Nolarbeit Theory Journal: Part Three of Three (1978-1979)

by Arthur T. Murray

                                                                 13 NOV 1978

     This evening  at Vaierre  I am  trying to do some more work on bringing
the whole Nommultic system  together out  of the  various components.   I am
trying to attach the language-work of last year to the recent overview of an
experiential and motor system.
     I am beginning to  suspect  that  I  don't  need  a  centrally located,
pyramidal-type language  decoder with  the "ultimate-tags" as denominated on
1.OCT.1977.    It  looks  like  it  may  work  just  to  let  the  known and
recognizable words exist in the vastly long "pipeline" of auditory memory.
     Idea of  the moment:   Node-slices  could be  kept thin  and compact by
having just axons within the slice.  Then cell bodies  could be  arranged in
tiers above  the "pipeline."   Who knows, maybe "carrier" neurons could send
their axons lengthwise  through  the  pipe,  while  "nodular"  neurons would
introduce perpendicular  axons.   A single  such perpendicular cell might be
able to have many, many "yes-or-no" synapses within a slice.  In  fact, such
a perpendicular cell, or groupings of them, might CONSTITUTE THE VERY ACTUAL
ASSOCIATIVE TAG.  But you sure  would have  to have  flat synaptic branching
from a cell body.
     I am  beginning to realize lately how passive the experiential side and
how active the motor side must be.  I suppose  the habituation  and learning
mechanisms must  all be on the motor side.  The whole perceptual and passive
apparatus exists  just  to  serve  the  motor  side  in  its decision-making
     I've had  a possible  insight tonight on how the motor mind may perhaps
reflect on things:  through variation by the  aid of  engram fatigue.   When
the motor  mind first  associates towards a passive memory, such as a visual
image slice, the following scenario may take place.  The  accessed image has
been fetched  through its  associative tag.  The nodular image slice becomes
"energized" within the visual "pipeline."  Up and down the pipeline, similar
images become  stimulated.  One such image wins out and is the first to send
out  a  signal  over  its  own  associative  tag.    This  signal  keeps the
associative  process  rolling.    It  may evoke further information from any
perceptual sense or from  language-memory.   At any  rate, the consciousness
has accessed  visual memory  and has had a certain output.  Now here's where
"engram fatigue"  or "neuron  fatigue" enters  in.   The motor  mind may get
shunted  back  to  the  same  original  visual memory slice.  In this second
instance, however, the fatigue of the  formerly first  responding engram may
allow  a  competing  different  engram  to  respond,  with the process being
repeated many times over.  Thus  the same  neuronal input  can yield  a wide
variety of successively different outputs.
     You know,  it may  be that verbal thought really does take place in the
passive experiential auditory pipeline, and that each word or grammar-ending
just always  happens to have a habituated motor sequence attached to it.  So
that when we feel we are hearing our own verbal thought, we  are really just
remembering  what  it  sounded  like  when  we  formerly  spoke  each sound.
Likewise if we pronounce in  our  minds  a  seen  combination  of alphabetic
letters, we are quickly just joining together the remembered motor sounds of
     I guess we have  to have  pipeline word-decoding,  or else  there could
never be any variations from a strictly spoken standard for a word.

(Nolarbeit) AI Theory Journal                                    17 NOV 1978

                    Remembrance of Verbs to Describe Actions

     Our current impasse is at a point where we are trying to bring together
all the accumulated subsystems of our intended automaton.  Recently  we have
tended to  simplify several elaborate designs of ours, so that for the final
design we luckily end  up with  a choice  of either  the elaboration  or the
simplification,  which  might  be  too  simple  to  work.  We have tended to
simplify the volition system from last March and the verbal  decoding system
from a  year ago.   The  impasse rests most pointedly in such questions of a
grammar system as how  the automaton  will observe  actions and  then recall
verbs to name the actions.
     That verb-problem  stands out  because we see rather readily now how we
can at least find nouns to go with perceived objects.   Actually,  the verb-
problem grew  out of  a narrower  problem from  several days ago, when I was
trying to figure out how the automaton would assign the concept of plurality
to perceived objects, so as to be able to form noun-plurals.  I was making a
little progress on the plurality-question.  For instance, I realized that to
perceive plurality  is not  a one-step process, because just to perceive the
unity of one entity is a  conceptual  step  in  itself.    To  recognize two
creatures, for  instance, a  mind can  recognize first  the one and then the
other, but not both at the same time.  So I was recently tending towards the
conclusion that use of the concept of plurality involves (the processing of)
multiple slices of perception.
     However, that quasi-conclusion caused  me trouble  because a  system of
unitary  associative  tags  from  percept  to word didn't seem sufficient to
handle plurality.  I  even  started  hypothesizing  that  our  minds project
plurality onto things, with greater or lesser success.
     Then  late  the  night  of  13NOV1978,  I got the idea that maybe there
should be an additional memory alongside the others  (sensory and  motor), a
memory which held perceptual content but not sensory content, a memory which
would handle conceptual associations beyond the  linear scope  of the purely
sensory memories:  an abstract memory.
     So for  several days  I revelled  in this possibility of a new insight,
but meanwhile I  came  to  focus  on  this  problem  of  assigning  verbs to
perceived actions.
     I sensed  an analogy  here with  the work  of 16.OCT.1978  on the skin-
surface.  When we verbally name a perceived action, we automatically tend to
select the  most aptly differentiated verb available to us.  In so doing, we
automatically pass over many  less apt  verbs which  would nevertheless have
correctly described  the action.   For  example, "He ruined it" is correctly
within the meaning of "He destroyed it."
     Another idea which I have been getting is that the remembrance of verbs
is perhaps the function of a rather elevated "abstract language-domain."

