willy-nilly to the conscious mind, from memory or from perception.
     We observe a portion of the associative "tapestry" being able to govern
or modify the  operation  of  the  associative  process  in  or  along other
portions of  the tapestry.   For instance, a human speaker can easily insert
an arbitrary syllable after  each word  in sentences,  such as,  "I-ay am-ay
here-ay."   Such insertion  slows down but does not stop the creative verbal
process which is thought.
     However, we can carry the investigation  even  further.    It  looks as
though the  "habit-mechanism" has  a kind of double access to verbal memory.
The problem of noun-plurals serves as an example.  On the one  hand, perhaps
the "habitmech"  knows the  usual way to form English noun-plurals.  So when
emerging thought calls for a noun-plural, it would be easy for the habitmech
to process  the retrieved  noun and  deliver it with the standardized plural
ending.  Now there could be a delaying mechanism where  time is  allowed for
either standard pluralization or else irregular override.
     Any  associative  process  which  grows  complex  can  be  regarded  as
consisting of a surface and a "subcorpus."  Suppose a habit-mechanism causes
associations to  link together  into sentences  in certain  ways.  While the
habit is not yet routine, many extra "nodes" in the associative formation of
a sentence  will run  through the  consciousness.  However, when the process
becomes smoothed out, only the end-product sentences will remain as surface,
as  associative   chains,  and  the  strictly  processor  associations  will
disappear down into the subcorpus.
     We want to devise a way for all  kinds of  grammatical rules  to become
operative in  the habit-mechanism and therefore in the subcorpus.  A grammar
rule is a piece of associable information, but  it is  one which  can affect
myriad other pieces as they are called out of memory and manipulated.


                                                                 30 AUG 1977

                    Key Modules List for Nommultic Device

      _____________      _____________________           ______________
     |             |    |                     |         |              |
     | environment |--->| perception channels |         | Motor Output |
     |_____________|    |_____________________|         |______________|

         ____________       __________________
        |            |     |                  |
        | Logic      |     | Coded-Perception |
        | Comparator |     | Channels         |
        |____________|     |__________________|

                ___            ____________       ______
               |   |          |            |     |      |
               | M |          | Central    |     | M  M |
               | E |          | Logic      |     | O  E |
               | M |          | Processor? |     | T  M |
               | O |          |____________|     | O  O |
               | R |                             | R  R |
               | Y |                             |    Y |
               |___|                             |______|

        ___________                                    ___________
       |           |   _________    _______________   |           |
       | Passive   |  |         |  |               |  | Motor     |
       | Coded     |  | Sensory |  | Motor         |  | Coded     |
       | Memory    |  | Tagging |  | Habit Tagging |  | Memory    |
       | Structure |  | System  |  | System        |  | Structure |
       |___________|  |_________|  |_______________|  |___________|


     It  may  be  that  there  are  two different tagging systems, a passive
sensory tagging system and an active  or motor  habit tagging  system.  This
idea came quite suddenly just now.
     It may  be the  coded-structure system which bridges the passive-active
polarity of the mind.  The coded-structure system  is one  where perceptions
and motor output must obviously be involved with the same place.
     When we hear a word, it filters right through an instantaneous decoding
locator system to reach the associative  node which  pinpoints a  concept by
holding all  the associated tags in one spot.  So what we hear goes straight
to a conceptual node.
     The motor output is more complicated.  It is clear  that a  verbal node
is probably the strongest, surest associative link to any information stored
in passive or active memory.  That is to say, the mind has all its memory at
its fingertips when it is operating in the realm of a verbally coded system.
     I suspect  that the verbal input code is automatically the address of a
concept node.  I would suspect  that the  mind would  not even differentiate
among different languages as to where a word was stored.
     We  immediately  imagine  a  problem  because  we want all the physical
addresses not to be encumbered with dozens or  hundreds of  associative tags
getting in  the way  of the  very decoding  lines.   It's as  if we wanted a
single line to  come  out  from  each  node  and  go  somewhere  else before
branching out into all possible associations.

     Very likely  the decode-line comes out of the auditory address area and
goes like the top of a "T" into the verbal motor output.  The  bottom of the
"T" goes  to the  concept node.   If activated by volition, the motor memory
for  any  discrete  word  probably  "avalanches"  onto  a  group  of muscle-
activation bars,  so that  there need  be no picking and choosing of letter-
sequences.  The verbal motor bars, before volition, probably also  feed back
into coded sensory input, so that the mind can "hear itself think."


                                                                 30 AUG 1977

   _______________________                          ________________
  |                       |                        |                |
  |  Perception Channels  |                        |  Motor Output  |
  |_______________________|                        |________________|

              .*.                                         .*.
            .*   *.                                     .*   *.
          .*       *.                                 .*       *.
        .*           *.                             .*           *.
      .*            .* *.                         .* *.            *.
     *            .*     *.                     .*     *.            *
    /            *         *.                 .*         *            \
   /            /            *               *            \            \
  /    P       /            /                 \  Motor     \       M    \
 *     A      /            /                   \            \      O     *
 >     S     *            /                     \            *     T     <
 :     S    >   Sensory  *                       *  Habit     <    O     :
 :     I    :           >                         <           :    R     :
 |     V    |           :                         :           |          |
 |     E    |  Tagging  |                         |  Tagging  |    M     |
 |          |           :                         :           |    E     |
 :     M    :           >                         <           :    M     :
 :     E    >   System   *                       *  System    <    O     :
 >     M     *            \                     /            *     R     <
 *     O      \            \                   /            /      Y     *
  \    R       \            \                 /            /            /
   \   Y        \           .*               *.           /            /
    \            *.       .*                   *.       .*            /
     *.            *.   .*                       *.   .*            .*
       *.            *.*                           *.*            .*
         *.         .*                               *.         .*
           *.     .*                                   *.     .*
             *. .*                                       *. .*
               *                                           *


                                                                 30 AUG 1977

                                         /|\
                                          |  To concept nodes.
                              |  |  |  |
                              |  |  |  |
                              |  |  |  |
   Verbal   |  Individual   --+--)--)--)--   Individual     Avalanche
   Sensory  |  Concept      -----+--)--)--   Word Motor     Speech Muscle
   Decoder  |  Addresses    --------+--)--   Output         Control
            |               -----------+--   Chains         Bars


                                                                 31 AUG 1977

     Late  yesterday  we  were  considering  a  system  of decoding of heard
language and motor generation of  words  connected  to  concept  nodes.   We
imagined a "T" with the input and output across the top and with the concept
node at the base.
     Then we were reasoning  on  how  those  concept  nodes  really pinpoint
everything:    the  audible  word,  the  generation of the word, and all the
associations which flesh out the word as a concept.
     Now we are figuring  out  how  concept-points  or  nodes  will interact
within the  mind.   Obviously they can't interact as unitary points, because
then they have no distinction.  They interact through the  features that are
associated into them.
     Thought  occurs  by  virtue  of the "coiled-spring function" of logical
aggregates in the mind.
     Any verb for a complex action is really reducible to  a list  of simple
actions.
     How can you express a subject, an action, and a direct object in purely
logical terms?  There  is conditional  logic, but  is there  semantic logic,
logic to correspond to what a transitive verb does in a sentence?
     If we want to find semantic logic, we have to go into that small array-
world where there are so few  points that  everything is  totally unique and
totally describable.
     The simplest transitive verb would be something like "touch," "hit," or
"push."

     A verb (such as "hit") does not show  just one  arrangement of  all the
dots in  the array.   I suppose it does show the arrangement of all the dots
at the crucial instant, but,  as  an  action-word,  it  must  also  show the
arrangement of the dots at a previous instant.

     We are able to express "touch," "hit," and "push" symbolically, or with
dots, on our scratch-leaf for today, but we  have trouble  trying to  make a
universally valid statement of semantic logic out of the triple sequences of
arrays.  It may be necessary to use kind of a switcheroo.
     First you express the verb on the dot-level so that the machine absorbs
the  concept  in  unique  and  describable terms, with reference only to the
dots.  Then you abstract the concept through re-expressions of the states in
the sequence.

     With  just  three  dots,  you  can  have seven configurations.  So with
sequences of three states, you can  have  343  different  things  happen, or
reach 343 different words to describe unequivocally what happened.
     The  simplest   language-relationships  correspond   to  summation  and
subtraction.    Complex  language   relationships  are   reducible  to  such
simplicity.



Diagram of Theoretical Model of the Human Mind                   10 SEP 1977

       ________________________________________________________________
      /                                                                \
     <                      E n v i r o n m e n t                       >
      \________________________________________________________________/
                |                     |              /|\         /|\
                |                     |               |           |
                |                     |             __|__       __|___
                |                     |            |     |     |      |
                |                     | Internal   |  V  |     | G  M |
                |                     | Verbal     |  e  |     | e  o |
                |                     |<-----------|  r  |     | n  t |
                |                     | Perception |  b  |     | e  o |
                |                     | Line       |  a  |     | r  r |
          ______V_______            __V__________  |  l  |     | a    |
    _____|              |     _____|             | |     |     | l  M |
   |     | Experiential |    |     | Auditory    | |  M  |     |    e |
 __V___  | Associative- |  __V___  | Associative | |  o  |/### | M  m |/###
|      | | Tagging      | |      | | Memory-     | |  t  |\### | u  o |\###
| E  M | | Comparator   | | A  M | | Tagging     | |  o  |  ## | s  r |  ##
| x  e | |              | | u  e | | System      | |  r  |  ## | c  y |  ##
| p  m | |______________| | d  m | |_____________| |     |  ## | u    |  ##
| e  o |       /##\       | i  o |      /##\       |  M  |  ## | l    |  ##
| r  r |        ##        | t  r |       ##        |  e  |  ## | a    |  ##
| i  y |        ##        | o  y |       ##        |  m  |  ## | t    |  ##
| e    |        ##        | r    |       ##        |  o  |  ## | u    |  ##
| n    |        ##        | y    |       ##        |  r  |  ## | r    |  ##
| t    |        ##        |      |       ##        |  y  |  ## | e    |  ##
| i    |/#######################################   |     |  ## |      |  ##
| a    |\#######################################   |_____|  ## |______|  ##
| l    |                  |      |       ##   ##     /|\    ##    /|\    ##
|      |                  |      |/########   ##      |     ##     |     ##
|      |                  |      |\########   ##      |     ##     |     ##
|______|                  |______|            ##      |     ##     |     ##
                                              ##      |     ##     |     ##
                                ################      |     ##     |     ##
                                ################      |     ##     |     ##
                                ##      Volition Line |     ##     |     ##
                                ##   /----------------'     ##     |     ##
                                ##   |     Volition Line    ##     |     ##
                                ##   |  /-------------------##-----'     ##
                             __\##/__|__|_      ____________##_   _______##
                            |             |    |               | |         |
                            | Conceptual  ####\| Verbal Motor  | | General |
                            | Address     ####/| Habit Tagging | | Motor   |
                            | Nodes as    |    | System        | | Habit   |
                            | Motor Coded ######################\| Tagging |
                            | Memory      ######################/| System  |
                            |_____________|    |_______________| |_________|
                                |   |                 /|\            /|\
                                |   |  Volition Line   |              |
                                |   \------------------'              |
                                |      Volition Line                  |
                                \-------------------------------------'


                                                                 16 SEP 1977

     Our mind  is now  ready to  focus upon  the "Verbal Motor Habit Tagging
System" in the diagram  of 10SEP1977.   In  the days  since then  we haven't
really  been   forging  ahead,   because  we've  been  busy  typing  up  and
photocopying much  previous  Nolarbeit  material.    Now  that  our  yen for
theorizing has  casually turned  its attention to verbal motor, I think this
is a good opportunity to record  and analyze  if any  creative process shows
itself now.
     The hopefully  creative process  is starting out with our mind thinking
of a black-box mechanism for which it has a purpose but for which it can not
yet describe  the interior  workings.  The purpose is partially that we want
the VMHTS at its output to have control  of discrete  individual motor sound
units, and  we want  the interior  VMHTS to group together those units as an
avalanche string to go with any desired "conceptual address node" punctually
representing a word which is really a string of motor sound units.  In other
words, we want the single node, coupled with volition, to be able to produce
rapidly the  whole string  of verbal sound units in the given word.  We want
the automaton to be  able to  spend some  time learning  the "habit"  of the
sound-string, and thenceforth to be able to pronounce it briskly and in such
a way that the associated  verbal  habit  tagging  mechanism  functions only
beneath  the  surface  and  does  not  intrude into the conscious process of
uttering or thinking the word.
     Our other partial purpose  is  that  we  may  want  the  same  VMHTS to
incorporate the grammar structures of language.  At any rate, we expect that
the learning and use of grammar  will be subject to some sort of motor habit
tagging system,  but we are a little afraid that the grammar problem will be
much more difficult than  the word-habituation  problem, simply  because the
inputs to  a mechanism  of grammar-function will have to be discriminated so
complicatedly as to such things as  what part  of speech  they are  and what
function they are assuming.
     For the  word-generation problem,  we envision right now an output that
controls around forty different motor tags, a number we get  from the UNIFON
alphabet published 29AUG1977 in the Seattle P-I.  It shows English as having
sixteen vowels and twenty-four consonants.
     So that's  where we  are now  - trying  to figure  out how  to stack up
sounds on  a pull-string  and how then to submerge the system in a subcorpus
so that only the habituated results appear during system operation.
     We feel pretty optimistic about the VMHTS because we suspect in advance
that  the  word-habituation  can  be  done quite automatically.  In fact, we
should be  able to  design a  general-purpose habituation  device which will
link  up  any  desired  sequence  of outputs with any single, nodular input.
It's as if the mind can run through any sequence of outputs  slowly and then
just decide to "freeze" them as a habit.
     We do  worry about  designing such a cumbersome mechanism that it would
be hard to imagine its analog  being  provided  genetically.    We  want our
system  to  be  simple  or  straightforward  enough  that it could be formed
embryonically according to genetic code.  We will  accept even  a cumbersome
mechanism and then try to simplify it.
     If we  actually do figure out a device which will habituate up to forty
outputs, then I think it would be pretty  easy to  give even  an inexpensive
automaton the  ability to  say words out loud.  We would just make the forty
outputs go to an actual mechanism of sound-production.  It  could be perhaps
bits of  voice-tape or  even some kind of digital memory.  That would really
sound spooky,  to hear  the machine  pronouncing words  out loud.   It would
probably sound  hiccupy or  rasping, but quite intelligible.  Later on in an
expensive model we could give the machine a  superlative voice  such as that
of actor Richard Burton.

                                   Scratch-Leaf

- Output of up to 40 units.
- Input as  a node, but output must be compared with the sound series behind
  the node.
- Obviously, the build-up chain of the sound-series to be habituated  will  
  start with  just finding  the initial sound in motor memory, and then it   
  will just add on sounds.
- For the auditory input, we may  have to  have a  kind of  slip-through    
  comparison chain,  where sequences are kind of slid past each other to see  
  if they match up anywhere.
- For the auditory input, we might establish a kind of  "short-term memory."
  By "short-term" we would mean memory that goes into a special register.
- Whenever I  get the idea of building registers, I feel the urge to attach 
  umpteen possible processing mechanisms to them.
- Contemporary psychologists have researched  short-term  memory  quite     
  thoroughly, so I could always read up on it.
- When the  psychologists say  that seven  things can  stay in short-term   
  memory, what they probably mean is seven different concept nodes.