(Nolarbeit) AI Theory Journal                                FRI 19 JAN 1979

                         More on the Verb Problem

     Perhaps  a  verb  can  be  viewed  as  follows.  A verb is a punctiform
expression of relationships ramifying from the  logical punctum  of the verb
     We can then think of a non-specified verb, which, in the history of its
being known to us,  has developed  some very  highly ramified  main branches
beneath the punctum.
     A verb  will describe  an event  of greater  or lesser  complexity.  In
accordance with  its  complexity,  a  verb  residing  in  a  mind's semantic
knowledge will  have "main  branches" as  divisions leading to the (probably
quite numerous) minuscule ramifications.
     When we perceive an event and  recognize its  nature as  being properly
described  by  a  certain  verb,  what  we  do  is  find and connect logical
categories which satisfy the  main-branch logical-input  requirements of the
specific verb.
     When  two  verbs  are  somewhat  similar in their semantic meanings, we
discriminate between the two verbs by means of  differences between  the two
groups of main branches.
     We must  have thousands of categories into which we can classify things
when we perceive them.    Perhaps  we  even  classify  things  into multiple
categories as a prelude to the connection of main branches.
     The  same  sort  of  system  could perhaps serve to assign prepositions
according to perceived relationships.
     When we perceive a thing, our mind seeks  to attach  to it  both a name
and  a   set  of   one  or  more  semantic  categories.    The  greater  the
discrimination we achieve  in  our  attaching  of  semantic  categories, the
greater the  discrimination we  can also  achieve in the selection of verbs.
Finding a semantic category for a thing is  not the  same as  finding a noun
with which to name the thing.
     Right  now  I  am  mentally  deep  into  the  present subject, the verb
problem.  Some strange possibilities are opening up.   Since  this Nolarbeit
Theory Journal  is ipso facto a journal, I think I will override my tendency
to keep personally out  of my  discussion, and  instead just  ramble on with
topical thoughts.
     The  strange  possibility  is  also  a  slightly disconcerting one.  It
points to that "abstract memory" which  I  was  mentioning  in  the  work of
17NOV1978.   Suppose there  had to  be an extra memory like a long bundle of
minuscule fibers.  Each fiber would represent one of the semantic categories
presently under  discussion.  The disconcerting idea is that our minds might
be limited by such a system in which we can  access verbs  only through this
intermediate subsystem  of semantic category-fibers.  In other words, we are
always limited in our ability to  describe  the  events  which  we perceive,
inasmuch as we must break down each percept into a set of minuscule semantic
categories coming from a larger set  already  resident  in  our  mind, after
which  breakdown  we  can  then  re-assemble  the information-flow via "main
branches"  or  "semantic  trunks"  to  fetch  a  specific   and  (hopefully)
appropriate verb.
     For weeks  or months  now I have been stewing on this problem of how we
recall appropriate verbs.  I have been pondering this problem  while keeping
in mind  my 12APR1978  diagram of  a visual-memory  channel.   I was telling
myself that I had enough theory to recall appropriate nouns  for things, but
I could  not even  begin to  figure out  how multiple image-slices, taken in
succession, would lead a mind to recall a verb.  It was  as if  I was trying
to  imagine  extra  hardware  and  extra  processes  into  the system of the
diagram.  But I knew I wanted to do it  all with  just the  associative tags
coming from the image-slices as originally planned.
     Even now  I may  not have the solution, but I will describe how I began
today's writing.  In my search  for verb-recall,  I was  picturing an entity
lying on  a surface.   If I were asked to describe with a verb the action of
the entity while lying there, I would say that it is lying there.   Now, how
do  I  arrive  at  that  verb  from  just  a still picture?  Obviously, I am
detecting a relationship between  the  entity  and  the  surface.    I would
recognize the  entity all by itself, but in this case its side is orientated
to the surface in such a  way as  to help  me recall  the verb  "lying."  My
pondering mind  seized upon the idea of the side of the entity as being in a
special, semantic category.  From the notion of concentrating upon  the side
of the  entity, as opposed to the total entity, I got the idea of the leg of
a system in which multiple legs had  to  be  "satisfied"  so  that  a common
summit would be reached where a verb stood.
     I  also  got  the  idea  that the semantic legs (trunks, main branches)
could have very many minuscule categories  attached  to  them,  but  that it
would  take  only  one  activated  category  per  leg to satisfy the recall-
requirements for a given verb.
     It was at around that point  in my  thinking that  I began  writing the
body of  today's work.   It is always thus;  I usually wait until I have the
rudiments of a solution before I start writing  down thoughts.   But  I have
been so stymied by this problem of verbs that today (on Seattle's Pier 51) I
have gone back and written down even my preliminary thought.   Now  I can go
     If the  broad "trunk"  requirements for selection of a typical verb can
be satisfied on each  semantic trunk  by any  one of  many numerous semantic
categories, then  obviously a  verb is  typically a very generalized notion.
Highly specific verbs would probably  tend  to  ramify  into  relatively few
categories, but,  on the other hand, some categories must be so general that
they encompass the trunks of almost all verbs.
     At any rate, we  have  posited  today  a  practice  of "intermediation"
between percepts  and verbs.   Verbs are to be visualized as like an octopus
or a furcated carrot.  A percept can summon a verb only by generalizing into
semantic categories  and then un-generalizing along semantic trunks to reach
a specific verb.


- Time division:  verbs in infancy vs. in maturity.
- Verbs become categorized?
- How do we recognize that someone is sitting, or lying down?
  It's a relational thing.
- A conceptualization as legerdemain.

                                                                 12 MAR 1979

                    Ways of Approaching the Verb Problem

- Look at how the first verbs are learned in infancy.
     - Infancy learning of first verbs.
     - Future learning of new verbs.
- Look at how verbs are recalled to describe perceptions.
- Look at how verbs are used for internal mental states.
- Look at the tie-in of motor memory to verbs.
- Avalanche the problem by writing down all possible ideas.
- Study the transformation of nouns into verbs, as in "booking" a flight, or
  "chaining" things together.
- Treat the  problem as that of a chain of complexities.  As the perception 
  of action is processed in the visual channel, what complex transformations
  can the  process go through without losing the full information necessary 
  to reach an appropriate verb?
- [26MAR1979]  Consider how modal, auxiliary verbs work.