                                                                 20 SEP 1977

                    Mental Processing of Transitive Verbs

     When we say that "A" does a transitive action to "B," it is like having
three  crucial  nodes  filled  in  a logical association-assigning apparatus
within a mind.
     It is like saying, "A nodes B."
     Switch-wise, for a three-word sentence  of  subject,  verb,  and direct
object to be understood by an automaton requires only that each of the three
verbal concepts gets tagged  to the  three crucial  nodes on  the processing
niveau of the language-understanding apparatus.
            A  V  C
            o  o  o
            1  2  3
     Subject "A" does verb-action "V" to direct object "C."

     If A-V-C, then H and R.

     "H" is a "How?" relating to A, and "R" is a result relating to C.
     It is  further possible  that A-V-C  also implies a two-way associative
memory link between A and C with some kind of reference to V.
         ______________________        ____________________________________
        |                      |      |                                    |
        | AVC  -->  H   &  R   |  or  | AVC  -->  H   &  R   &  AVC-tag    |
        |            A      C  |      |            A      C            AC  |
        |______________________|      |____________________________________|

     Now comes the semantic nitty-gritty.
     "A" is a concept because it is a  bundle of  associative tags collected
at a node, and so is "C."
     The verb-concept  "V," by  virtue of being a transitive verb, can cause
tag ends to be delivered for "HA" and "RC."
     When I say that A-V-C implies RC, a result with respect to "C," I mean
that to  "C" is  now associatively  connected a  nodular tag that leads to a
whole list of different result-memories associated with the concept "V."
     For example, if "A kills C," then  a  whole  list  of  images  of death
becomes associated to the nodular concept of "C."
     Thought then  has transpired because the mind's concept of "C" has been
altered radically.  The new list for "C" probably does not erase other items
for C, but rather it probably overrides them in associative priority.
     At the  same time,  if "A  kills C," then a whole list (HA) of possible
"how's" of killing becomes  associated to  the nodular  concept of  "A."  Or
maybe just the question of "killing-how?" becomes associated with A.  If the
"how" is  actually stated  in the  sentence, that  can be  associated to "A"
instead of just the question.  Of course, language always leaves some degree
of possible question.
     So we see that the nodular concepts "A" and "C" are both altered by the
sentence  with  the  transitive  verb.    The  process is meaningful but not
precise.  "V" just gives its result-list to "C" and its how-list to "A."
     Probably  the  sentence  itself  as  a  percept  goes  into  memory  of
experience.
     Notice the  importance of  the idea  that a transitive verb carries the
two lists (subnodes?), the "how" and  the "result."   A  transitive verb can
link  the  result-list  to  the  direct-object  concept.   I suppose that an
intransitive verb would link both lists right back to the subject.


                                                                 27 SEP 1977
                                                           [U.W. Engr. Lib.]

     We have theorized that it may be possible to determine the least amount
of learning necessary to implant a usable concept in a brain.
     When a  concept is being summoned, it is represented by a unitary node.
However, if a brain is to make use of a  summoned concept,  then features of
its informational or logical content must come into play.
     The  concept  is  a  bundle  of  tags.    Tags  have a kind of "pop-up"
priority.
     Ultimate informational content is  very  particular;  it  gets  down to
arrays of yes-or-no bits like in a truth-table or a visual dot-array.
     Thought can  perhaps proceed  by a process of surface-skimming.  When a
concept is summoned, it can come  along internal  memory paths corresponding
to one  or more  of the senses.  (If it is fetched in correspondence to only
one  sense,  still  it  can  quickly  associate  into  other  senses.)   The
appearance of  the summoned  concept is  a kind  of pregnant occurrence.  We
don't know in advance  what use  the brain  will make  of the  concept.  The
brain starts getting a serial feed-through of the single associative tags in
the conceptual bundle, starting with the  tag  of  the  highest  valence and
going on down in a kind of scan or search for one or several highly relevant
associative tags.
     The semantic meaning introduced  by a  concept-word in  a sentence goes
into memory  as the simple record of an occurrence, but it also plays a role
in  subjective  conscious  thought.    If  a  thought  is  a   statement  of
relationship,  then  the  chasing-around  of  concepts  in a mind causes the
expression (statement) of relationships, or thought.
     Internal verbalizing of the chase of relationships would  be the rather
firm or  solid activation  of verbal  concept-nodes in their role as part of
the structure of verbal motor memory.  That is to say, based on our model of
the mind  as illustrated  on September  10th, the summoning of a concept can
result in avalanche activation of the verbal motor  memory concept  node for
that concept.   Some  relationships between  concepts get translated into or
expressed as verbs, so  that sentences  arise.   We know  theoretically that
relationships are  assigned by  tags, but  can we ever say that the tags are
the relationships?  How does a mind fetch a verb to describe  a relationship
it  is  thinking  about  or  even  perceiving?  Well, here also, associative
taggings made  from either  the previous  thought or  the present perception
must  fetch  the  concept  of  the  verb.    What  we might have here is the
summation of tags until a specific  verb/concept  is  fetched.    After all,
erudite  people  use  highly  specialized  verbs.    The  tags coming from a
perceived or contemplated relationship would, as  it were,  "vote" for which
verb is to express the relationship.
     The refinements  of grammar  would have  to be  added on by a mechanism
supervising the broad processes of verbal thought in sentences.   One way to
do it  might be  to make  the deep-structure formulations subconscious, with
their surface-structure transformations rising into the consciousness.  (See
the ideas  on verbal motor habit-tagging systems.)  However, we mustn't rush
to invoke the subconscious here, because we are theorizing that the chase of
concepts is a conscious process, or are we?
     It may  be that the verbal motor habit-tagging system, as an embodiment
of grammar principles, affects the chase-summoning of word/concepts  in such
a way that they are forced to emerge into the consciousness already put into
their grammatical form which is proper for the sentence being generated.
     Notice that we often  describe  a  past-time  scenario  in  the present
tense:  "Hitler invades Russia.  The Russians counterattack."
     There may  be something  like a  "forward-looking radar system" to make
sure that  words enter  consciousness in  their proper  grammatical form and
syntax.
     Let's go  back towards  the first  part of  today's work.  The concept-
chase  would  hardly  ever  have  to  get  down  to  "ultimate informational
content."   So therefore verbal thought can get pretty abstract and still be
logical and rational, even though it is pretty far removed from the ultimate
yes-or-no constructions of logical information.
     Those  ultimate  logical  constructions  were probably necessary in the
infancy  of  the  organism.    Then  they  yielded  to  ever  more  abstract
ratiocination,  so  that  in  the  mature  organism those microstructures of
"ultimate informational content" are probably  not  necessary  any  more and
could probably  be excised  from memory  with utterly no resulting damage or
impairment.  What this  theory  says  is  that  you  have  to  go  through a
minuscule gearing-up  for abstract thinking, but from then on you don't need
the early structures.
     So it looks as though we can't obtain what we were foolishly hoping for
at  the  beginning  of  today's  paper:    a  read-only-memory  containing a
standardized concept.  Because a concept  is inextricable  from the  mind in
which  it  resides.    Because  the  content  of  a  concept  depends on the
associations it makes both to sub-concepts and to other concepts.


                                                                 28 SEP 1977

     We haven't yet really gone deeply into the  motor habit-tagging systems
as envisioned  on September  tenth.   Instead we started off onto short-term
memory and then yesterday onto concept association.
     Some thoughts  have come  to mind  concerning motor  habit-tagging.  An
intriguing way  to do  it would  be to  make some discrete functioning units
which could operate together in indeterminately large groups.
     I mean, we could outright design a system  to habituate  grammar, or we
could design  basic units  which would  then organize themselves so as to be
able to habituate grammar.
     Habituation would probably have  to occur  during short-term rehearsal-
type memory, and then be able to function over long-term memory.
     It might  be important  to note  that the  barrage of words potentially
coming  into  the  grammar  system  is  probably  thinned  out  whenever the
consciousness  reviews  a  series  of  visual  images.  The review of visual
images could qualify as "non-verbal thought," but of course features  of the
images are  capable of  evoking associated words.  If they don't, it must be
because of levels of dominance.
     It's rather easy to  imagine that  the first  noun-phrase summoned into
the grammar-system could automatically go into the "nominative case," unless
there is a forward-looking system  which  is  able  to  determine  and apply
grammatical usage before the word surfaces into consciousness.
     A rough  general requirement  for the habituation system might be that,
given any nodular verbal inputs, it shall modify  and assemble  those inputs
into a  sentence conforming to the grammar rules as learned from the outside
world.


                                                                 29 SEP 1977

                         Towards a Theory of Grammar

     There may  develop  concepts  which  we  could  call  "invisible quasi-
anonymous concepts."   Now,  these concepts may be so important for language
that they become operationally linked to  the language  system, that  is, to
the verbal motor habit-tagging system.
     These concepts  exist, outside  of the  VMHTS, in the permanent memory,
where they  can  always  be  immediately  linked  to  either  perceptions or
thoughts that are going to give rise to language-sentences.
     They are  "invisible" in  that we  don't become  actually aware of them
when they are activated by association.  For instance, we  may know  that we
are  seeing  either  one  fish  or  several fish, but our mind doesn't focus
consciously on the singularity or plurality.
     They are "quasi-anonymous"  in  that  we  don't  necessarily  give them
names.    Their  silent  activation  does  not  make  us think of words like
"singularity/plurality" or  "past/present/future" or  "subject/object."  Yet
they govern  classifications which  are real  and which  are immanent in the
external world, as perceived by us.
     In this particular writing of theory  there is  hardly any  lag between
new thoughts  and my  writing down  of thoughts.  I find it hard to keep all
the  factors  in  mind  while  trying  to  develop  from  them  a  theory of
linguistics.  However, the wellspring of ideas has not dried up.
     I'm just  theorizing that  it may be good to have concepts in permanent
memory linked operationally to the MVHTS.   You  see, there  seem to  be two
levels of  habit-tagging to be done.  On the low, easy level, habituation of
the sounds in words would be just  a  simple  comparison  problem.    On the
higher level,  the habituation  required to set up a language system is much
more complex because it actually involves getting concepts to operate.
     We are tending to theorize now that the  VMHTS is  allowed to associate
itself  directly  with  the  invisible  concepts  and  use them as important
elements in the linguistic habituations which  it achieves.   Well,  yes, we
might as  well posit  an ability  of the  VMHTS to  seek out  and attach any
concept it needs.
     Of course, I guess  it will  use those  concepts on  a yes-or-no basis.
For instance,  when dealing  with "singularity/plurality" it will answer one
or both of those questions with "yes" or "no."   Or it  may just  accept the
association/activation line of the concept as an input calling for a certain
learned (habituated) operation.   For  instance,  with "past/present/future"
it's not an either-or operation, it's a question of which one.  Likewise the
imperative mood might be just a single input.
     But there is a fundamental difference  between the  concepts in general
and the  habituation-linked concepts.   The  general ones just float around,
and  when  they  are  summoned  (randomly)  they  must  so-to-speak identify
themselves by bringing with them associative-tag bundles which influence the
course of thought and,  by  so  doing,  constitute  the  functioning  of the
concept as  a concept.   On the other hand, the invisible habituation-linked
concepts are already pre-identified  any time  they go  into activation, and
they don't  have a  direct, conscious  influence on thought, but rather they
affect the generation of sentences in a predetermined (habituated) way.   We
might say  that they  effect the  translation of a concept into a linguistic
phenomenon.  For instance, the invisible concept of plurality makes us often
add an "s" to English noun plurals.
     The habituation  system might  function by rules of which the following
would be an example:   "In  the presence  of a  plurality-signal and  in the
absence of  an irregular-plural  signal, an English noun will follow the set
rule to have its plural end in 's.'"
     The neat thing here is that  the process  can be  quite automatic.   We
have  shifted  the  burden  of  conceptuality  out of the VMHTS and into the
perception system.
     If we could devise a "discrete  habituation unit"  (DHU?) we  would not
have to  program into the machine any of the intricate mechanisms needed for
linguistic functioning.  Of course, we don't want here to build a programmed
computer; we  want a  mind like that of an infant.  But we will want to know
exactly what switching-function goes on for any given  operation, linguistic
or not.   We don't want to build a machine whose wonderful function we don't
even understand.
     If we say that conceptual inputs  of  the  invisible  type  are  just a
unitary nodular  line into  the VMHTS,  then we  can begin to search for the
above-mentioned DHU by establishing various  parameters,  such  as  the idea
that  they  should  be  able  to  handle  any human language and any typical
complexity as long as  the DHU's  are present  in sufficient  numbers.  They
have as  single units  such characteristics that their powers are multiplied
as their numbers are multiplied.
     It's a  lot easier  for genetics  to provide  a discrete  unit in large
numbers, than to provide a ready-made mechanism of complex function.

                                                                 30 SEP 1977

     We now  want to  design a "discrete habituation unit" for language.  It
may be impossible or unnecessary to design such  a unit,  but we  want to at
least toy with the idea.  It will be wonderful if we can make a device which
can handle greater complexities by coupling with identical units.
     We can start with the "black-box method" by figuring out the inputs and
outputs.   I guess for the first time in my Nolarbeit I've reached the point
of designing a Turing machine.
     The DHU's of the VMHTS must end up constituting a  system for sentence-
generation,  but  first  they  must  be  able to self-organize in a way that
builds up  that  system  for  sentence-generation.    In  other  words, they
represent two important processes.
     There are two classes of input, which we might for brevity call "nodes"
and "signals."  A "node"  here  is  a  verbal  concept.    A  "signal"  is a
grammatically relevant link from an "invisible quasi-anonymous concept."
     The VMHTS  must learn  to process  the nodes  according to what signals
they are coupled with.  The nodes will be freely  variable, and  the signals
will be  constant and  invariable, except of course that they can be learned
and unlearned.
     It now begins to look as if we don't care how many nodes are coming in,
whether  one  or  a  dozen  more.    Because  a node is just a word, and its
grammatical role is determined by its signal or signals.
     The changes that can be worked upon a node/word are changes with regard
to its  sound-form and  its position  in a sentence.  The sound-form changes
are changes in the so-to-speak  "reins"  or  control-units  of  verbal motor
memory.   In our automaton we might incorporate forty such control-units for
forty discrete sounds.  At any rate, the  verbal motor  control-units are at
the mercy of the VMHTS.  The VMHTS sets them up to work in certain ways, but
it is always at liberty to change those procedures, as  when learning  a new
language.
     So thus  far we  have a handful of nodes for input, forty control-units
for output, and we still have to figure out the role of the signals.
     Now a  node is  already a  set group  of identified  control-units.  In
other  words,  the  node  itself  could  go through verbal motor memory as a
spoken word.  But through the  linguistic VMHTS,  the mind  has a  chance to
manipulate the nodes into language.
     Remember, we're dealing with discrete sounds, not spellings.
     Let's establish notation that nodes are called " " (theta), signals are
called " " (delta), and control-units are called " " (sigma).
     We will allow special signals  to  change  a  node/word  utterly.   For
example, the nodular concept "I" can become expressed as the word "me."
     Note that  we went  to the more difficult problem of language before we
even tackled the simpler problem of the habituation  of words  as strings of
discrete sounds.   Now  it looks as though we'll have to go back to the same
beginnings, because  we'll  have  to  have  a  short-term  memory comparison
system, so  that the  mind can  check itself  against examples  of what it's
trying to achieve.