     As  I  further  ponder  the  verb  problem,  all  kinds  of preliminary
propositions come  to mind.   With  so many  of them, they can't all be very
correct, but from enough of them true directions should eventually emerge.
     As visual images  come  down  the  visual  memory  channel  in infancy,
objects are  perceived, and  we can easily imagine how nouns are learned and
recalled  for  such  discrete  objects.      The   noun-words   are  learned
phonetically, and then linked up with the visual images.
     When things are in a class, they all share a relationship, namely their
mutual belonging to that class.
     Our perception system for visual  images  attaches  nouns  to perceived
objects.   "Other than nouns it does not attach" - dare I say that?  Because
I don't think the out-tagging  system  can  handle  just  jumbles  of visual
haphazardness.    When  perceiving  a  scene  or  image, we either relate it
through one of its ingredients to a previously tagged item, or else we learn
a new  word or  make a  new association  so that  the novel image can itself
become an archetype to serve in the recognition of re-occurrences of such an
image.   But probably  all such novel tagging is done in the early phases of
language-acquisition, so that subsequent tagging and  word-learning probably
amount  to re-groupings and re-classifications of previous archetypes rather
than to the novel formation of new archetypes.
     After  infancy,  we  learn  many  new  nouns  and  verbs,  but  not new
archetypes of visual perception.
     There must  be a  classification process which goes on in an area which
can be thought of as perpendicular to the visual memory channel.
     When we read a storybook, our mind conjures up its own image to go with
each noun  or verb.   Numerous  individual examples  of each  noun have been
classified as expressions of  each  particular  noun.    Now  when  our mind
encounters the nouns in a story, it uses the whole class behind the noun for
understanding the story, but our  "mind's  eye"  conjures  up  some specific
visual  example  which  happens  to  present  itself  most fittingly for our
interpretation of the story.   In  fact, it  may be  that particular example
that yields  access to  the logical  associativity of the whole class behind
the noun.   So  the bare  noun reminds  us of  a specific  example, but each
specific example has full access to the whole class.
     Now I  think that  there are  some psycholinguistic classes that are so
abstract that they go beyond visual images.
     Every perceptual recognition yields access to  at least  that one class
of which  the recognition  is being  made.   For instance, perception of one
mouse yields access to the psycholinguistic  class of  "mouse," and  then in
turn to the class of "animal," and so on through myriad other classes.
     I  suspect  that  oftentimes  access is gained to some logicoconceptual
classes that are so abstract that they  lead  not  to  nouns  but  rather to
logical conditions and functions, such as the condition of plurality and the
function of subject of a  verb.    It  may  be  that  these logicoconceptual
classes  can  not  be  traced  backwards  to  specific examples, as the word
"mouse" could.
     Perhaps every slice of perception must lead at some level to (at least)
one of these logicoconceptual classes, of which, understandably, there might
be a relatively small number:   certainly under  a thousand  and probably at
least half  a dozen.   In fact, the possible binary permutations of the full
number of logicoconceptual classes might give a hint as to  the upward limit
on the  number of verbs which we could possibly access.  However, that large
number might in turn be obviated if the unitary logicoconceptual classes can
be used  more than  once in  the formulation  of the  recall-apparatus for a
     It's possible that there must be a "re-affirmation"  mechanism with the
memory channels  to keep  these logicoconceptual classes valid and vigorous.
Suppose a slice of visual perception entails recall through a previous slice
in the  distant past, a slice which grants access to a line running parallel
to the visual memory  channel,  which  line  constitutes  a logicoconceptual
class.  At the moment of new perception, the new slice first gains access to
the logicoconceptual  class by  the roundabout  recall route.   There should
perhaps be  a "re-affirmation"  mechanism of  creating a new direct tag from
the  new  slice  to  the  parallel  line  representing  or  constituting the
logicoconceptual class.
     If there  is non-retraceability,  if a logicoconceptual line can not go
backwards to activate its afferents, then  it is  perfectly fine  if all new
perceptions find  their (roundabout) way to a direct tie-in with one or more
of the logicoconceptual classes.
     In fact, this theory being developed may be  equivalent to  saying that
we  forcibly  attach  logicoconceptual  interpretation  to  each  and  every
perception, and that we can not do otherwise.  To perceive is to interpret.
     This present  theory may  be solving  two problems  at once:   both the
action-to-verb problem  and the  problem of  accessing function-lines in the
operation of grammar rules.

                                                                 19 MAR 1979

     A brain cannot even begin to recall a  verb without  first seizing upon
some  entity  within  its  perception-slice  as the subject or object of the
verb-to-be-recalled.   And the  brain cannot  seize upon  a perceived entity
unless it  successfully makes a comparison with an old slice.  It's as if to
say that we never  really  perceive  anything  new,  just  recombinations of
elemental old things.
     So a  first step in fetching a verb is to recognize an entity by making
a connection with  a  stored  record.    According  to  the  theory  that is
presently  being  developed,  such  connection  is how access is gained (and
maintained) to "psycholinguistic  classes."    A  constellation  of accessed
classes will  approximate the  recall-requirements for a stored verb.  I say
"approximate" because the process does not  have  to  be,  and  perhaps even
cannot be, exact and certain - it just selects the most likely, the most apt
and fitting verb.
     The reader or re-reader of these  notes may  begin to  suspect that the
theory is calling for a great superabundance of class-structures.
     So  when  a  verb-related  entity  is  perceived,  it  could activate a
plethora of class-structures.  However, any action perceived and calling for
a verb  will probably involve several or many separately perceived entities.
For argument, let's say that five perceived entities  are necessary  for the
recall of  a particular  verb.   Each of  the five  entities being perceived
might  individually  activate  dozens  of  class-structures,  but  only  the
congruence  of  five  specifically  required  classes  would fetch the verb.
Remember, from perception these class structures  operate only  forwards and
not backwards.
     Of  course,  it  is  not  yet  clear  whether  this process operates by
"strict" "voting" or by summation-type "voting."

                                                                 23 MAR 1979

     A "re-affirmed" (See NTJ 12MAR1979.)  perception  slice  can  feed into
even a  large number  of psycholinguistic classes.  These classes themselves
do not feed back into the perception channel.  If the perception channel did
not  have  an  ulterior  purpose,  obviously  these classes in the "abstract
memory" would be useless.
     I suppose that a  main function  of the  abstract memory  is to achieve
"intermediation" between  raw percepts  and such complexities of language as
verbs.  When  the  first  verbs  are  learned  by  an  infant,  probably the
connection between  the raw  perception and the learned verb is originally a
very tenuous one, but that doesn't matter very  much, because  there are not
many verbs to cause confusion in the child's vocabulary.
     If semantic  inputs to  a verb can be called "radices," then each early
verb of a child might be learned with  just one  radix.   For a  more mature
speaker, a more discriminating assembly of radices would be required.
     By  the   function  of   the  abstract   memory,  the  classes  of  the
intermediation "vote" for which of  all  (however  loosely)  connected verbs
will be fetched for recall.
     We  can  make  a  case  now  for  the need of adept speakers to teach a
neophyte.  The neophyte's internal selection  of  the  correct  verb  is not
ratified internally, but rather by the approval of the teaching speakers.

                                                                 27 MAR 1979

     In selecting  a verb for recall, it is obvious that a mental mechanism,
while  perceiving  a  stream  of  input,  must  initially   seize  upon  one
significant percept  as the  linguistic subject  of the verb to be recalled.
Such is probably the case even when we  use impersonal  expressions like "It
is raining."
     This  selection  of  tentative  verb-subjects  may  be a function of an
attention-mechanism.  At any rate, it matters indeed  to theorize  that such
selection occurs.   To coin a phrase, the "nominator-mechanism" which seizes
upon tentative verb-subjects can also serve to provide a logic-line  for the
grammar  area  which  differentiates  between subjects and objects of verbs.
Once something has been perceived as a tentative verb-subject, the  mind can
go to work expressing that verb-subject in the proper grammatical form.
     It is  quite likely  that, for selection as a verb-subject, all a thing
has to do is be noticed first in a series.   Or  there could  be a level-of-
associativity  trigger-mechanism  which  fires  when  a  percept  is  highly
significant enough.  When things are expressed initially  as direct objects,
it  would  probably  be  not  in  the  course  of raw visual perception, but
probably rather in a more abstract  situation where  the subject  or verb or
both are already understood.