                              Scratch-Leaf

- Inputs will be nodular words extruded from the association process,  plus 
  invisible-concept signals both relating to the nodular words and governing
  the sentence-generation process.

- Pluralization:

           [Theta]-CAT + [Delta]-pluralization --> [Sigma]-CATS

- Past Tense:

           [Theta]-BLANK + [Delta]-preterite --> [Sigma]-BLANKED
           [Theta]:BLANK + [Delta]:preterite --> [Sigma]:BLANKED.


  + [Delta] \
  + [Theta]  } --> [Lambda]
  + [Beta]  /              [Sigma]

  [Delta]  = signal

  [Theta]  = word/node

  [Beta]   = volition ("boulema")

  [Lambda] = habit pattern (learning)

  [Sigma]  = discrete control-unit for a sound

     Of course, the learned  habit "[lambda]"  has to be in relation to some
perceived or  imagined model,  for which  there must  be an additional input
into the habituation process.
     Therefore [psi]  = the model, or the information which is
                        to be abstracted from each model
                        of the given grammar phenomenon.
     If necessary,  let gamma = a grammar rule as we know it when discussing
it or stating it in English.


                                                                  1.OCT.1977

  [Gamma]  = a grammar rule

  [Psi]    = information from a model

  [Delta]  = signal

  [Theta]  = word/node

  [Beta]   = volition

  [Lambda] = habit pattern (learning)

  [Sigma]  = discrete control-unit for a sound

     The  same  system  which  generates  sentences must be capable of being
operated in reverse so as to understand sentences.
     Recently we were theorizing that the mind understands a sentence, or at
least  a  verb,  by  assigning  associative-tag  bundles  among the concepts
invoked by the words in the sentence.  It was  fine to  do that  for a verb,
but now  we need  to describe how it was done so that we can devise a system
that can learn to handle any facet of grammar.
     Typically you have a grammar  phenomenon  that  is  taking  place  as a
model,  such  as  putting  person-endings  onto  a verb-stem, as in Latin or
English.
     One or more grammar concepts will have to provide the  Delta-signals to
control the lambda-process  of habituating the formation of words containing
any fitting stem plus the proper ending.
     A theta-word is a word in its most storable form.   It is at an address
equivalent  to  its  decoded  composition.    The  address is the word.  The
address has a definite end, which is the last element of the word.
     For example, in our  presently envisioned  automaton, addresses (words)
may  start  with  forty  different  initial letters and then (theoretically)
branch on to forty different second letters, and so on.
     It seems obvious that memory-storage of  words is  double, because they
are  stored  as  unique  addresses  and also within experiential memories of
occurrences of words.
     It is very likely that an address is tagged at the end of its  word, or
perhaps at  the spot  just before  where inflection  would be  put on.  Thus
perhaps an incoming compound word  can  activate  two  tags,  a subordinate,
prefinal one and a main, final one.
     So when a [theta]-word comes in it gains instant access to a conceptual
bundle because its ultimate  element automatically  activates the  tag.  The
non-ultimate elements would have just fallen into place.
     So recognition  of words  goes by ultimate-tag, but how does generation
go?
     Remember, we recently theorized that  selection of a theta-word is done
by a kind of cumulative "voting" of associative tags.
     When we  perceive or  imagine something,  and seek to express the thing
with a word, pre-positioned tags reach out to  activate the  address of that
word and  thereby its conceptual bundle.  Obviously, they only need to go to
the end of that address.
     We are now getting into the  idea  in  today's  scratch-leaf  about the
forty-element  train  or  channel.    Obviously,  an  easy  way  to transmit
internally a complete [theta]-word would be to somehow activate each element
of its address along a channel  having the same forty elements  as can be in
the address.  Of course, the word would go serially through such a "[theta]-
channel."  And naturally it came in from the ears along a similar channel.


                                    A
                                    B
                              A     C
                                    D

                                    A
                                    B
                              B     C
                                    D

                                    A
                                    B
                              C     C
                                    D

                                    A
                                    B
                              D     C
                                    D

     - You can't  skimp any  further here;  you've got to do it like this so
that you will have unique addresses.
     - Some simple trigger such as a "pause-trigger" can  help to  make sure
that the front of each incoming word goes first into the word-memory.
     You know, a word to be spoken is not really a function of incoming-word
memory.  It's really a function  of  the  VMHTS  or  some  memory associated
therewith.
     The foregoing  idea really gives us something to think about.  We don't
want to be pushing  words around  backwards, as  non-biologic hardware might
do.   No, perception memory and motor memory are separate, but they approach
each other inasmuch as the motor memory learns to contain the same  words as
are in perception memory.
     It is  much more likely that a [theta]-channel of words to be generated
would exist  in a motor area  rather than  in a perception area.  So let  us
think of  a manipulable  and  even  programmable  (by habituation)  [theta]-
channel  starting in some kind of static memory  and  stretching through the
habituation system  on out  to the motor musculature  for making  the  forty
sounds.
     A word is a habit.


      Associative Tag
     (coming to a word) --> DMU  -->
                               C
                             |
                            DMU  -->
                               A
                             |
                            DMU  -->
                               T

     Above, "discrete memory units" form the word "cat."

     At  this  stage,  we're  into  pretty  complicated material.  The above
diagram shows how a tag could activate a word-memory and  cause its elements
to move one-by-one down a forty-line theta-channel into verbal motor memory.
But the material is  complicated because  we've got  to figure  out both the
genesis and operation of word-habituation.
     It's very  possible that  the "left" (See diagram of 10SEP1977) side of
the mind becomes aware of individual "sounds" as if they  were concepts, and
that thus each of the forty Sigma-sounds can be known on the left and tagged
over to  the right,  where it  reaches some  agent capable  of uttering that
sound.  Thus the VMHTS can attack a word just by starting quasi-conceptually
with the first distinguishable sound, and by then going on through the whole
word.

                                   Scratch-Leaf

-  Output is [SIGMA]1 to [SIGMA]40.

   Grammatically relevant concepts are [DELTA]'s.

-  We may  have to imagine a channel of forty [SIGMA]-lines going to several
   different places.

          A  _______
          B  _______
          C  _______
          D  _______



-  You know, if the channel into word-memory is a dead  end, then  pushing  
things out backwards will cause them to be going forward again.

   Concerns involving word-habituation:

-  Is infant-like  "random dynamics"  necessary so that the automaton just
grows into the use of its speech-organs?

     Comparison of uttered words and model-words could be  done either  in a
register alongside  short-term memory,  or perhaps  directly inside address-
memory.

                                                            A
               Short-Term                         Address   B
               Memory &                           Memory    C
               Comparator                                   .
                1  2  3                                     .
                C  A  T                                     .
                                                            T


                                                                 2. OCT 1977

     One way to imagine the habituation  is as  follows.   First the random-
dynamics automaton develops quasi-concepts of the forty [SIGMA]-sounds.  (We
say "quasi-concept"  because of  course one  motor sound  is just  a unitary
information, not a concept.)
     Then the  automaton tries to imitate various heard words.  (We'll solve
this volition problem later, you see.)  (If a bird  can do  it, an automaton
can do  it.)  A model verb "reverberates" in short-term memory.  Now, here a
fine distinction must be made.  There are two ways for the  auditory channel
to "hear"  a word:   passively  and actively.   By "passively" I mean on the
left side of the  September  10th  diagram:    by  actual  perception  or by
associative activation  of a  passive memory  (short-term or long-term).  By
"actively" I mean on the right side: by inner motor  generation of  the word
so that it enters the receptive auditory channel on the left side.
     So when  the left  side is repeatedly referring by tag to a model word,
it is not strictly an act of volition, it is an act  of the  natural flow of
associations.
     The foregoing  paragraph is  not intuitively  convincing, but it agrees
with the theory that  the  left  side  is  passive  and  the  right  side is
volitional.  Of course, the theory also says that the volition arises as the
convictional  end-product  of  ratiocination,  which  is   the  free-flowing
interaction of  the concept-nodes  on the left side.  The left side declares
verisimilitude,  which  is  automatically  interpreted  as  volition  by the
bouleumatic accumulator system.
     Anyway, a reverberating word should be a unit with a proper tag over to
the motor system, but if it's just a new model, of course it doesn't  have a
conceptual tag yet, so the "trans-tagging" operation drops to a lower level,
lower in that it tags over to motor  not the  whole word,  but the elemental
quasi-conceptual tags of the constituent [SIGMA]-sounds of the model word.
     Now  we  assume  that  there  is a certain general volitional desire to
learn to say new words.  Each time the model reverberates,  it sends over to
motor a  serial volley of its constituent [SIGMA]-sounds.  These constituent
[SIGMA]-sounds  comprise   a  tentative   chain  or   concatenation  in  the
habituation area,  perhaps even  in a "motor short-term memory."  An impulse
of volition coursing through the tentative  concatenation can  then actually
send  the  [SIGMA]-sounds  into  motor-operation, either spoken or along the
"internal verbal perception line" of the diagram of 10SEP1977.
     Thus the right side responds to a model  by generating  its own attempt
at mimicry.   The  mimicry now comes into the perception side for corrective
comparison with its original model.   I  suppose  we  now  have  a classical
feedback  situation,  or  a  cybernetic  situation,  where  the  goal  is to
eliminate any differences showing up in the mimicry.
     At any rate, we somehow have to have an adjustment process on  the left
side so  that on  the right  side the correct concatenation will be lined up
when the habituator proceeds to "harden" its concatenation.
     Since the automaton is so strictly defined, how could any  errors enter
in?   Well, there is room for error if the low-level process of sending over
a volley of quasi-conceptual [SIGMA]-sounds is a particularly loose process.
Since the  sounds are  going separately, they may lose their proper sequence
during the cross-over, due perhaps  to  varying  lengths  in  the "neuronal"
pathways.
     We must  also keep  in mind that this process is designed as if it were
taking place in a very young child.  The quasi-conceptual  tags may  not yet
have been  accurately formed, or a word that is heard may somehow be garbled
in its newness and strangeness.  But I think the  very possibility  of error
fosters the possibility of perfection.
     Anyway,  when  the  mimicry  comes  back,  there  are  various  ways to
automatically diminish and eliminate error.  One easy  way would  be to keep
the  process  going  over  and  over  until  success  were  indicated by the
activation of an ultimate-tag in the address-memory.
     The trouble  is,  such  a  process  would  not  allow  for intermediate
corrections.    Obviously,  though,  there  should be a corrective mechanism
which starts with the front element in the word and goes through.
     One way to work it would be that, if the  mimicry came  through with at
least the front element correct, there would now be two associations calling
for the send-over of that quasi-conceptual element into  motor, because both
the model and the mimicry would tag the same first element, and likewise any
other elements that came through  correct.    But  if  any  elements  of the
mimicry  were  incorrect,  there  would  not be a double insistence upon the
tagging of each such element.  And we could arrange things so that the model
word reverberated  more frequently,  or perhaps  even that  the mimicry went
through only once and then tended to die out.  Thus correct mimicry elements
would  steer  the  modeling,  but  the strength of the model would gradually
override any incorrect elements of mimicry.
     A partial clash between model  and  mimicry  would  keep  the formative
process going  on until the clash disappeared.  At that point there could be
a  mechanism  such  that   the  habituator   would  "harden"   the  existing
concatenation.   As an  added benefit,  we might  establish that at the same
time the ultimate-tag would  be set  up in  address-memory.   After all, the
address has  to be  pinned down,  too, somehow,  because the  address is the
word.  And thirdly at  the  same  time,  the  conceptual  activation  of the
concept behind  the word  can henceforth evoke an immediate motor production
of the word.
     Thus we end up with the important things  tied together.   The address-
memory is  set up  for instant  decoding of  the heard  word to activate the
concept.   At the  same time,  if conscious  thought requires  it, the motor
system has available a conceptual [theta]-line ready to generate the word in
a volley of motor activation.
     During  this  discussion  I  haven't  really   gone  deeply   into  the
development of  certain things,  such as  the address-memory  and the actual
process of the hardening of the word-habituation system.  Their descriptions
are yet to be fully theorized, but they seem much less complicated than this
whole process of learning the rapid pronunciation of words.
     The neat thing about this theory  is that  it allows  a word  to have a
double  existence,   on  the   left  and   on  the  right  side.    The  two
representations of the word are joined  by a  kind of  concept node,  but at
that juncture  the whole  word does  not flow  back and  forth, but only its
identifier.
     This theory  allows conscious  verbal thought  to be  a motor function,
even though  the concepts  beneath the  words are in the province of passive
memory.  Of course, the flowing  results  of  conscious  motor  thought pass
through the  "internal verbal perception line" and thus become a part of the
historical record in  experiential  memory.    So  consciousness  feeds upon
itself, and  therein lies its power.  It can produce ideas, and then examine
its own ideas in  a lengthy  chain.   This circling  around of  ideas allows
complex logical processes to occur.
     The  same  sort  of  system  which habituates a word ought to habituate
grammar  structures.    However,  grammar  acquisition  is  more complicated
because concepts  of rules are involved rather than just linear data as with
a single word.
     Although an infant has to conceptualize  a lot  of things  utterly from
scratch, I  suspect that a human does not have to figure out for himself the
"invisible quasi-anonymous concepts" (See 29SEP1977) of  grammar, but rather
they are conveyed to him when he learns a traditional human language.
     In  the  beginning  comes  the  word.    The  infant  learns  words  by
habituating  them  into  his  motor  system.     However,   the  grammatical
inflections  and  other  rule-structures  must  initially  present a puzzle,
albeit not consciously.  Because word-endings will go  through weird changes
which are  not part of the basic word contained so precisely in the address-
memory.  But just as words  are conceptualized  because they  are associated
firmly with  bundles of  perception, so  the invisible grammar concepts will
also  develop  in  the  mind  because  the  mind  will  record  that certain
linguistic  phenomena  (such  as  word-endings) are always simultaneous with
certain classifiable or conceptualizable circumstances.


                                                                 3. OCT 1977

     It looks necessary to  describe  how  invisible  grammar  concepts will
develop in  a mind which is acquiring language.  First the mind would become
aware, in some measure, of the existence of a [gamma]-rule because of extra,
"unexplainable" information  involved with language inputs - typically word-
inputs.  For instance,  such extra  information might  be a  different word-
ending for various declension-cases.
     It is  an important idea that such enigmatic extra information actually
sets up the initial node  for  a  [gamma]-concept.    Because  it's  a clear
genesis:    if  you  have  an  enigma  that  has  to  be fit in, establish a
"Sammelpunkt" and let information accrete onto that point.
     We want the concept to come in, but  function somewhere  outside of the
realm of consciousness.
     I  know  that  I  personally  can  sling  inflections  of a new foreign
language around by picturing the written paradigm in my mind.  Of course, my
mind in advance makes a choice of what route to follow in the paradigm.  For
example, my mind automatically identifies a subject as being one  of the six
persons.
     You might  say that  it's a  non-consciously learned skill.  Perhaps it
grows like a crystal upon the  "seed" of  the "enigma-node."   "Enigma-node"
looks like  a good  term to call those extra elements in words which are put
there by grammar rules and puzzle  the mind  which has  not yet  learned the
grammar-rule.
     You know,  I can  see enigma-nodes  for passive  voice operating when a
subject is thought of and immediately thereafter a verb-action to which that
subject is subjected, with or without regard to an agent.  But that's how it
would work to generate sentences; how would it initially work  to comprehend
sentences?
     I am  going to theorize rather riskily now about how the mind sets up a
concept for an enigma-node.  Suppose  someone  walks  up  to  you stretching
forth a  closed fist  and says, "I have my kreds in my hand.  Do you want my
kreds?"  Now, "kreds" is a  nonsense-word that  I just  dreamed up.   Notice
that there's no way to suspect that it's plural or not, except by the "s" at
the end of the word.  Now, when  thinking of  such an  utterance, I  get the
mental image of a hand holding a bunch of small objects about one centimeter
long.  I actually get a couple of different possible images.  So I  am going
to theorize  something pretty  far-out now.   I suggest that a gamma-enigma-
concept is  actually a  kind of  list of  concrete examples  of the concept.
There is  probably a  point in  the development of each such concept where a
particular or group of particulars is suddenly transformed into a universal.
This universalization may perhaps happen (of necessity) in the extreme youth
of the organism, at the time when speech  is first  being acquired.   (After
all, isn't  there a rumor that children prevented from acquiring speech by a
certain age lose the  ability to  acquire speech?)   My  theory wants  it to
happen  in  the  youth  because  that  is  near or at the time when even the
concrete, non-universal, particular reality is first being perceived.   (You
know, we  never really  become infallible at recognizing members of a class,
anyway.)  Of course, the concept  may be  updated by  newer associations, as
long as the string of associations remains unbroken back to an origin.
     This theory  of invisible  concepts has  something to  do with an older
theory of mine, which I call the theory  of "virtuality."   If consciousness
can be  thought of  as a kind of whirling illusion where we never get to see
between the elemental components of our conscious processes, then we can say
that  we  are  perceiving  an  entity,  consciousness, by "virtuality."  For
example, the cinema shows  motion  only  by  virtuality.    Likewise,  if an
enigma-concept is a list of speedily consultable concrete examples, then the
mind can whiz through them at a speed so fast that they  blur into  a multi-
dimensional thing, a concept rather than a mere ordinary fact.
     After all, another definition of a concept is that a concept is what we
make of it.  If we use our enigma-concept of plurality to  act as  though we
are dealing with plural items, then the enigma-node has served its purpose.
     Our train  of thought  "skims" over  its concepts and uses them only to
the extent necessary to keep the train going.   If  called upon  to define a
concept, it stops and does verbally the best it can.
     Likewise  enigma  concepts  should  develop  for  "subject of verb" and
"direct object of verb."
     Rather  than  designing  every  conceivable  grammar  concept  into the
automaton, or  even figuring out how the machine itself would do it, I would
rather decide what I think is the general  process and  then just  watch the
machine do it.
     So we  have decided to just let the enigma-concepts develop in a freely
associative process based upon virtuality.  We can now go on to  discuss how
the  enigma  nodes  (or  gamma-nodes)  would  function  with  respect to the
grammar-habituation system.
     We theorize that a [gamma]-node sends a [DELTA]-line into the sentence-
generation  area  to  influence  the  generation  of sentences and make them
grammatical.
     We theorize that individual,  unaltered  words  are  evoked  from motor
memory by a [theta]-line.

                                                              (4. OCT. 1977)

     One part  of our  theory, which  we intuited  in Goettingen in 1972, is
that sentence-generation probably proceeds from a  single node/word.   Sure,
we have  Chomskian transformations  that we  can perform, but generating any
such sentence has probably got to be  like  yanking  on  a  string,  and the
yanked end  of the string is the concept/word which first comes to mind just
before we willy-nilly generate a sentence about it.  I suppose this idea has
to  do  with  [DELTA]-control  over  word-order.   If I'm going to develop a
theory of the habituation of grammar, I want  it to  be able  to handle even
the  most  complicated  grammar  structures,  and  word  order  seems  quite
complicated.
     In German there are  such strict  patterns of  word-order, depending on
what kind  of word  (by usage)  you choose to utter first.  So I guess there
are word-usage deltas and word-order deltas.
     I think there should be a hierarchy of at least three delta-lines going
into the VMHTS.

     S[delta]  =  part-of-speech delta

     I[delta]  =  irregularity delta

     U[delta]  =  usage delta.

     It looks  as though  the part-of-speech  deltas (S[delta])  will be the
ones which govern syntax.  One way to  do it  would be  to have  the machine
gradually learn  what other  S-deltas it  can add on when once it has seized
upon an initial S-delta.  This idea corresponds to our  pullstring theory of
sentence-generation.
     Questions  of   tense  will   probably  be   answered  by  usage-deltas
(U[delta]).  There can be a separate gamma-concept not just  for each tense,
but also  for each  mode of  expression of  a tense.   For example, note the
following two sentences.
          "John slept eight hours."
          "John was sleeping."
Each sentence seems to look at the action of the verb in a different aspect.
     You know, tense-deltas might really be  shared between  the subject and
the verb.
     I can  see how the concept of the ongoing, imperfect English verb might
call right away for a form of the verb "to be" plus a present  participle of
the  main  intended  action-verb.    Such  an  ongoing  verb  is  a  kind of
protracted-status verb.
     There may be a kind of gamma-concept which has to attach itself  to two
different  words  because  of  an  important  relationship between those two
words.  For instance, take a  gamma-concept  of  tense  between  subject and
verb, or a gamma-concept of the relationship between verb and direct-object.
     We might  even have  to say that all gamma-relationship between subject
and verb is expressed simultaneously with tense.  After all, if there has to
be a  relationship, and  tense will  always be  there, why  not just use the
tense-relationship by itself?

          S[delta]

          I[delta]

          U[delta]

     The U-delta (for usage)  just shows  specific modifications  of a word,
such  as  "s"  for  plural,  "ed"  for  past  tense,  and  "ing" for present
participle.  It  could  show  "er"  for  comparative  degree  and  "est" for
superlative.
     The  I-delta  (for  irregularity)  could  be  used to override a normal
process in favor of a required irregular process, such as when the plural of
"child" goes to "children."
     The S-delta (for part of speech) actually must organize the whole show.
The place of a word in syntax will  depend upon  what part  of speech  it is
functioning as.
     The  initial   push  to   generate  a   sentence  will  come  when  the
consciousness seizes upon a salient concept and associates a word.  In order
to pass into the VMHTS to start generating a sentence, the salient word/node
will first have to pass through a kind of screen  set up  by the habituation
of the S-deltas in the VMHTS.
     The S-delta-screen  would allow only certain parts of speech to start a
sentence.  I'm having trouble right now trying to think  of an  English part
of speech that thus would not be allowed to start a sentence, and I can only
cite that we rarely start a declarative sentence with a verb.   Sometimes we
say things like:  "Running!  He's running!"
     Whatever  part  of  speech  the  mind did successfully start with for a
sentence, the VMHTS would then have only certain  allowable continuances for
each part of speech used as an initial word.
     Now, one  way to  imagine the process after an initial word would be to
picture  a  whole   group   of   node-words   making   themselves  available
simultaneously  to  the  VMHTS.    Remember  that  some of them perhaps have
certain relationships already decreed by their gamma-concept.   At any rate,
the VMHTS  would tend  to take  those node-words most closely related to the
initial word, until it reached a juncture of fresh choice.  Then there could
perhaps be  a play-off  between certain  general syntactical expectations of
the VMHTS on the  one hand,  and associatively  available node-words  on the
other hand.   As  long as  associativity kept offering up the right [theta]-
words by  part of  speech, the  VMHTS would  not object.   But  if a somehow
unallowable  word  were  proferred,  the  VMHTS  might  stop and wait for an
allowable word.    Thus  randomness  and  habit  could  operate  together to
generate sentences.
     Eventually   we're   going   to   have   to  come  to  terms  with  the
transformational grammar which arose around 1957.


                                                                10. OCT 1977

     F[delta], I[delta], M[delta]

     F[delta]  =  "function delta"

               =  functions or usages of a [THETA]-word in a  sentence, such
                  as:

                         - subject of verb
                         - (main) verb
                         - direct object of verb
                         - indirect object of verb
               =         - preposition hinging from another word
                         - object of preposition
                         - adverb
                         - adjective
                         - modifier of  the whole sentence, e.g.,           
                           "fortunately"
                         - conjunction between words.

     M[delta]  =  "modification-delta"

               =  modifications or changes that can happen to a [theta]-word
                  irregardless of  its function or usage in a sentence, such
                  as:
                         - singularity/plurality
                         - degree of comparison of adjectives.


Artificial Intelligence                                         11. OCT 1977

     Let's try  again to  establish the  basic rules  for the  inputs to the
habituated mechanism for grammar.
          1.  Function-deltas can control modification-deltas and perhaps
              also [theta]-words.
          2.  Modification-deltas can modify [theta]-words, usually         
              according to a habituated pattern contained in the VMHTS.
          3.  Irregularity-deltas can override a normal modification-pattern
              so as to modify a special [theta]-word in a special way.
          4.  A VMHTS-[lambda] (VMHTS-lambda) can  control function-deltas -
              for example, by arranging them in syntax.
          5.  Conscious volition can, theoretically, override and overrule
              everything in this discussion.
     Today's work, developed between late last night and  this afternoon, is
quite exciting to me because it presages the completion, on a certain level,
of the theoretical design  of  the  basic  modules  to  be  contained  in my
artificially intelligent  automaton.   I think now I should start heading my
papers with the words "Artificial Intelligence" rather than  "Nolarbeit," my
old, personal word stemming from teen-age years.
     Just  by  establishing  the  controlling inputs to the grammar-VMHTS, I
have made it easy to specify the inner workings.  The next step will then be
to  describe  the  habituation  process  itself,  but  that shouldn't be too
difficult, because  I  have  already  described  a  habituation  process for
[theta]-words.
     It looks  as though  I have a broad enough process being developed that
it will be able to handle many, if not all, human languages.   For instance,
I have  kept Latin  in mind  as a  highly inflected language, because I know
that English has some few, but  highly essential,  inflections.   In a Latin
declension-paradigm  for  a  noun  or  adjective,  modification-deltas would
select the proper case.  Of course, a  modification-delta could  have chosen
which of the five declensions to use for endings.
     Of course,  there is  no such thing in my theory as a "language-delta,"
but  we  could  say  that  a  "language-lambda"  applies  the  proper syntax
depending upon which language the speaker is using.  For instance, among the
five languages which I claim to know well, I have to use  different syntaxes
and different declension-paradigms for Latin, Russian, Greek, and German.  I
feel like I am "in" a language when  I am  using that  language to  think or
speak.
     So  if  a  person  knows  several  languages,  there  could be separate
"language-lambdas"  in  the  VMHTS  to  facilitate  speaking  each language.
Theoretically,  address-memory,  reality-concepts  and function-deltas would
work the same way for multiple languages in one mind.  (The Chomskians would
refer to "deep structure" here.)
     You know,  I find  it initially  a puzzle as to how we keep our flowing
words within the same language when we know  several languages.   I  get the
idea that it must be because of separate address-memories for the vocabulary
of  each  separate  language.    As   a  concept   in  my   mind  approaches
verbalization, perhaps  it goes to five different [theta]-nodes, but perhaps
the mind is able to keep the link-up  going to  node/words only  of the same
language.

                                          (sentence-delta)
         /-----------------S[delta] --------------------------------------->
         |
         |
         |
         |                                (function-delta)
         |       /---------F[delta] --------------------------------------->
         |       |
         |       |
         |       |
         |       |                        (modification-delta)
         |       |    /--- M[delta] --------------------------------------->
         |       |    |
         |       |    |
         |       |    |
         |       |    \---                (theta-word)
         |       \-------- [THETA] ---------------------------------------->
         \----------------

     There may have to be another control-line going from associativity into
the VMHTS:  a "sentence-delta"  (S[delta]),  which  would  direct operations
governing a sentence as a whole, as for instance whether a sentence is going
to be a statement, a question, a command,  or a  wish.   I had  thought that
eventually I  would have  to get around to dealing with the class of English
question-words, but I guess  it would  suffice to  posit a  whole "sentence-
delta"  to  deal  with  question-words  and such things as little words with
which languages like Polish and Japanese indicate questions.
     It bothers me a little to be gathering together so  many control-lines,
but I  guess they all are necessary to represent functions of the intellect.
The VMHTS itself does not select  concept-nodes, it  just arranges  them for
communication.
     Obviously, I  have heaped  a lot of the burden of sentence-generativity
into the associativity area.   That  is  to  say,  my  machine  can generate
sentences if concepts can activate the various control-nodes and word-nodes.
     I suppose we may feel free to go ahead in a rather unrestrained fashion
if we do the following.  Once we have determined exactly what inputs we will
allow,  we can  go  ahead  and  design  a  VMHTS capable of habituating  any
structure based on those inputs.  That way the VMHTS should be able to learn
most or  all human  languages, and  we will avoid built-in programming, as I
discussed in the work of 29SEP1977.


               Habituating a Sentence of Subject-Verb-Object

S[delta] ---------------------> declarative sentence

Let's say, "Maria amat Italiam."
             _
            /  S[delta]       ---> declarative sentence:    (a) certain word
           /                                                order(s)
          /                                                 subject  of verb
         /                                                  = nominative
Maria   <      F[delta]       ---> subject of verb:  nominative case
         \     M[delta]       ---> singular number
          \_   [theta]-word   ---> Maria:  first declension
             _
            /  S[delta]       ---> declarative sentence:  indicative mood
           /   F[delta]       --->   /  main verb
          /                          \  transitive
         /                           /  active voice
amat    <                           /   present tense
         \     M[delta]       ---> <    singular number
          \                         \   third person
           \_  [theta]-word   ---> amare (infinitive):  first conjugation
           _
          /    S[delta]       ---> declarative sentence
         /     F[delta]       ---> direct object of verb:  accusative case
Italiam <      M[delta]       ---> singular number
         \_    [theta]-word   ---> Italia:  first declension.


     One of the first problems of the VMHTS for a  Latin noun  as a [theta]-
word is  to get  at what declension it belongs to.  A language will not have
very many declensions, and obviously the forms of their endings  will reside
within the memory of the VMHTS.
     My  initial  dilemma  involves  whether  to  have  the  declension-clue
contained  within  the  [theta]-word  itself,  or  to  require   a  specific
communication to the VMHTS of which declension is involved.
     You could  perhaps tell  which declension were involved if the [theta]-
nodes dealt with genitive singular forms, because they  distinguish the five
Latin declensions,  except that the second and fifth declensions both end in
"i" in the genitive singular.
     I think we must  recognize  a  general  principle  that,  if  the VMHTS
habituates such a large array as a declension, then there really ought to be
at least some kind of modification-delta to reference  that array.   Now, we
already theorize  that the  cases in  any declension  will be  summoned by a
function-delta.
     No, as I was thinking further  about the  dilemma, I  realized that the
answer might lie in a third possibility.  The Latin noun "miles, militis" is
an example of a Latin noun where you can't get  either of  the nominative or
genitive from  the other.   But if you have both, you are clearly on the way
to declining a noun of the third Latin declension.
     Remember, whatever forms you  have going  out, have  to be recognizable
coming in.