     Later, in  the evening,  I've had  an insight into what it means to say
that we "know" something.   Knowledge  is a  composite of  both the original
acquisition and the subsequent consideration of information.
     The preceding  sentence suggests how knowledge or information is stored
in the mind.   Suppose we  first hear  a piece  of knowledge  as a statement
through our  ears.   That linguistic  statement is laid down in our auditory
memory channel, where it remains as  a  record  both  of  experience  and of
knowledge.   However, true  possession of the information as knowledge comes
from the subsequent processing we do of the information.  In accordance with
how  much  we  believe  the  information  and are affected by it, we develop
traces of  the  information  in  the  memory  channel  of  our  own internal
reflections.   The more  we tend to believe a statement, the more broadly we
will associatively associate it with the  main corpus  of our  knowledge and
belief.   Therefore significant  knowledge becomes  widely anchored within a
mind, because it reverberates so deeply in our memory channels.

                                                                 28 MAR 1979

     I have been reviewing the NTJ work of  9NOV1978 on  motor memory  and I
have had an insight or two concerning volition.  Instead of having prolonged
associativity constitute inhibition of motor initiative, I would now like to
reverse   that   notion   and   argue  instead  that  positive  (i.e.,  any)
associativity above a  threshold  level  actually  causes  motor initiation.
Indeed,  the  theory  is  becoming  quite  clear  right  now.   The passive,
experiential  side  of  the  mind  knows  (from  experience)  its  own motor
capabilities.    To  contemplate  any  such  capability  is  to  "nudge" the
threshold of its execution.  My first of  two insights  is that  the passive
mind can't  actually look  ahead and  feel or foresee each motor initiation.
No, the mind is  just  blindly  confident  that  the  motor  initiations are
available.   So the  so-called "desire"  to activate  emerges on the passive
side in the context of belief and knowledge as discussed yesterday.
     My second insight concerns the  relative  natures  of  verbal  and non-
verbal volition.   Non-verbal  volition works fine, as in reaction to sudden
danger.  Enough compelling association towards  an action  simply causes it.
What's more,  I would  like to  place the activation-thresholds at the point
where the "Motor Memory Activation Channel"  enters the  motor habit tagging
system.  Thus there need not be an elongated threshold system in between the
passive and active sides of the mental automaton.
     Verbal  volition,  however,  can  be  much  more  refined,  precise and
delicate, because  there are  such intricate  pathways of verbal cogitation.
The ego,  referring to  itself in  English as  "I," wanders  amid its verbal
memory and feels confidently in command of its motor options.
     Now I am getting an insight on how generation of sentences may actually
occur in the passive experiential side instead of  within the  motor system.
If so,  this theory  would mean  that the  motor system habituates the basic
phonemic sequences of the words and  that the  passive side  manipulates all
the grammatical changes worked upon words.

Nolarbeit Theory Journal                                         28 MAR 1979

                                                M u s c l e s
                                                o o o o o o o o o o
       .---.     .------------.                  \ \ \ \ \ \ \|_|_|_
     (< EYE >)   '--. EAR ,---'                   \ \ \ \ \ \/      |
      \"---"/        \   /              |          \ \ \ \ \/       |
       """//          \ (                           \ \ \ \/        |
         //            \ \              |            \ \ \/         |
        //              \ \                           \ \/          |
       //                \ \            |              \/           |
   ___/(______            \ \                          / Cerebellum |
  /           \            \ \          |             /_____________|
 |             |            \ \                        //        \\
 |             |             \ \        |             //          \\
 |             |              \ \                    //            \\
 \             /        _______) \__    |    _______/(__     _______)\_____
  |           |        |            |       |           |   |              |
  |           |        |            |   |   |           |   |  Motor       |
  |           |        |            |       |           |   |              |
  |  Visual   |        |  Auditory  |   |   |           |   |  Memory      |
  |           |        |            |       |           |   |              |
  |  Memory   |        |  Memory    |   |   |  Concept  |   |  Activation  |
  |           |        |            |       |           |   |              |
  |  Channel  |        |  Channel   |   |   |  Nodes    |   |  Channel     |
  |           |        |            |       |           |   |              |

                                                                  4 APR 1979

     The  system  diagram  of  our  automaton  changed  considerably between
10SEP1977 and 28MAR1979.  In September of 1977 we were glad just to have our
first system-wide  diagram.   It gave  us a  holistic basis against which to
react, and we have  reacted so  thoroughly that  the diagram  (28MAR1979) is
really in a state of high flux.
     The  main   difference  is  that  the  system  has  become  simplified,
streamlined, and highly orthogonal.  The  perception and  motor channels are
now seen  as running  in parallel.   In  the pristine  diagram of 10SEP1977,
heavy black lines represented unknown, "black-box"  processing-channels.  In
the  recent  new  diagram  of  28MAR1979,  no such lines have been drawn in,
because broad interaction is  envisioned  at  right  angles  all  across the
various perception  and motor  channels.  In the diagram of 10SEP1977, there
had been separate boxes set up to organize the elongated memory channels, as
if  perceptions  would  be  assigned  associative tags as they were filtered
through such separate, modular tagging-systems.  Now the  perception channel
itself is  seen as paramount, with orthogonal tagging going on all along the
length of the perception channel.
     A  process  of  theorizing   has   perhaps   become   clear,   that  of
"dimensionalizing"  complex  systems.    The  visual  channel  of 12APR1978,
despite all  its complexity,  becomes just  one linear  dimension within our
total system  diagram of 28MAR1979.  When we lay down all the perception and
motor channels in parallel, our notion of "dimensionality"  suggests that in
the  subsequently  orthogonal  direction  we  can  include as many different
sensory and motor channels  as  are  feasible.    For  example,  if  it were
possible  to  have  a  "sixth  sense" that registered dangers and perils, we
could just lay it down in a  groove  alongside  the  other  channels  of our
automaton.    Such  a  sense  might  be  used  only rarely, but it would not
overcomplicate the host system, because  its  dimensionality  fits  right in
with the  host design.   In  futuristic automata,  we could have some really
exotic senses present.