Nolarbeit                                                       13. OCT 1977

                     Habituating Inflected Noun-Declensions

     A quandary has recently developed as to how the VMHTS ought to identify
the appropriate declension for a Latin noun.  Fortunately, we can attack the
problem by  looking at  its quasi-mirror-reflection in the address-memory of
the passive left side of the automaton.
     We  can  imagine  a  way  by  which  the   address-memory  could  quite
efficiently handle  an incoming  inflected Latin noun.  Under this idea, the
address-memory could have two different ultimate-tags for a Latin noun, such
as  "miles."    The  first  ultimate-tag  could,  if necessary, identify the
nominative form of a conceptual noun.  The other ultimate-tag would identify
the basic  stem of  the noun,  onto which  case-endings are  attached.  Thus
there could be one ultimate-tag for "m-i-l-e-s" and another for "m-i-l-i-t-"
as the  stem of  the genitive  form "militis."  There would have to be these
two separate ultimate-tags  if  the  stem  were  not  fully  present  in the
nominative, or were in an altered form.
     The nifty  value of  such a system lies in what we can then do with the
letters (sounds) remaining after the stem of a noun.  The activation  of the
ultimate-tag of  a stem  could cause the remaining sounds to go quickly back
to the  entry channel  into the  address-memory, so  that these case-endings
could now  themselves be  identified as to what case and function-delta they
represent.
     A major question now is, would such case-endings have to  be sorted out
as to  which of  the five declensions they belonged to?  Such sorting could,
of course, be done,  especially if  there were  some kind  of enigma-node or
modification-delta  to  link  each  concept-noun  permanently  to its proper
declension.  We don't  want  nouns  like  "servi,"  "militi,"  and  "rei" to
interfere with one another.
     I think  we should  keep in mind that the passive address-memory is one
of the most "cross-wired" and thoroughly  organized systems  in the putative
automaton.   There could be all kinds of gates established adjacent to it to
sort out classes of data, such as ending-groups for noun declensions.
     The various declension-endings would be brief  groups of [SIGMA]-sounds
lying pretty  near to  the entrance  to the address-memory channel.  (I just
got an idea:  What if we made the reverberating short-term memory a function
of  the  address-memory  channel?)    Their ultimate-tags could be logically
gated in conjunction with the declension-identifying  modification-deltas so
as to  associate the  proper function-deltas.  Now, there might have to be a
kind of system-wide notification-device in the address-memory to signal that
these declension-ending ultimate-tags are really secondary ultimate-tags.


                                                                 16 MAR 1978

               -O -- O -- O-
             /               \
            O    O - O - O    O
           /    /         \    \
          O    O     O     O    O
         /    /    O   O    \    \
        /    O   O       O   O    \
        |   /  O           O  \   |
        O  O  O             O  O  O
        |  |  |             |  |  |
        O  O  O             O  O  O
        |  |  |             |  |  |
        O  O  O             O  O  O                                /----(B)
        |  |  |             |  |  |                               |
        O  O  O             O  O  O                /------(B)-----+-----(I)
        |  |  |             |  |  |               |               |
        O  O  O             O  O  O               |                \----(U)
        |  |  |             |  |  |               |
        O  O  O             O  O  O               |                /----(B)
        |  |  |             |  |  |               |               |
        O  O  O             O  O  O     (B)-------+-------(I)-----+-----(I)
        |  |  |             |  |  |      |        |               |
        O  O  O             O  O  O      |        |                \----(U)
        |  |  |             |  |  |      |        |
        O  O  O             O  O  O      |        |                /----(B)
        |  |  |             |  |  |      |        |               |
        O  O  O             O  O  O      |         \------(U)-----+-----(I)
                           /  /  /       |                        |
                          O  /  /        |                         \----(U)
                         /  O  /         |
                        O  /  O          |                         /----(B)
                          /  /           |                        |
                         O  /            |         /------(B)-----+-----(I)
                           /             |        |               |
                          O              |        |                \----(U)
                                         |        |
  B  O-----------------------------------/        |                /----(B)
                                                  |               |
  I  O----------------------------------(I)-------+-------(I)-----+-----(I)
                                                  |               |
  U  O-----------------------------------\        |                \----(U)
                                         |        |
                                         |        |                /----(B)
                                         |        |               |
                                         |         \------(U)-----+-----(I)
                                         |                        |
                                         |                         \----(U)
                                         |
                                         |                         /----(B)
                                         |                        |
                                         |         /------(B)-----+-----(I)
                                         |        |               |
                                         |        |                \----(U)
                                         |        |
                                         |        |                /----(B)
                                         |        |               |
                                        (U)-------+-------(I)-----+-----(I)
                                                  |               |
                                                  |                \----(U)
                                                  |
                                                  |                /----(B)
                                                  |               |
                                                   \------(U)-----+-----(I)
                                                                  |
                                                                   \----(U)


                    Ideas to go with today's diagramming

     - There should  be lots  of auditory  short-term memory loops, and they
should exist in a kind of associative grid or network where each  loop has a
kind of attention-valence.  I've been puzzling over this problem for several
months, and now I think I see my way clear.
     Let me restate the  problem.    In  September  1977  I  had  worked out
hypothetically how language-words would enter the mature mind and succumb to
immediate decoding  through the  conceptual address  nodes.   It was obvious
that  words,  phrases,  and  even  whole  sentences would have to be able to
circulate in a short-term memory so that the brain would have the option and
capability of  submitting any  coded aggregate multiple times to the "front"
end of the conceptual address decoder.  Whenever the mind  perceived a break
at the end of an aggregate (word), it would automatically submit any ensuing
code to the front, on the assumption that  a new  word is  beginning.  Well,
one important  value to short-term memory circulation lay in the idea that a
word which was garbled  the first  time through  could be  resubmitted after
looping  through  short-term  memory.    Likewise  a  compound word could be
submitted slowly and deliberately,  in  hopes  that  the  conceptual decoder
would  glean  secondary  or  tertiary  meanings  from  the  elements  of the
compound.  By now one can imagine a line of poetry going  through many times
with all  kinds of  remote associations  coming out.   The problem was, what
would be the nature of the auditory short-term memory?  Would it be a really
long channel in which the oldest traces would constantly be dissolving?  Now
I think not.
     The solution  which I  have just  perceived this  evening is  to have a
whole "family"  of short-term  memory loops.  Their breadth would be that of
how many phonemes are within the language of the mind.   Their  length would
be some  apparently arbitrary  length depending on how long an utterance the
mind would be expected to remember all at once.   This length-question poses
no special  problem.   All we  have to  do is design it long enough to cover
those sentence-lengths that a  human  can  normally  remember  in short-term
memory.   I'm sure  that it  is an empirically available statistic, and many
conventional psychologists have probably worked on determining just what the
length is.   This  situation is just another case where our fullblown design
would be in accordance with the  human reality,  while our  prototype design
would be some severely limited simulation.
     But to  go on  with today's  solution.  There would be a typical short-
term memory loop of arbitrary length.   The  mind would  have a  "family" of
many of  these loops.  Now we get to a part of the description which is very
pleasing to the would-be designer.  We will say that the artificial mind has
to have  a "liminal" number of such loops, but above the liminal number more
loops just  make the  mind more  powerful -  if you  will, more intelligent.
That  feature  is  pleasing  to  the designer because it establishes an area
where he can plan to add more loops as permitted  by such  resources as time
and money.
     Now how  does the  family of loops operate?  Let's say there are thirty
loops.  Empty or "faded" loops have an automatic tendency to line  up at the
auditory  input  port  to  onload any next-arriving coded utterance, whether
from the outside world or from an interior thought-line.  Therefore there is
a kind  of "distributor"  which holds loops ready in queue to receive loads.
One after another the queued loops take on  loads.   A loaded  loop detaches
from the  reception-queue.   The family of loaded loops must exist on a kind
of "valence-topology."  By this I mean that there will always be one loaded-
loop  most  ready  to  recirculate  its load through the conceptual decoder.
Each loaded loop has a recirculation-valence derived from such things as the
perceived importance  of the  utterance, or  its novelty/shock value, or its
associability to circumambient thought  and experience.   This associability
notion is  pretty serious,  and I  should not  just blithely  claim it.  But
there could easily be temporary association lines as follows.  They would go
from the conceptual decoder to any qualifying one of the, say, thirty short-
term memory loops.  Any noun, any concept,  could be  temporarily linked (in
the short  term) between the concept-decoder and that short-term memory loop
in which the noun or concept occurred.  Say, we  could even  use this method
to keep  track of  the antecedents  of pronouns.   Anyway,  key words or key
concepts could  serve  associatively  to  bind  together  freshly remembered
utterances in the family of short-term memory loops.
     This same  associativity might  somehow play  a role  in the passage of
information out of short-term  memory into  long-term permanent  memory.  Of
course,  we  don't  usually  remember  statements  verbatim in our long-term
memory.  Therefore, an addition to permanent memory is more like the factual
alteration of  a large  corpus of belief or knowledge.  Memory of the events
in passage of time, instead of  being a  corpus, can  probably be  more of a
stringing effect,  where minutiae  of memory  are held  together by a serial
associative   string.      Yes,   we   could   establish   something  called
"chronomnemics" to  deal specifically  with this  operation of the stringing
together of memory-minutiae in temporal succession.
     Let us return to the family of  loops.    There  would  be  built  in a
tendency over  time for a loop to lose its load and return to the reception-
queue.  Such fade-out would occur if the load of any loop  is not refreshed.
Now, a decision has to be made here as to whether refreshment means that the
same  loop  with  the  same  contents  is  enhanced,  or  whether  just  the
information itself is enhanced by flowing into one or more additional loops.
     It  looks  to  me  as  though  refreshment  ("rehearsal") occurs by the
process of a memory going from one loop  into  a  new  loop.    Thus,  if we
refresh an utterance over and over in our mind, each time it would fill up a
new loop, so that gradually a whole group of loops could become  loaded with
the same  informational content.   Of course, this chosen process allows for
and  makes  possible  changes  such  as  conscious  alteration  or  gradual,
unconscious distortion.


                                                                 17 MAR 1978
      ___   ___   ___   ___   ___   ___   ___
     |   | |   | |   | |   | |   | |   | |   |
     | S | | T | | M | | L | |   | |   | |   |
     | H | | E | | E | | O | |   | |   | |   |
     | O | | R | | M | | O | |   | |   | |   |
     | R | | M | | O | | P | |   | |   | |   |                        ____
     | T | |   | | R | | S | |   | |   | |   |                   ____/    |
     |   | |   | | Y | |   | |   | |   | |   |              ____/         |
     |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___|         ____/              |
      |||   |||   |||   |||   |||   |||   |||     ____/                   |
  _   |||   |||   |||   |||   |||   |||   |||    /         CONCEPTUAL     |
 |_|--((+---((+---((+---((+---((+---((+---((+---|                         |
 |_|--(+----(+----(+----(+----(+----(+----(+----|          ADDRESS        |
 |_|--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----|                         |
                                                 \____     DECODER        |
                                                      \____               |
                                                           \____          |
                                                                \____     |
                                                                     \____|

                                                                 17 MAR 1978

     There can  be no will without knowledge of the options available to the
will.  So  we  can  perceive  of  the  will,  for  one  thing,  as  having a
representation of  all the  available options.   Now, the will does not just
slide over a field governing all the individual  muscles.   Rather, the will
probably floats over a quasi-surface of very numerous nodes, where each node
can represent a conceptualized, habituated action consisting of  a string of
many activations of individual muscles.  There might be a node for reaching,
for bicycle-riding, for jumping, and  so  on.    Yet  the  will  can  not be
disassociated from its available options.
     We perceive  of the will as a motor function.  It has at least two main
subdivisions:  muscular sequence activation and verbal thought.
     One method would be to establish  a special  association-accumulator to
be known  as a  volition register.   The  volition register  would be like a
cylindrical pole having on itself nodes which would constantly be  trying to
initiate mental activity.  Instincts, bodily appetites, conscious plans, and
so on, could be represented on the volition register.  Each node  could have
a kind  of priority-valence  which would  determine how  frequently the node
fired out a demand for initiatory action.  For instance, as an  organism got
hungrier  and   hungrier,  the   appetite-node  would  fire  more  and  more
frequently.
     Of course, the above paragraph does not describe  a complete  will.  It
just describes  a mechanism  for focussing  the will.   Now  I would like to
suggest a quasi-two-dimensional bouleumatic accumulator system  for enabling
the  deliberate  execution  of  action  demanded  by  a node on the volition
register.
     On the volition register, the node of presently  highest priority would
become coupled  to a "volitional accumulator."  This volitional accumulator,
"VA," would accept both positive and  negative  inputs  in  a  process where
positive  accumulation  to  a  certain  satiety-point  would  actually cause
initiation of the action.  Thus  a decision-process  is stretched  over time
and  the  whole  mind  gets  to  watch and affect the decision taking shape.
Indeed we probably only need one such VA to serve as the seat of the will in
the  mind.    How  the  positive  and  negative  inputs arise is a different
question.  However, they would  be  the  result  of  the  processing  of all
available  related   knowledge  (belief).     We  could  say  that  positive
accumulation  in  the  VA  is  automatic  unless  contravened   by  negative
accumulation.   Now here's  a trick.   Negative accumulation could simply be
defined as any protracted, prolonged fetching  of related  associations.  In
other words,  we're not  really value-judging the inputs.  We're decreeing a
positive process which will just run its course unless you  stop it.   We're
saying that  any pause  to reflect is automatically negative.  After all, if
you haven't thought through the relevant  data, you  can't make  an informed
decision.


                                                                 18 MAR 1978

     To continue  with yesterday's  discussion of the mental will, so far we
have the Volition Register (VR) and the Volition Accumulator (VA).
     Every habituated muscle sequence  is a  potential target  of the mental
will.  Each sequence was developed with respect to a purpose.  Such purposes
can be very generalized, even though the action sequences are very specific.
For instance,  walking is  a very specific action sequence, but the purposes
for walking  can  be  infinitely  various.    So  a  purpose  can  be rather
conceptual and  abstract.   However, I  tend to  imagine a  purpose as being
analogous to  a  kind  of  osmotic  pressure.    That  visualization  is why
yesterday I  established the  notion of a Volition Register.  It was easy to
imagine bodily appetites and  instincts finding  their way  to expression on
the volition  register.   After all,  they can be genetically "hardwired" as
such.  It is harder to  figure  out  how  conscious  plans  would  reach the
Volition Register.
     One domain  that might  lend itself  to figuring  out is that of mental
curiosity.  I likened a purpose to osmotic pressure.  Well, I  can imagine a
quasi-osmotic  pressure  of  incomplete  information resulting in curiosity.
For instance, an organism perceives a container and immediately wonders what
is  inside  the  container.    Or,  better  yet,  the organism experiences a
physical blow or push  and immediately  wonders as  to the  causation of the
action.   Yes, causation  provides a  good source  for the disequilibrium of
curiosity.  It could be either  designed or  taught into  an artificial mind
that  it  should  generally  seek  to  discover  the  immediate causation of
perceived consequences.
     Now, how do we conceptualize causation-curiosity?  It is interesting to
note  that  with  humans  causation-curiosity  often  extends only a limited
number of steps off into murky terra incognita.   It  takes great physicists
like Einstein and Heisenberg to really pursue matters all the way unto first
principles.
     Having stopped and thought, I get this idea:  The desire to  discover a
cause for a consequence is basically the desire to find something with which
to associate a consequence.
     When a phenomenon presents  itself to  a mind,  I can  imagine the mind
querying  itself  as  to  logical  associations.    The  causation-curiosity
phenomenon could be quasi-two-dimensional  in the  following way.   The mind
perceiving  a  consequence  would,  on  the one hand, be seeking any logical
association to the consequence.  On the other  hand, the  mind would perhaps
have learned  to bring  in and  apply the concept of the immediate past as a
second dimension to its  search for  anything associated  with the perceived
consequence.   Thus I  imagine a  kind of  two-arrowed vectoring.   The mind
experiences two disequilibria in looking both for something  related and for
something immediately past.
     I often  have the  hunch that many mental phenomena are exponential and
nonlinear in the way just described.
     Now, these disequilibria of search are probably something to be handled
by  a  general  mechanism  of  associativity.    The  idea  goes as follows.
Percepts are to be synthesized into units as  much as  possible.   Then they
can be  handled by  unitary tags.  The General Associativity Mechanism (GAM)
has hold of tags governing unitary percepts laid down in memory.  Any memory
track would  have a GAM connected with it for the very purpose of organizing
the contents of  the  memory  track.    Associative  GAM-tags,  if activated
backwards to  the engram,  cause the memory percept to flow back through the
perception  channel.     During   flowback,  opportunity   arises  for  many
subassociations to  come into play.  Thus a single GAM-tag can fetch a bulky
memory aggregate,  but during  flowback the  aggregate can  be analyzed with
particular subassociations being looked for or expected.
     Now,  it  can  somehow  be  the  design  of the GAM to have a logically
compulsive need to associate  a perceived  consequence along  the two above-
mentioned vectors.   It  is easy  to imagine  the physical reality of such a
compulsion.  There would be, so to speak, three registers with which the GAM
would operate.  The Percept Register (PR) would contain momentarily the GAM-
tag,  or  even  many  subtags,  of  the  unitarily  perceived  happening  or
consequence.    The  Percept  Register  would  simultaneously hold a kind of
Substantiality Index (SI) or measure (SIM?)  relating to  and indicating the
degree of  logical complexity  and substantiality  inherent in the aggregate
percept momentarily being registered in the Percept Register.
     Secondly, the Lateral  Associand  Register  (LAR)  would  be  under the
above-mentioned quasi-osmotic pressure to come up with something that can be
associated with the contents of the Percept Register.  The pressure would be
towards  arriving  at  an  equilibrium  of  the Substantiality Index Measure
(SIM), there being an SIM connected with the  Percept Register  and also one
connected with the Lateral Associand Register.
     This compulsion  system would not require equality to exist between the
SIMs.  However, it  would require  significant correlation.   (I  don't mean
"correlation"  in  the  strict  statistical  sense.)    Now,  here  is where
volitional motivation comes in.  To whatever extent  the SIM  of the Lateral
Associand Register did not measure up to the presumably high value obtaining
in the SIM of the Percept Register, to that compulsive extent the  GAM would
send out  a signal  to a  node on  the Volition  Register, where in turn the
valenced or prioritized node would demand that attention be directed towards
discovering some  second phenomenon which could be logically associated with
the aggregate percept momentarily being registered in the  Percept Register.
Voila,  a  desire  to  know  something  has  been created and expressed as a
motivation of the system,  all done  with switching  circuits, quasi-osmotic
pressures, and the disequilibria of index measures.
     I have  not forgotten  the third  register in the GAM.  It would be the
Temporal Associand Register  (TAR),  and  it  would  constitute  that second
vector, which,  together with  the first vector of the LAR, would create the
exponential phenomenon of causation-curiosity.   The  TAR would  also have a
Substantiality Index  Measure (SIM),  and the compulsive need for it to rise
in value to meet the PR-SIM, just as the LAR-SIM is trying  to do,  would be
expressed as an analog signal to the Volition Register.
     Now, I haven't stated whether the TAR-SIM signal and the LAR-SIM signal
would go separately or jointly to the Volition  Register.   I would  like to
theorize them  as going to the same VR-node with a summation-effect upon the
priority or valence of the node.  After all, the  two signals  come from the
same GAM.
     We could  now have  a homeostatic effect.  Once the causation-curiosity
node achieves release-priority on the Volition  Register, then  the Volition
Accumulator (as  theorized yesterday) couples to the operant node and starts
accumulating towards a go-ahead signal for initiating action.   But  in this
case, what  action is to be initiated?  According to yesterday's theory, the
action to be initiated has to be already  expressed and  ready to  go at the
competent node  on the Volition Register.  The Volition Accumulator isn't an
enabling bridge; it's a firing mechanism.  So far in today's written thought
all we  have done  is bring a desire for causation-knowledge to the Volition
Register.
     A curiosity-GAM must therefore probably bring even more to the Volition
Register.    I  can  theorize  the  process as follows.  Perception GAMS are
obviously on the passive side of the mind, even though  we are  here and now
designing initiatory  mechanisms into them.  On the active side of the mind,
along with  muscle-sequences as  for walking,  there must  also be something
that we could call an Associative Motor Attention Mechanism (AMAM).  Just as
there would  be a  separate GAM  for each  perception track,  so there would
probably arise  a separate AMAM to correspond to each perception GAM.  There
would be an Associative  Motor  Attention  Mechanism  for  hearing,  one for
seeing,  one  for  each  sense.    Now,  each  perception-GAM  could have an
associative link to its corresponding AMAM in such a way that the AMAM would
be dynamically  represented conjunctively  with the causation-curiosity node
at the Volition Register.
     Now, after coupling but before go-ahead, the Volition Accumulator (here
is a  new part  of the  theory) would cause non-volitional, memory-only-type
associative impulses to flow through the involved parts  of the  Motor Habit
Tagging System (see diagram 10 SEP 1977).  In other words, the mind would be
pre-thinking whatever motor actions it were  thinking of  taking.   The pre-
thought of  each motor  action would  flow through consciousness, giving the
system its opportunity to  object  negatively  to  any  contemplated action.
Remember,   yesterday's   theory   says  that  any  prolonged  associational
occupation with the contemplated action automatically constitutes inhibition
or  interdiction  within  the  Volition  Accumulator.    However,  there can
obviously rage a battle  royal within  the mind,  where the  insistence of a
demand-node on  the Volition Register can keep forcing the issue, within the
Volition Accumulator, of a motor proposal  to which  the general associative
consciousness prolongedly  raises objections.  Thus we have a picture of how
a mind might engage in intense,  drawn-out deliberation  while contemplating
an  action.    We  can  see  how the Volition Accumulator becomes almost the
physical seat of consciousness and will,  because it  is within  the VA that
the  action-release-potential   waxes  and   wanes.    Truthfully,  however,
consciousness and the will are  spread  out  to  wherever  free associations
reverberate in the reaches of the mind.
     During  today's  written  discussion  I  have  formulated the idea that
specific motor sequences might be  linked  specifically  to  certain passive
memory  networks.    The  ontogenesis  of  such  links  would  probably be a
situation of side-by-side development.  After all, motor sequences had to be
tailored to  fit initial purposes.  So the thread of reference proceeds from
initial purposes down through subsequent purposes and applications.
     Come to think of  it, motor  attention-getting mechanisms  as described
today could  be the general key to remembering and bringing to bear even the
most general-purpose motor sequences.
     While reading back into today's work  above, I  thought of  an idea for
the general  representation of  conscious plans  in volition.   You see, the
work I just did on causation-curiosity  involved having  the mental organism
look  backwards  into  time  in  search  of  causation.  For general-purpose
volition, perhaps we should have the mind look  forward into  time in search
of solutions.
     A perceived  or even  thought-up phenomenon  could be  interpreted as a
problem if it set off a  rash or  burgeoning chain  of associative activity.
Say,  this  idea  even  tells  me  how  specific  motor  sequences might get
involved.  As I was  already  theorizing  today,  the  ontogenesis  of motor
sequences  results   in  specific   linkage  to   passive  memory  networks.
Therefore, if an emerging problem sets off an associative vortex,  that same
vortex will  elicit tags  referring directly  to motor sequences, and we can
design that the motor tags should  queue  up  at  the  problem  node  on the
Volition Register.
     Under this idea, just about everything that presents itself to the mind
could be interpreted as a problem.  However,  the prioritizing  mechanism of
the Volition  Register causes  the mind to treat as problems really only the
most pressing phenomena.
     This idea of each vortex being  handled as  an almost  palpable problem
seems especially  felicitous and  fortunate.   It is  a way for the focussed
mind to become specifically  attentive to  nonspecific happenings,  that is,
the general diffusion of dynamic associations.
     I  suppose  we  should  devise  something  to  be  called  the  Problem
Extraction Mechanism (PEM) and deposit it along with  causation-curiosity in
each General Associativity Mechanism (GAM).
     I  was  now  momentarily  tempted  to try to use the Problem Extraction
Mechanism to abolish the  need for  the mechanism  of causation-curiosity in
each  GAM.    However,  I  think  I realize that the mechanism of causation-
curiosity really is needed as essential  to the  whole domain  of attention-
getting.   In fact,  attention-getting can occur first, and then perhaps the
Problem Extraction Mechanism can  also  come  into  play.    After  all, the
functioning  of  the  mechanism  of  causation-curiosity  could in itself be
sufficient to set off the Problem Extraction Mechanism.
     Each GAM could have  something  analogous  to  a  summation-column that
would  measure  the  general  level  and  intensity  of associative activity
spreading out around a percept as  a  proto-problem.    We  could  call this
summation-mechanism the  Associativity Index  Measure (AIM), and it would be
similar to the Substantiality Index Measure (SIM) by which the  mechanism of
causation-curiosity  functioned.    However,  the  AIM would measure diffuse
activity spreading out, whereas the SIM would measure a centered, punctiform
phenomenon.
     A high AIM-level would cause a GAM to transmit an emerging problem to a
node on the Volition Register.   Simultaneously motor  proposals flushed out
by the  problem-vortex would queue up at the VR-problem-node for adoption or
rejection after consideration during operation of the Volition Accumulator.
     I am quite pleased (perhaps prematurely)  with yesterday's  and today's
working out of how a mind might exercise will.  I certainly had to translate
several phenomena into equivalent but unobvious interpretations.
     For  instance,  I  translated  the  notion  of  positive  and  negative
influences on  the will.   I  simply declared that all manifestations of the
will  start  out  as  positive  and  that  any  interfering  or  temporizing
associativity is  to be  interpreted as  negative.  Thus value is functional
rather than epiphenomenal.
     I  translated   intellectual   curiosity   into   the   homeostasis  of
disequilibria, and thence into a mechanism of attention-getting.
     Finally I translated the recognition of a problem into the detection of
any massive vortex of associativity.
     Gradually I think I am mapping out the operant regions of a functioning
mind.   The systems  which I  have described this week can become so complex
and recursive that I can almost  picture the  hum of  a mind  processing the
inexhaustible  material  of  external  perceptions  plus  its  own  internal
reflections.
     When the mind is  rather inactive,  it is  able to  daydream and follow
tenuous  chains  of  thought  because  there  are  no  higher  vortex levels
demanding attention and  action  at  the  Volition  Register.    However, if
something  important  is  suddenly  remembered  or  reasoned out, the raging
vortex of associativity galvanizes the problem-solving mind.


                                                                 24 MAR 1978

                    Creating a "Nommulta Information Index"


     I am amassing so many notes and especially so much  printed matter that
I  feel  compelled  to  take  a  large  cardboard  box with dozens of freely
obtained escrow envelopes  and  start  a  large  file  to  be  indexed  by a
"Nommulta Information  Index," or "Nominfo Index."  The Nominfo (Index) will
access the following areas, preceded below by their intended locations:

1.  (PDF-box)  Nolarbeit Theory Journal, with index.  (Nolarbeit Theory     
    Index?)
     - master file; manuscript storage file; safety file; attache file.
     - extra papers file.
     - Note:   The Nominfo will access only the index to the Theory Journal,
       and then only partially, during cross-reference.
     - Note:  The safety file will be kept somewhere safely away from  the  
       other files.
2.  (PDF-box)  Nolarbeit Hardware Journal.  (With index?, Nolarbeit Hardware
       Index?)
3.  (PDF-box)  Nolarbeit Financial Ledger (= record of expenses).
4.  (PDF-box)  Nolarbeit Topical Files.
     - Structured, organized files of work on specific topics  or projects. 
       Excerpts from the strictly date-serial Nolarbeit Theory Journal would
       not have to be date-serial in these topical files.
     - Perhaps topics should be indexed in the Nolarbeit Theory Index?
5.  (PDF-box)  Publications/Documents File - "PDF."
     - Brochures, catalogs, clippings, correspondence,  manuscripts, memos, 
       photocopies, software as documented computer programs, etc.
6.  (Bookshelves)  Nolarbeit Reference Library.  (With catalog?)
7.  (Passim)  Extrinsic Reference Locations.
     - Public and  private libraries;  unheld periodicals;  persons as      
       consultants or authorities; data bases; vendors  and manufacturers;         
       institutions and agencies; existing systems and hardware.


                                                                  5 APR 1978

                              Machine/Brain Paralleling

     Recently I  have read  a series of four excellent articles on the brain
by Professor Kent in Byte magazine.  It  is important  to take  issue with a
lot of  points raised  in the  articles.   Right now  I just  want to record
general impressions and ideas.
     Kent wrote a lot about  how  lower  functions  of  the  central nervous
system  are  designed  to  run  independently if not interfered with from on
high.  I think he wrote that the rationale of  control is  for higher levels
to act  generally to  inhibit lower levels, which would operate massively on
their own if left  alone.   (I will  have to  re-examine this  notion in the
articles.)  Anyway, general ideas were put forth.  One idea was that nervous
mechanisms were pyramided by  evolution.   That numerous,  myriad mechanisms
run parallelly while subject to intervening control from on high.
     Well,  all  these  articles  (including  the  aphasia-article in "Human
Nature") cause novel reactions in me with my Nommultic viewpoint.
     One reactive notion I get is that the brain, which seems so monolithic,
is really  like a stick-forest of parallel components.  For instance, in the
various aphasias various abilities can be lost.  Yet an essentially integral
brain  remains  which  can  operate  around  the  losses if they are not too
severe.    So  that's  the  one  reaction  I  get  -  a  notion  of columnar
parallelism.
     However, to the first reaction (in the preceding paragraph) I get yet a
second reaction, namely the  suspicion that  the true  ultimate seat  of the
mind  rests  highly  independently  above  the  various automatic processing
mechanisms.
     By the "seat of  the mind"  I mean  the part  where the  mind thinks in
natural language and makes completely free decisions of volition.
     A  good  picture  of  the  free  conscious  mind is that of a mind just
thinking or  meditating, following  a line  of internal  thought rather than
responding   to   external   stimuli.     Nommultic  theory  says  that  the
consciousness can be  free  because  there  is  really  a  dichotomy between
elements of  high consciousness and elements of lower processing mechanisms.
I would hypothesize that  most  uncontrollable,  unpreventable  crossflow is
one-way,  in   the  direction   from  lower   mechanisms  across  into  high
consciousness.  (Exceptions might be blushing and sweating out of fear.)  In
other  words,   external  or  lower  stimuli  can  forcefully  impinge  upon
consciousness, but consciousness ensconces itself in its own  realm and does
not have to send out signals unless it is implementing volitional decisions.
Yet within its own realm the consciousness makes decisions as  to what train
of thought  to follow  and how long to meditate without initiating any motor
muscle actions.    Now,  there  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  whether these
associative happenings  are really  decisions or  just associative outcomes.
One further situation is  rather clear,  though.   When the  meditating mind
expresses its  desires and  decisions verbally, by thinking such words as "I
want...," it achieves a high  level  of  symbolic  abstraction,  of abstract
thought.   Whether or  not the  underlying associative process constituted a
decision, the symbolic formulation of  "I  want"  achieves  the higher-level
reality of  a formalized  decision, which  possesses an enhanced associative
dynamism and which can continue in existence as a trace in memory.