                                                                  6 APR 1979
                    The Acquisition and Function of Grammar Rules

     Now that on 28MAR1979 a new system-wide diagram has been developed, the
problem of grammar has returned to the eminence it held in fall of 1977.  At
that time I did develop a complex system of grammar, but I ended up with the
feeling that  my grammar  system was  too much in isolation from the (as yet
undeveloped) other portions of the automaton.  The more sweeping the grammar
rules I  allowed for  in my  system, the more I had to conjure up extraneous
inputs necessary for the function of my grammar system.   I felt  that I was
ending up  trying to  tackle the  problems just  by transposing the problems
outwards to the perceptual system.  Since the perceptual system had not been
designed, the  new grammar system stood in isolation while great burdens had
been heaped  upon an  almost non-existent  perceptual system.   However, the
feeling of  accomplishment in  the grammar  area did  set the  stage for the
perceptual work of April 1978.  Meanwhile, in  March of  1978 work  had also
been done  on the  motor side of the automaton.  It remained to simplify the
volition system in November of 1978.  From then on,  enough major subsystems
had been roughly designed that we could gain a new look at the total system.
As I tried to integrate the  perception subsystem  with the  total system, I
focussed on  the verb  problem on 17NOV1978.  Over the winter I felt stymied
by the verb problem,  but I  am holding  in abeyance  the tentative solution
through  an  abstract  memory.    Before  designing  in detail that abstract
memory, I want to  go back  to the  isolated grammar  work of  late 1977 and
modify my design which used extraneous inputs from the perceptual system.
     There are  two forms  of habituation  necessary in the language system:
the habituated linking of  phonemes to  form words,  and the  habituation of
grammar  rules.    In  my  present  work  I  have been tending to physically
separate those two domains of habituation:  to put phoneme  habituation into
the  VMHTS  "cerebellum"  and  to let grammar-rule habituation develop right
within the auditory memory channel itself.   I  am nudged  towards using the
auditory memory  channel because of the problem of how to enable the mind to
"hear itself think."  In the  system diagram  of 10  SEP 1977,  there was an
"Internal Verbal  Perception Line" as a sort of internal return loop so that
the motor mind could  hear its  own output  and simply  make a  choice as to
whether or  not that  output would actually be spoken.  Now, however, it may
prove radically simpler to  let the  very sound-volition  system be hearable
unto itself and serve as its own self-perception system.  The way to achieve
that  self-perception  would  simply  be  to  have  the  rather  wide-spread
sentence-generation process  deposit its pantothenic results in the succinct
form  of  an  utterance-capsule  at  the  freshest  extremity  of  the self-
lengthening auditory memory channel.  Indeed, it sometimes seems to me as if
people like R.D.  Palmer  have  a  well-developed  "pre-elocution register,"
because they  seem to  hold before their mind's eye their intended utterance
with the additional ability of altering it quickly in the light of their own
flashing reaction  to it.   The  trick of such a pseudo-register would be as
follows.  The "pantothenic" procedure  is  probably  sufficient  to generate
sentences  for  immediate,  unpremeditated  utterance  followed by immediate
deposition at memory-extremity.  Such is probably the  glib manner  in which
young  children  speak.    However, mature speakers with the "pre-elocution"
skill can perhaps let their  intended  utterances  go  into memory-extremity
before  exceeding   volition-thresholds  for  actual  speaking.    Thus  the
sentence-formulations can be rapidly adjusted  several  quick  times  in the
brief moment  before utterance.  Of course, the mechanism being described is
by no means simple.  There still has to be passage of control lines from the
auditory memory  channel to the "effatory" motor channel.  I haven't decided
whether those would be old "pantothenic" lines or  newly re-affirmed memory-
extremity  lines,  although  the  old  pantothenic  lines  are  necessary to
generate the reaffirmations.  In describing the system in this  paragraph, I
haven't  yet  described  what  mechanism would be generating those sentences
right within the self-perceiving auditory memory channel.
     The beauty of today's proposal  is  that  several  things  fit together
quite nicely.   The habituated grammar knowledge resides ubiquitously within
the auditory memory channel and  generates  sentences  from  verbal material
interspersed  amid  itself.    Simultaneously  the  auditory  memory channel
perceives and understands the sentences being generated within  itself.  The
auditory  memory  channel  thus  becomes  an  arena  through  which  all the
conscious knowledge of a mind can interact for such purposes as equilibrium,
synthesis, and communication.

     It is beginning to look as if "deep structure" is going to be little or
nothing more  than the  classifications which  arise in  the abstract memory
channel.   Just how  flexible and  "habituable" is this channel?  Its inputs
from perception  are  constantly  variable  through  the  mechanism  of "re-
affirmation."   Its outputs to the auditory memory channel are variable with
respect to their destinations within the auditory memory channel.   In other
words, there  can be  a two-tiered  process, which nicely keeps the abstract
memory isolated between perception and cogitation.   The  first tier  is the
perceptual  re-affirmative  inputs.    The  second  tier, that of outputs to
auditory  destinations,  will  probably  function  by  a  normal associative
tagging  mechanism.     That   is  to   say,  abstract   memory  lines  will
perpendicularly  acquire   their  output   destinations  on   the  basis  of
associative  tagging  through  simultaneity.    No,  I  take that back.  The
assigning of their destinations must probably  occur by  conscious learning.
You  see,  ordinary  simultaneity  would  create  too much of a jumble.  The
abstract memory is supposed to be aloof and isolated.
     Perception  fetches  no  theta-word  without  simultaneously  conveying
through the  abstract memory all the concomitant grammatical influences upon
that word.
     Perception fetches a theta-word directly, but the abstract concomitance
governs the  form and  syntax in which the word will emerge to be thought or
     Suppose a nonsense-word like  "kred" is  to be  pluralized into "kreds"
from perception.   The  basic theta-word  is fetched by recognition.  At the
same time  the  abstract  line  for  plurality  is  accessing  the extremely
frequently used suffix for plurality in the auditory memory channel.  But at
the same time this procedure must  be  being  organized  by  lines governing
syntax.   Of course,  syntax is part of the "concomitance."  That is to say,
syntax arises from  the  perception  itself.    Rules  of  syntax  have been
learned.    This  "learning"  has  been  habituated  through  the process of
establishing to which destinations the abstract-memory outputs will go.
     Now, I have been getting the idea that each whole line for  syntax will
actually be  a node  upon a  whole "tree"  of syntax nodes.  In other words,
each line will be truly elongated and not punctual, but also as  a node each
line will  lead up  from itself to a particular sentence-delta at the summit
of the tree, from whence branches will go down leading to other nodes crying
for imposition of satisfactory "fillers," be they words or concepts.
     Now, it  is rather  clear how  a low node-line for a particular percept
can come into play  simply as  a result  of logicoconceptual classification.
It's not so clear how a sentence-delta will come into play.  I would like to
make it hinge upon the total state of mind of the speaker.   For  example, a
playful person could express all of his declarative observations in the form
of questions.  Of course, there  would not  be very  many sentence-deltas to
choose from, anyway.
     The sentence-delta  could come from perceptual classification, but at a
time possibly either equal or prior to the low node-line.