                                                                  6 APR 1978

                         Mindrealm versus Perceptflow

     The terms "mindrealm" and "perceptflow" are meant to refer respectively
to the mental consciousness/volition area and the total input sensorium.
     In Nommultic  theory I  maintain that  the quantitative  aspects of the
mindrealm and the perceptflow can be quite non-interdependent.
     A typical task of a mindrealm  is  to  know  the  external  world.   In
humans,  apparently  the  input  sensorium  can be quite drastically limited
while still the mindrealm is able  to know  the world  full well.   (In this
regard,  I  think  I  had  better  read the autobiography of Helen Keller in
search of insights.)  AI researchers lay so  much importance  on vision, yet
people's intelligence is not affected by blindness from birth.
     So what  I am  looking for  is a  way to use a minimal sensorium to get
information about the world into the associative memory of a  verbally adept
mindrealm.
     One extreme  would be  to try to imagine a grandiloquent mindrealm with
associative emptiness at every conceptual  address  node.    One immediately
jumps  to  the  idea  that  the  words  would refer to other words, but that
recursive idea can't work ("os lien mega to aitema"), because there can't be
any discriminating or prioritizing of associations if they all hold the same
value of zero.
     So the problem is one of discriminating.  Half in  jest, I  say that we
need not so much to know things truly as just to tell them apart.
     The abstract,  symbolic nature  of natural  language plays an important
role here.  Once things are  discriminated and  given individual  names, all
kinds of  memorable attributes can be tacked on to the pristine cognition of
each  named  entity  through  the  process  of  symbolic-level  reference in
sentences referring to the named entities.


                                                                  7 APR 1978

                         Conjecture on How We Know Things

     When I  contemplate an artificial mind which is supposed to get to know
the external world, I imagine a potentially very intricate linguistic system
just  waiting  to  associate  its  conceptual  nodes  with knowledge gleaned
through the senses.
     But what can we know?  Of the five main senses, taste  and smell convey
a lot  of information  but convey  it in  too narrow a fashion.  They convey
identifiers, not knowledge of essence.
     The sense of hearing is a serial sense,  not parallel.   As  such it is
excellent for  conveying coded  information, but perhaps not so good for the
all-at-once capturing of essence.
     Such elimination leaves us with touch and vision.  For  the purposes of
this treatise,  let us  consider vision  to be a special or enhanced case of
the sense of touch.
     Touch and vision both can convey  widespread, parallel, instantaneously
two-dimensional  knowledge.    Let  us  say  that  they  both convey "array-
knowledge" or "array-information."   Thus they  are distinct  from the other
three senses  mentioned above.   If the sense of balance is another sense in
its own right, it, too, is not an "array" sense.
     So I would like to speculate that an "array" sense is necessary for the
development of general knowledge about the world.
     Now,  I   know  that   the  professional  AI  researchers  are  working
energetically on visual pattern  recognition.   I also  know that  vision is
totally unnecessary for intelligence of the highest order.
     Such elimination  leaves us  with touch as the only essential sense for
epistemology.
     Now, for years I have been captivated by  the notion  that the simplest
geometric entities  of point,  line, and  curve contain some kind of central
key to the whole problem of epistemology.  It has seemed to me that  only on
the level  of these simplest geometricalities can we know the world directly
and unerringly.    We  cannot  without  prior  history  know  a  blob,  or a
confusion, or a plethora.
     The trouble  was, for a long time (as in August of 1976) I applied this
notion of geometricality mainly just to vision.  But vision at this stage is
perhaps too complicated for me.  Let me for a while in this treatise confine
myself to consideration of touch as an essential "array" sense.
     All the variations of a small  enough  array  can  be  known absolutely
thoroughly because  the small  number of  content-points permits only a very
limited number of variations.

                         Scratch-Leaf - from 7 APR 1978

- virtuality
- We can know utterly simple things directly.
- Mensch!  What if you had  a  mind  which  didn't  need  "knowledge gleaned
 through the senses," but which could deal directly and internally with pure
 logic, so that it could ascribe properties to simplest particles and thence
 decogitate whole universes deducible from the logic?


                                                                 10 APR 1978

     In recent theory I have concentrated on the senses of touch and vision.
Today I get a curious  idea  about  the  relative  importance  of  those two
senses:   that perhaps  touch is more important for the "infant" development
of intellect, and thereafter sight  is  more  important  because  it conveys
immensely more information.  Here follows reasoning behind the idea.
     Human vision  does not  seem actually  to get  down into point-by-point
characteristics.  Rather, as  I have  been reading  in Ernest  Kent's "Byte"
articles, human vision does a lot of feature extraction.

                    First Scratch-Leaf - from 10 APR 1978

- the time-dimension.
- multi-level:  arrays below, interconnecting language above.
- simplest geometry.
- interior organization of perception channels themselves.
- two-dimensional (or  multi-dimensional) up-and-down  cascading of feature-
  summation
- remember:  The perception array (eye; skin-surface) will probably have one
  central point of departure.
- Only the array-senses matter:  touch and vision.

                    Second Scratch-Leaf - from 10 APR 1978

- Perhaps acquisition  of intellect is in two stages:  bootstrap, by touch; 
  and ongoing, by vision.
- virtuality:  When the  eye looks  at a  scene, the  mind is  fooled by    
 "virtuality" into thinking that it is seeing the whole scene at once.


                                                                 12 APR 1978

     It  is  rather  obvious  that  there  must  be feature-summation in the
recognition of any aggregate, of  everything  with  more  than  one feature.
Therefore it  follows that  features, not  aggregates, are  what we know and
recognize.   If we  could not  perceive and  identify each  feature, then we
could not cumulatively sum up features to recognize aggregates.
     I can  imagine an  infancy where  the organism learns to know features,
and then a maturation where the  organism learns  myriad aggregates composed
of the various features.
     We  must  establish  a  Short-Cut  Principle  (SCP)  to  mean  that  an
originally  slow  and  cumbersome   mechanism   of   feature-summation  will
automatically follow all available short-cuts  in summation  to identify  an
aggregate.   In  other  words,  if  we  had  to  use  extremely "granulated"
features,  the  summation  mechanism  would  still  work,  but in a slow and
cumbersome way.   Perhaps  "leaps"  of  the  intellect  are  shortcuts  in a
summation process.
     We would probably not have to design the shortcuts into the machine; it
would find them itself.
     The question must be resolved of whether the perception memory channels
hold arrays of raw data or only feature-highlights.
     It  would  be  neat  (and  inexpensive)  to  design  a  perceptor  that
remembered (for touch and  vision) only  arrays or  registers of collective,
pre-processed  features.    That  is,  each  slice of perception would be an
engram remembering in a registered way just which  of all  possible features
were present  in the  original slice  of raw  perception.   (Don't forget to
consider the time-dimension.)
     Along this idea, when we remember a mental image, a registered slice of
features  is  resubmitted  to  the  highest echelon of our visual perception
system.  This highest echelon could  consist of  a framework  internally and
peripherally organized  to the  highest possible  degree.   Thus it might be
possible to bring even  our  visual  imagination  to  bear  upon  the summit
framework.    That  is,  while  we  are  recalling  an  engram of registered
features, we might use our imagination to fill in other features.   It might
be like having articulated, transparent layers.
     I like  the idea  of having a kind of "gate" along the optic perception
channel.  In advance of the gate, between the eyes and the gate, there would
be  all  the  considerable  apparatus  for the self-organizing of the visual
perception  system  and  for  the  infancy-stage  learning  of  the standard
features in a registered array.
     Postpositional to  the gate,  there would be the lengthy memory channel
with  the  oldest  memories  coming  first  and  with  new,  fresh  memories
constantly being  added on  at the  extremity of the memory channel.  I like
this notion  because  it  presents  an  elegant  sequence  for  the physical
positioning of  all that  goes on  in visual  perception and memory.  It may
bother someone to think that the oldest, perhaps outdated memories would lie
closest  to  the  recall-gate.    But  that  arrangement  is  not so bad; it
certainly would  be  difficult  to  have  the  most  recent  memories always
closest.
     There  is  more  detail  to  how  the  post-gate channel would operate.
Basically, the level  of  organization  prevailing  in  the summit-framework
recall-gate  would  not  be  improved  upon further down the memory channel.
Each (so highly significant)  point  in  the  gate  would  go  into  a line-
extension all  the way  down the postgate channel.  All the lines as a whole
would remain positionally "registered" just as they were in the summit-array
of the  recall-gate.   Now I  do not  necessarily mean  that the lines would
physically stay in order with respect  to  the  physical  geometry  of their
dimensional co-ordinates,  but rather  I intend an organizational order.  Of
course, a high degree  of physical,  locational order  could just  chance to
occur!
     Nor is  it hard  to imagine  a switching-network  or a synaptic growth-
process which  would continually  provide for  the proper  elongation of the
registered memory channel.
     The elongated  post-gate memory  channel is a transmission-channel.  An
incoming slice  of  perception  (probably  pulsed)  travels  to  its ongoing
extremity to be deposited as an engram-slice.
     For the  slices, we  must imagine  that at  regular, frequent intervals
each extension-line can branch off into  a memory-node.   The extension-line
itself is not a string of nodes (or is it?), but all along its length it has
slices of nodes that hold the same "register"  or array  as is  held both in
the recall-gate  and all  along the ordered memory channel.  Thus an instant
of visual memory  can  be  recorded  as  a  feature-image  on  a node-slice.
Because every element of the node-slice is in register with the channel, the
intact  image  can  be  "dumped"  onto  the  transmission   lines  and  thus
automatically show  up in the recall-gate in just the same array-order as it
was perceived minutes or years previously.

     Note:  When AI researchers say that we can recognize a shape  no matter
its size  or orientation,  they may be forgetting one thing:  most shapes we
have seen at one time or another in many different sizes and orientations.
     Small print is difficult to  read  for two reasons:   because, being
small, it  is difficult  to see,  and because  in our memory channels we are
unaccustomed to the small-size images.


Nolarbeit Theory Journal                                         12 APR 1978


                    Diagram of a Visual Memory Channel

                                 -------
                               /         \
                              |  Eyeball  |
                             \ \         / /
                              \  -------  /
                                ---------
                                      /
                                     /
                                    |
                                    |
                                    | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                    |\
                                    | \
                                   /|\ \              Infancy-Stage
                                  / | \ \
                                 / /|\ \ \            Self-Organizing
                                / / | \ \ \
                               / / /|\ \ \ \  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                              / / / | \ \ \ \       
                             / / / /|\ \ \ \ \
                            / / / / | \ \ \ \ \       Feature Extraction
                           / / / / /|\ \ \ \ \ \
        - - - - - - - -  _/_/_/_/_/_|_\_\_\_\_\_\_  - - - - - - - - - - -
         "recall-gate"  |_________________________|  "summit framework"
        - - - - - - - -   | | | | | | | | | | | |   - - - - - - - - - - -
 oldest memory slice --> o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|   Memory Slices
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|   as Node-Arrays on
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|   Transmission Lines
                          | | | | | | | | | | | | - - - - - - - - - - - -
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          | | | | | | | | | | | | - - - - - - - - - - - -
                         x|o|x|o|x|x|x|o|x|x|o|x|   memory slices
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         o|x|x|o|x|o|x|x|o|x|x|x|   with   some
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         x|o|o|x|o|o|o|o|x|o|x|o|   nodes  occupied,
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         x|x|x|o|x|o|o|x|x|o|x|x|   some unoccupied
                          | | | | | | | | | | | | - - - - - - - - - - - -
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|---- associative
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|----------- tags
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                         o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|------------------
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
 newest memory slice --> o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|o|-------------------------
                          | | | | | | | | | | | |
                          Extremity of Expanding
                          Channel


                                                                  4 MAY 1978

     "Virtuality" in visual perception.   In  the popular  culture there are
various  drawings  which  display  two  different image-patterns at the same
time.  Usually the one image  is rather  obvious (augenfaellig,  in German),
and the  other image  must be  searched for by the eye.  While searching for
but not yet finding the  hidden  image,  the  observer  certainly  fixes his
vision in  a haphazard  way upon many of the separate features of the hidden
image.  Suddenly the observer  sees  the  proper  configuration  of  all the
features into  the hidden  image.  Now the hidden image looks actually quite
obvious, and the observer can study it in detail.
     This trickery of hidden  images  gives  us  valuable  information about
visual perception.   Our  seeing of  large-scale objects is greatly involved
with "virtuality," the phenomenon  in  which  a  seemingly  solid  effect is
produced from rather chimerical and insubstantial substrata.


                                                                 12 OCT 1978

                    Development of Tactile Awareness and Memory

     How does  an organism  develop knowledge of the sensations arising from
the surface area of its own skin?   We are  posing this  question because we
now want  to tie the whole input sensorium together and figure out a way for
an organism to remember its multifaceted existence over time.
     Obviously, a skin-surface  is  analogous  to  just  a  grid  of sensory
points.   Of course, we know that important areas of the human skin, such as
the fingers, have many more sensory nerves than other, less important areas.
     We  have  long  relied  on  our  maxim,  "Whatever  information  can be
transmitted can  also be  recorded."   So we can imagine a large information
channel which  represented every  sensor-point on  the skin  of an organism.
But we would not want constantly to be taking slices out of that channel and
recording them.  Rather, we would  rather  have  a  kind  of self-organizing
time-stage in  which the  organism learned  about its  skin and from then on
just made any necessary use of its knowledge.
     In a way, knowledge of our skin is recursive, because each part  of our
world is  determined in  terms of  other parts, but our whole skin-knowledge
doesn't just collapse upon itself into unity, but  rather our skin-knowledge
branches out  into countless associations.  So we might say that each neuron
going to the skin is a potential building-fiber of knowledge.


                                                                 15 OCT 1978

     Over the last several days  I  have  been  reflecting  a  lot  upon the
problem of  tactile perception  and memory.   This  evening I  have begun to
crystallize a few ideas.
     Tactile  perception  must  probably   have   a   pre-positioning  stage
(embryonic),  a  self-organizing  stage  (infancy),  and  a lifelong record-
forming stage (maturity).
     The different human senses are requiring me to theorize different forms
of perception  and memory.   For  vision, I have thus far theorized a memory
slicing mechanism.  For auditory perception of words I have  had to theorize
a pyramidal  coded structure.   Now  for touch  I suppose I must theorize an
altogether different system in which the  individual perception  points come
into play only as needed (in the maturity-stage), rather than going along on
a Gestalt basis as in my theory for vision.
     In trying to devise an  as-needed  tactile  system,  my  attention goes
towards reflecting  upon the central memory train which chronicles the whole
life of the organism.  For this purpose I am imagining a  lifelong series of
associative discs, each of which for a particular moment constitutes the hub
of associative activity for the organism.

                                                                 16 OCT 1978

     Before I explain the discs,  let  me  approach  them  from  the tactile
system.
     The general  tactile nervous  transmission system  is laid down by pre-
positioning in the embryo.  As we know,  human embryonic  growth follows the
nerves.    But  such  pre-positioning  is  probably  not accurate enough for
individual perception points.  So we must imagine a self-organizing stage in
the infant  organism.   There are  probably masses of brain tissue which are
pre-positioned so as to  embody the  self-organizing of  the tactile sensory
reception  system.     In  other  words,  contiguity  on  the  skin  surface
establishes a logical contiguity  within  the  self-organizing  areas.   (It
doesn't  matter  if  the  fingertips play a massive information-transmitting
role; the principles remain  the same.)   In  yet more  other words,  we can
imagine the  process in  which an individual sensory point on the skin would
command the attention of  the  conscious  mind.    The  first  news breaking
rapidly  to  the  conscious  mind  would  be  that  of  which major sense is
signaling, namely, touch,  and  not  sight  or  hearing.    Rapidly, perhaps
subconsciously,  the  mind  would  associate  into which side of the body is
signaling, which major area or limb, and right on down  to the  most precise
point.   Probably at the same time certain motor associations would be being
suggested.  This quasi-chain-of-command structure from on top has to be kept
in  mind  as  we  theorize  about  the  organization  at  the lowest levels.
Assuming that a sensory impulse reaches the consciousness, it can  be traced
(consciously or  not) back  to its source only by much associative branching
down the tree.  The organism ultimately knows where the source is because at
each  level  the  live  transmission sets off extra-parietal associations to
lifelong knowledge.  In other words,  the hierarchical  tree itself  (of the
self-organized tactile  area) could  not pinpoint  a sensory  point, but the
"voting" extraparietal associations can.
     So the pre-positioning works embryonically from genetics, and the self-
organizing  works  by  physical  and/or  logical  contiguity.   But how does
tactile information reach the  main consciousness?   We  must return  to the
notion of the lifelong-memory associative discs.
     The notion  of the  disc is  just a lemma or tool for theorizing.  Over
some years I have devised systems for various senses (vision,  audition) and
motor effects.  All along I had in mind that there must be a central flow of
consciousness.  As a lemma I choose the image of  a flat,  coin-like disc so
that I can imagine both many peripheral connections and a lifelong series of
the discs to constitute  the central  tapestry of  lifelong personal memory.
The trouble  with such  a dynamic, forward-moving system is, how do you hook
up to it such static aggregates  as self-organized  tactile systems  or even
auditory coded-structure conceptual systems?
     One way to do it is to go by the double-edged idea that only used links
survive, and that survival is assured  because links  are used.   We already
wrote  today   that  pin-pointing   is  done   by  virtue  of  extraparietal
associations.  Well, we can have those very  same extraparietal associations
merge into  the consciousness  discs and provide a hierarchical thread which
moves along with the temporal progression of consciousness.
     We might theorize that often-used association lines become  thicker and
stronger,  perhaps  because  free-floating  transmission-material  tends  to
attach itself to links receiving heavy usage, thus  turning such  links into
"trunk lines."
     We might  also theorize  that two  links to the same node can, by heavy
usage, fuse and bypass that node to form a single, more direct link.


                                                                  8 NOV 1978

                                     _____________________________________
                                    |                                     |
                                    |  Immediate Motor Activation Memory  |
                                    |_____________________________________|

   ________                                               _______________
  |        |==================       _____________       |               |
  |  L  M  |==================       \           /       |  Habituating  |
  |  i  e  |==================        \   AVR   /        |               |
  |  f  m  |==================         \_______/         |  Motor        |
  |  e  o  |==================       _____________       |               |
  |  l  r  |==================       \           /       |  Sequencing   |
  |  o  y  |==================        \   AVR   /        |               |
  |  n     |==================         \_______/         |  Memory       |
  |  g     |==================       _____________       |               |
  |        |==================       \           /       |               |
  |  P     |==================        \   AVR   /        |               |
  |  e     |==================         \_______/         |  two-         |
  |  r     |==================       _____________       |               |
  |  c     |== time-pulsed ===       \XX         /       |  dimensional  |
  |  e     |== associative ===        \XXXXX    /        |               |
  |  p     |== tags ==========         \XXXXXXX/         |  plus         |
  |  t     |==================                           |               |
  |  i     |==================                           |  time-        |
  |  o     |==================                           |               |
  |  n     |==================                           |  dimension    |
  |________|==================                           |_______________|

   AVR = Accumulating Volition Register.


                                                                  8 NOV 1978

               An Accumulating (Integrating) Volition Register

     Late this evening I have  been  diagramming  and  theorizing  on  how a
Lifelong Perception Memory might link up with a Habituating Motor Sequencing
Memory.  I have assembled enough  ideas that  it is  time now  to write them
down.
     A Seattle  newspaper reported  recently (P-I, 25.OCT.1978) that we have
around 639 muscles.  At any rate, whatever number of  muscles there  were in
us or  in an  automaton, that  number would serve as direct activation lines
for Immediate  Motor Activation  Memory, which  could perhaps  be more aptly
termed as just neuronal hardware rather than memory.
     Coming from  Immediate Motor  Activation Memory I have in mind a habit-
channel consisting of segments of Habituating Motor Sequencing Memory.  Each
segment would represent a habituated motor sequence.
     Now and then I come upon surprising little conclusions which accelerate
the Nolarbeit.  One  such realization  today was  that at  the front  of any
habituated  motor  sequence  must  be  the tag from passive perception which
(tag) initiates the sequence.   In  other words,  habituated motor sequences
don't  develop  in  a  causeless,  sourceless  vacuum,  but  rather they are
assembled starting with and  in response  to a  passive experience stimulus.
In fact,  I suspect  that the  actual process  of assembling each habituated
motor sequence will consist of a  long series  of tentative memory-to-memory
link-ups, which  will go on in a quasi-searching way until the full, refined
sequence becomes  established  as  a  reliable  response  to  the particular
stimulus.    Before  this  evening's  theorizing, I had vaguely envisioned a
motor habituating mechanism which  would do  the iterative  work all  on the
motor side, but now I see that that would be a displacing of causation flow.
     Having described the original departure-point for each habituated motor
sequence, I must now  write down  my present  ideas for  the nature  of each
sequence.   Basically I  have in  mind either a kind of fan-out or a nodular
concatenation.  From the Immediate Motor Activation Memory  block would come
a  specific   number  of  lines,  each  of  which  would  directly  activate
musculature in an unrefined, unsequenced way.  These control lines would all
go down  through the  segmented channel  of the Habituating Motor Sequencing
Memory.  At each segment, though,  there  would  be  available  the neuronal
hardware necessary  for assembling  a superstructure  that would concatenate
control nodes in a firing sequence.  For each sequence  there might  even be
available "empty  nodes" for interspersing within a sequence so as to smooth
out the timing.  The relative impetus of each control  line within  a firing
sequence  might  be  established  by  using  more  than  one  firing  of the
particular node in a series or cluster of identical nodes.  That  is to say,
to emphasize a node just place it, say, three times in a row.
     There would probably not be a fan-out, but just a nodular concatenation
that gave the appearance of a fan-out.
                                             From After Midnight, 9 NOV 1978

     The motor habituation system which I am describing is not  very sparing
of neuronal hardware.  It builds up a refined sequence by endless trial-and-
error, and it just consumes  neuronal  hardware  used  up  in  the erroneous
trials.   However, the  system does perform an important function called for
in the Theory Journal  work on  motor ontogenesis  of 18MAR1978,  namely the
idea that  motor habituation should proceed in side-by-side development with
initial purposes residing in the passive  memory network.   However,  in the
present work we are tending to move the causation flow out of the motor area
and more  into the  passive memory  area.   We are  tending now  to say that
impulses won't  go into  the motor  area unless physical motor activation is
really supposed to occur.  One might say that we are removing  the "Volition
Lines"  from  the  system  diagram  of 10SEP1977.  Of course, the equivalent
substance of those volition lines is moving diagrammatically  leftwards (for
then and  now) into  the highly attuned knowledge of the Lifelong Perception
Memory.  From simultaneous passive experience the organism  knows quite well
the nature of any habituated motor sequence which it may contemplate.
     By the  way, this  present theorizing  sheds new  light on what happens
when we contemplate an action such as lifting  a hand.   Our  belief that we
know intimately  the feeling of the impending movements is not motor memory,
but passive memory of the chain of results of motor  memory.   Why, even now
in this  cold apartment,  my upper arm flinched a little when I contemplated
lifting my left hand as I began this paragraph.
     This present work on general motor habituation works out well enough on
paper that  we may  even apply it to the "Verbal Motor Habit Tagging System"
of 10SEP1977.
     Now we should  go  into  present  ideas  on  an  "Accumulating Volition
Register," which  concept has arisen out of the work beginning on 17MAR1978.
You see, it may  be  possible  to  have  a  combined  Volition  Register and
Volition  Accumulator.    Each  Accumulating  Volition  Register (AVR) would
actually just be a function of  the linkage-line  between the  passive motor
stimulus on  the diagrammatic  left and its habituated motor sequence on the
diagrammatic right.  Each linkage-line would  automatically tend  to be slow
to  fire,  depending  however  on  the  intensity and frequency-tempo of its
input.
     The selection of a motor action results from remembrance.   To remember
a motor  action is  to propose  performing it again.  Present thought in the
Lifelong Perception Memory can  associate  backwards  to  a  whole  gamut of
Passive  Motor  Stimuli.    If  a  particular  motor  stimulus stands out as
desirable or advisable, its  passive-to-motor  linkage-line  (Volition Link)
will begin  to accumulate, to "integrate," towards conveying a firing-signal
to the habituated motor sequence.   In the  work of  18MAR1978 we  said that
"any  prolonged   associational  occupation  with  the  contemplated  action
automatically constitutes inhibition  or  interdiction  within  the Volition
Accumulator."   Now we  can see  more clearly  how all  this accumulation or
waxing and waning of volition  is  really  a  searching  process  within the
"Lifelong Perception Memory," which is our temporary lemma-type term for the
stream of consciousness.  If all  conscious  indications  point  to  a motor
action as  immediately necessary,  it can  be pushed  through quite rapidly:
the Volition Link fills  and fires.   The  mind can  dawdle and  hesitate by
contemplating a  haphazard group  of actions.   It  can be designed into the
Volition Links that they shall tend to drain if not accessed repeatedly.
     We have thus drawn a kind  of volitional  demarcation line  between the
diagrammatic left  and right  sides of  passive and  motor memory.   We have
gotten away from a "seat" of volition and  we now  envision volition  as the
sum outcome of the albeit haphazard totality of consciousness-cum-memory.
     Even though in recent weeks I have been trying to draw together all the
main features of Nommultic theory, tonight I have had to limit myself to the
combined subsystems  of passive and motor memory.  However, motor activation
memory has been suggesting itself as the right  departure point  for putting
the whole Nommultic system together.
     It has  been obvious  that animals  such as  dogs have to have a motor-
sequence  selection  system.    A  dog  learns  tricks,  i.e.,  sequences of
behavior.   A dog on the loose is constantly making choices and decisions as
to what learned actions  to initiate.   So  I have  been feeling  safe about
designing a  motor system  with the  idea that intellectual natural-language
systems can be superimposed by design  upon  faculties  as  present  in mute
animals.   In fact,  in accordance with the Theory Journal work of 24JAN1973
and 8MAR1977, dealing with minimal systems, I am  always on  the lookout for
simple, model-type  constructions which become possible with new advances in
the theory.  Tonight's work suggests how to build a robot animal  capable of
learning and  executing behaviors.   Of  course, even the simplest Nommultic
systems are quite complex because they require so much in the way  of memory
and processing.


                                                                 11 NOV 1978

                    Fixed Inputs into Expanding Channels

     In  combining  all  the  so-far  developed portions of the Nommulta, we
encounter the problem of connecting fixed systems with expanding systems.
     The input sensorium and the  motor  output  constitute  basically fixed
systems.   In the  infancy-stage, there is self-organizing of these systems,
but thereafter they are fixed.
     For all the various systems  of  experiential  memory  we  have  had to
envision  amazingly  long,  expanding  channels  of engrams.  We have had to
design these expanding channels as if they stretched  off into  the distance
away  from  the  locale  of  the  sensorium.   For instance, with the visual
channel as designed on 12APR1978, there was apparently  no other  way but to
design an expanding edge which received its information from no source other
than its own interior "pipeline."   Lo  and  behold,  our  main experiential
channel seemed  to stretch off into nowhere.  Yet at the same time it had to
have associative tags exiting all  its  length  to  provide  access  to each
engram-slice.
     The idea was that all engrams laid down for a particular moment of time
would be joined together by associative tags.
     Whereas the  visual  memory  would  be  of  a  "simultaneous," "sliced"
nature,  the  experiential  auditory  memory  would  be  of a serial nature.
However, I can see now that memory for sounds would  also have  to have that
"pipeline"   effect.      All   the   auditory  input  lines  important  for
differentiation would have to go into the auditory pipeline.  For each time-
extended sound  there would  have to  be a  temporal series  of nodes in the
auditory pipeline.   Each  momentary combination  of frequencies  would be a
mosaic of  sound, a  mosaic of  nodes.   Now, into  our sound channel we can
probably design a  special  stringing  effect.    Mosaics  which  come  in a
temporal group will automatically be strung together.
     I think I may have just made a startling insight, according to which we
would not be able to recognize  time-extended sounds  without our short-term
memories.   I was thinking of the fact that, from just a few notes of music,
we can quickly recognize and identify a particular symphony by  a particular
composer.   No, actually  I see a more orthodox way to do it, which follows.
Let's say we want to recognize three successive mosaics, say, three notes of
a symphony.   The  first note going through the pipeline would stimulate all
pre-engrammed mosaics of the note.  When the second and third notes went in,
they, too,  would stimulate  their pre-engrammed  mosaics.   However, in the
symphonic spot where  three  adjacent  mosaics  were  being  stimulated, the
string-effect  would  cause  a  kind  of  summation of the stimulations, and
therefore the  strongest and  fastest associative  output would  come out of
that spot  in auditory memory where the actual engram of the three symphonic
notes truly was.
     In both the laying-down and recognizing of extended sounds, there  is a
question as  to where in the extended sound-series the associative tag would
be attached.  I don't think it would come at the beginning or at the end....
No, it  would have to be attached at the beginning, but in virtuality by the
stringing effect it would really be attached to the first several mosaics.
     I thought I had  an insight  that the  short-term memory  would have to
perform a  match-up like two railroad trains alongside each other.  But then
I saw that, even so, the  match-up  would  have  to  occur  inside  the main
auditory "pipeline."