                                                                  9 APR 1979

     The Evolution of Mind.  The new system diagram of 28MAR1979 leads me to
speculate that  now there  is an obvious possibility for the origin of mind.
Since the channels in the diagram are mainly in parallel and coming from the
joint area  of perception  and motor  function, I tend to see that stimulus-
response area  as  a  source  both  in  the  diagram  and  possibly  also in
evolution.    Until  recently  I  had  never viewed the evolution of mind as
possibly so simple a process.  But now I can imagine certain steps.
     An early step would  be  the  differentiation  of  cells  necessary for
stimulus and  response.   With such cells, many sorts of complex systems can
arise even before memory is introduced.
     Now, I don't claim to know how instinct functions, unless it is  a form
of  quasi-memory  pre-established  genetically.    But  the next step in the
evolution of mind might be  the  appearance  of  memory  capabilities.   Two
subdivisions in  this memory-stage might be instinctual memory and learning-
memory.  My diagram  of 28MAR1979  suggests to  me that  to add  memory to a
neuronal system  is to  open a  real floodgate  of possibilities.   It makes
sense to add memory only  in  enormous  quantities  suitable  for  the whole
natural  lifetime  of  the  organism.    Of  course, with all these parallel
memories there must also be the associative cross-linkage.
     The third  step  in the evolution  of mind  might  necessarily  be  the
development of an  abstract, logicoconceptual  memory, as  opposed to merely
sensory and motor memories.   In this regard it is perhaps significant that,
in my design of the  abstract memory,  I have had to derive it from  what we
might call the "apex" of the perceptual  memory channels.   Logicoconceptual
classification does not go directly sideways,  but occurs "apically" through
the roundabout route of recognition.  Contemplating the 28MAR1979 diagram, I
receive the strong impression  that the whole works  is just an outgrowth in
temporal extension of the original stimulus-response apex.

     Prototype Construction.    Although  consideration  of  actual hardware
construction should  not be  allowed to  influence the theoretical design of
our automaton, construction insights may be included in this journal.  For a
long time  I have  hoped to be able to use variable loops of memory channels
in a prototype so that, on the one  hand, I  could have  a real-time machine
without absurd simulations of time or its environment.  Now it (again) looks
as though it may  be  possible  to  use  loops  to  recirculate  the various
parallel  channels,  and  to  add  increments  as they become available.  Of
course,  the  sideways  associative  networks   would   also   have   to  be

                                                                 11 APR 1979

                         The Abstract Memory

     It should  be possible to use the 4APR1979 method of "dimensionalizing"
the abstract memory channel.
     The abstract channel stands  out alongside  so many  "concrete" sensory
and motor channels.
     The first  delineation of it is that its inputs probably come only from
sensory channels, and not from motor  channels.   The second  delineation is
that its  outputs are  only to the auditory memory channel as the vehicle of
language.  Therefore, in terms of  inputs and  outputs, the  abstract memory
channel  is  an  organizer  of  all  sensory perception channels for special
presentation  to  the  auditory  perception  channel.    Significantly,  the
abstract memory  channel can have both input from and output to the auditory
memory channel.  Although I have been designing the abstract memory in terms
of the  visual memory channel, a blind person can certainly learn the use of
language, and therefore the abstract memory must be open to  most or  all of
     The possible  need for  an abstract memory arose in the effort to solve
the problem of access to verbs.  I may now use the abstract memory  to carry
or mediate  the whole grammar system of language.  For grammar, the question
is, must abstract memory lines be simple and  unconnected, or  can they feed
into one  another and  cause structures  to arise within the abstract memory
itself?  In other  words,  what  is  the  "dimensionality"  of  the abstract
memory?   To start  out with,  it is at least two-dimensional because it has
the length and width of its group of multiple lines.
     Each  "planar"  line  represents  a  classification  of  elements  from
perception.   These are  not classifications  made consciously  by the mind,
they are automatic.
     It seems to me  that the  most difficult  classifications are  the ones
that fetch verbs.  But it is not enough just to find a root verb in storage;
for Indo-European languages, the proper modification  has to  be worked upon
the form of the verb.  Such modifications are almost always worked according
to standard rules; otherwise, specific irregularities are recalled.  But the
rationale for  the functioning  of rules  has to be present already when the
fetch-order is made for a verb, so I refer to the extra request-structure as
the "concomitance."
     I would  now like  to suggest that the total verb-fetching structure is
itself a concomitance to the perception-driven  generation of  a noun phrase
perceived as the subject of an incipient utterance.
     The mind unconsciously knows that noun phrases call for verb phrases to
form sentences.  So perhaps  a  "first-filler"  mechanism  latches  on  to a
subject-function noun  phrase and then tries to fill in the role of the verb
phrase.  Perception  or  selection  of  a  subject  noun-phrase  initiates a
coordinated process.
     It is  not hard  to imagine  how a  classification-line in the abstract
memory can get hold of a subject  noun-phrase.    There  can  be  a  kind of
"primacy-hook" so  that an attempt is made to force any new discrete percept
into the role of a subject noun-phrase.  The fact that thereafter begins the
search  for  the  concomitance  means  that "primocapture" (or the "primacy-
hook") has broken into a kind of absorption-structure.

                                                                 19 APR 1979

                         Ideas on Grammar Habituation

- The bridge from a perception to auditory memory  involves three  things:  
  word, syntax, and inflection.

- In a  way, a salient feature of syntax is probably already present when a 
  percept is seized upon as one meant to lead to an initial word.

- It is important to distinguish between the two domains which  give rise to
  the generation of sentences:  external perception and internal reflection.
  It is possible that all sentence-generation occurs only  under the control
  of internal reflection through a consciousness-continuity-mechanism.  Such
  a notion is attractive because it allows a syntax-mechanism to  be always 
  dominant.   The idea is, let nothing be perceived (or thought) unless the 
  syntax-mechanism is attentive to it and ready to latch onto it.

- We expect the more convoluted, more contorted sentences (such as these
  journal sentences) to arise from the domain of internal reflection.  There
  syntax can become quite complex because of the way in which one thought
  (or reflection)  leads to another.  External perception we expect to give
  rise to short, simple, direct sentences  made  in  observation  of  the
  external world.   This  discussion matters  significantly, because we are
  faced with the question of deciding  what  causes  the  lead-off  to  a
  sentence, or what causes the initial syntactic assertion.  You see, we may
  want there to be a natural tendency for subjects and nominative case to be
  the first  to assert themselves in the domain of external perception.  The
  oblique cases we expect to be much more likely to start sentences (such as
  this one)  in the domain of internal reflection.  Such expectations are
  reasonable, because the continuity  of internal  thought can  cause each
  internal sentence  in a  chain to  pass a  syntactic departure  onto the
  succeeding sentence.  Oblique departures can allow internal sentences to
  begin with  or hinge  upon oblique  constructions.   On the  other hand,
  observations made about the external domain can be expected to spring so
  directly from "prime movers" as subjects that oblique constructions would
  not be called for.

- In the auditory memory channel, an "onset-tag" would serve to fetch a     
  word, while  an ultimate-tag would serve to recognize a word.  Such close  
  bifurcation to a word gives the idea of looping through a word before      
  returning to pronounce a word.

                                                                 27 APR 1979

                              More on Grammar

     The bridge  by which  a word crosses from perception to auditory memory
involves three things beyond the word itself:   part of  speech, syntax, and
inflection.   The part  of speech is a spontaneous concomitance of the word.
That is, each perception  is originally  channeled as  a particular  part of
speech.  So a perception heads towards a word along two vectors:  the parse-
vector towards syntax and the recall-vector  towards the  basic, stored form
of  the  word.    The  part  of  speech  (plus  perhaps  also the "syntactic
departure") leads to the syntax, and then the syntax governs the inflection.

Nolarbeit Theory Journal                                         28 APR 1979
                                                          diagram number one

                                                     /       \
                                                    \  model  /

            round-about connection                 /\
      /--------------------------------\          /
      |                                |         /part-of-speech
      |                                |        /vector
      |                                |       /
      |                                |      /
    __|__                           ___V___  /                      _____
   /     \   re-affirmation line   /       \/   recall-vector      /     \
  /percept\<----------------------/abstract \-------------------->/stored \
  \       /                       \ memory  /                     \ word  /
   \_____/                         \_______/                       \_____/

                                                                 28 APR 1979

     For sentence-trees, we want a  structure  which  is  like  a  filter in
abstract memory.  A percept has various vectors in its concomitance, such as
part-of-speech vector, function-vector, recall-vector,  and  any  of various
modification-vectors   for   such   things   as   plurality,   negation,  or
conditionality.  An S-structure  (or sentence-structure)  in abstract memory
looks like  a ladder which has slots instead of rungs, and furthermore there
are multiple apparitions of the ladder  for multiple  levels below  the "S."
When the concomitance vectors of a percept "address" any slot on any ladder-
level of any S-structure,  then the  very re-affirmation  line quickly wends
its way  up through  the S-structure  to the  apical S.   Well, perhaps not;
let's investigate further, because  meanwhile I  have drawn  today's diagram
number two.

Nolarbeit Theory Journal                                         28 APR 1979
                                                          diagram number two

             \          \                               \
   \          \          \                               \
    \          \          \                               \          ...
     \          \          \                               \        =   =
      \      \   \    \     \         \               \     \      = SM  =
       \      \   \    \     \    ...  \          ...  \     \      =...=
        \      \   \    \     \  =   =  \        =   =  \     \
         \      \   \    \     \= SM  =  \      = SM  =  \     \     ...
          \      \   \___ \     \=...=    \      =...=    \     \   =   =
           \      \  /   \ \     \___      \      ...      \     \ = NP  =
            \      \< SM  > \    /   \      \    =   =      \     \ =...=
             \      \\___/   \  < NP  >      \  = NP  =      \     \
              *      \___     \  \___/        \  =...=        \     \___
              S      /   \     \               \               \    /   \
                    < Nuc >     \               \               \  < V   >
                     \___/       \___            \___            \  \___/
                                 /   \           /   \            \
                                < VP  >         < MV  >            \
                                 \___/           \___/              \___
                                                                    /   \
                                                                   < NP  >

     I need  a word  to describe  that roundabout  passage of a percept back
through old recognitions in a  cross-over  to  elongations  in  the abstract
memory channel.   We could call it "anocatamnesis" for "up-and-down memory,"
that is, "supratraversial" memory which  flows  up,  across,  and  then down
again in  an "anocatamnemic"  way to achieve an "anocatothenic" tie-in to an
abstract memory line.  Forsooth, I need  such  words  so  as  to  think more
     Anyway, in  today's diagram  number two we see the various slots in the
various levels  of an  S-structure.   The concomitance-vectors  of a percept
will reach any such slot supratraversially.  It is readily obvious from this
diagram that certain superior (abstract-memory) lines must feed into certain
inferior  lines.     In   fact,  the   whole  rationale  of  addressing  the
anocatothenic S-line is to  generate  a  sentence  out  of  parts  tagged by
perception.   The question  is, what  taps the  S-line?  Perhaps it does not
matter whether the S-line  is tapped  by perception  or internal reflection.
Nevertheless, a subapical percept gets to its slot through the anocatamnemic
filter.  Notice that "NP" for "noun phrase" occurs twice  in today's diagram
number two,  but that  the two  noun phrases  differ greatly with respect to
their function, which is "subject of  verb"  in  the  superior  instance and
"direct object of verb" in the inferior instance.  Obviously, as part of the
anocatamnemic  filter,  a  function-vector   has   to   help   select  which
anocatothenic  noun  phrase  will  be  activated.    So  the concomitance of
perception filters through to  the proper  slots in  the S-structure.   (Let
each elongated abstract-memory line be an "anocat.")  We might have to think
of the S-anocat as freezing or steadying mental activity in such a way as to
permit all  available and  relevant percepts to percolate through the supra-
filter to their proper slots in the S-structure.   After  all, these anocats
are  actually  controlling  or  manipulating the recall-vectors of the words
tagged to the percolating percepts.  So when a word is being  recalled, say,
a  noun  or  a  verb,  the  source-percept  (or  a series of them) is like a
stanchion to  which the  various filter-vectors  are tied.   In  fact, it is
possible  to  glimpse  a  scene  and  then  close  one's eyes and generate a
sentence about the scene.  The various percepts become the stanchions.
     I just got a possible insight on the inflection-mechanism.   Perhaps it
functions because  the word-recall-mechanism  is two-tiered.  The first tier
is indirect through  anocatamnesis,  and  then  the  second  tier  is direct
through the re-affirmation mechanism.  The first tier could be subconscious,
and the second tier, with the inflections added, could be conscious.
     Anyway, in the case of a  momentarily "frozen"  S-structure, a percept-
vel-word such as a subject NP has activated its proper slot.  The system now
has the time of the "freeze," during which  all possible  percepts can drive
vectors through  the supra-filter to reach and fill up the appropriate slots
in the  S-structure.    Meanwhile,  the  S-structure  effortlessly functions
perpendicularly  (to  the  anocats)  to  drive  slot-fillers away from deep-
structure and out towards  the  ready-made  sentence  of  surface structure.
However,  what  does  each  slot  have  hold  of?  Each anocat-slot has been
arrived at via the concomitance-vectors of a percept-stanchion.  Somehow the
anocat has  to keep  hold of the underlying word-recall-vector.  So far, the
anocat-slot "knows" what part of speech  the word  is, what  its grammatical
function is,  and, per  se, where  syntax will put it in the sentence.  Aha,
what it does not know is what the inflection of the word  will be.   But the
inflection is highly dependent upon the function-vector, which was used, for
instance, to choose which of several possible NP-slots would be  selected in
the S-structure.   Now, do we want the function-vector to continue up in the
supra-filter, or to be  subsumed in  the branchings  away from  any relevant
anocat-slot?  Remember, we still haven't figured out how the anocat-slot has
hold of the word-recall-vector.
     The time-order of perception is not necessarily going to be the same as
that of  the resulting  utterance.  The S-structure creates a specific time-
order for the utterance.
     The question is, at what point  do  the  words  mesh  with  the anocat-
clusters of information concerning the words?
     In  general,   manipulative  control  over  a  word  must  probably  be
considered to operate upon that word as it sits there in the auditory memory
channel.   Then the  control of  inflections of  that word is a separate but
related process.
     The S-structure that we see in  today's diagram  number two  - its sole
purpose is  to generate  syntax, temporal  word-order.   It is not concerned
with the forms  of  the  words,  the  inflections,  or  the  intonations and
accents.   But since  the S-structure is indeed declaring the syntax, it has
hold of the words while other processes determine the inflections.
     Perhaps the supra-filter fetches  the stem  of a  word plus  a vectored
approach  to  its  possible  inflections.    If so, there is an interstitial
return from the auditory memory  channel  to  the  abstract  memory channel.
Perhaps  the  stem  of  the  word  is  fetched  by an onset-tag, and then an
ultimate-tag leads back to  the abstract  processing-mechanism which vectors
towards the proper inflection.  Note that when the ultimate-tag leads to the
abstract channel, it (the tag) has to join up with  a function-vector  if it
is going to lead to the proper inflection in the auditory channel.
     Perhaps the S-structure actually decrees which recall-vector will first
fetch a stem from the auditory memory channel.
     When we say that the S-structure has control of the  underlying recall-
vectors, perhaps  what we mean is that signals from the anocat-slots have to
be AND-gated to the processing-vectors if their progress is to proceed.
     I suspect that initial  word-order  hinges  upon  perception,  and that
subsequent word-order to round out the sentence comes from the S-structure.
     Here's a  possible scenario.  An active component signal flashes at the
primordial point of the  surface-structure syntax.   This  signal cannot re-
trace backwards, so it has to have been "escorted" by an AND-gated vector to
the word-fetch (word-recall) line.  So  therefore let  us say  that the word
recall-line  in  the  supra-filter  has  to go through its own quasi-ladder-
levels to reach the auditory memory channel.   A specific  percept will pass
through  each  quasi-ladder-level  only  if  it  is  AND-gated  from  the S-
structure.  Even, or finally, at the level of surface-structure a fetch-line
(recall-line) has  to get  the go-ahead of an AND-gate from the S-structure.
If the first item in an utterance gets its surface-structure  go-ahead, then
a stem  is accessed in the auditory memory channel.  However, accessing that
stem could possibly send an ultimate-tag back into the abstract-processor in
search of  an inflection.   Now,  it is  obvious that the ultimate-tag would
lead to an abstract area specific to the stem just  fetched.   For instance,
it might  lead to  a decision-juncture  of five  possible case-endings.  The
proper selection would then be done by AND-gating with the  proper function-
vector back along the recall-path.
     A word  recall-line, then,  is a  "knotty" path with abstract AND-nodes
along it.  The AND-nodes correspond to quasi-ladder-levels.  When input goes
into  a  cluster  of  recall-lines  that will coalesce into a sentence, each
recall-line has to be helped along  by successive  go-ahead AND-signals from
the S-structure.  It may be that all but the surface-structure go-aheads are
very  quickly  and  haphazardly  forthcoming,  so  that  sentence-generation
proceeds quickly and in a manner of parallel processing.
     However, the  release of surface-structure items is a serial operation.
(Stuttering may be due to a foul-up in this operation.)  When a point on the
surface-structure releases  its go-ahead  AND-signal, we might say that that
point is de-potentiated.  It summons  a  stem,  and  the  stem  activates an
ultimate-tag.    The  ultimate-tag  AND-gates  with  the  function-vector to
address an appropriate  inflection-engram.    Perhaps  the inflection-engram
also  activates  an  ultimate-tag  to  send  serial  control  back to the S-
structure.  In fact, control may  pass straight  to the  S-anocat, whence it
quickly  percolates  to  the serially next undepotentiated surface-structure
item.  During this process, all accessed engrams of the auditory channel are
being thought or spoken.

                                                                  2 MAY 1979

     In  the  work  of  27APR1979  I  was theorizing that the grammar-bridge
involves three vectors:  part of speech, syntax,  and inflection,  above and
beyond the recall-vector.  I would now like to pare that number of four down
to just two:  a function-vector and a recall-vector.
     Syntax doesn't have to be a  vector, because  the S-structure  is there
waiting  for  the  perceptions.   Part-of-speech, and inflection, are really
just aspects of a word's function,  so a  function-vector should  cover both
those aspects.  The grammar system really doesn't care what part of speech a
word  is;  it  just  cares  what  function  it  serves.    We  scholars have
artificially  classified  the  parts  of  speech.    As for inflections, the
function-vector will go into the grammar system, and then it  will encounter
a mechanism which takes care of inflections.
     It is  good to  pare down  the number of bridge-vectors, so that the S-
structure of syntax will  have to  keep track  of fewer  underlying items in
     So therefore,  when a  word is  going to  be recalled from, say, visual
perception to auditory memory, the process  has to  bridge the  chasm filled
with lines of abstract memory.  The abstract memory is operationally divided
into parts.  The logicoconceptual  "cable"  allows  rudimentary  percepts to
join  together  to  fetch  such  complex  items  as verbs.  This "L-C cable"
(logicoconceptual cable) probably also works to fetch such work-words as all
conjunctions and  prepositions.  It would be safe to theorize that nouns and
adjectives also can be mediated by  the LCC  (L-C cable).   So word-fetching
recall-vectors are rooted in the LCC of the abstract memory.
     The problem  is, we need a grammar system that will handle both classes
and specifics.
                                                    (Later, in the evening.)
     There could be a way of increasing the number of logicoconceptual lines
in an abstract memory cable if bunched lines were allowed to subdivide or if
free, unused lines were  allowed  to  join  with  dedicated  lines  and then
unjoin, leaving only dedicated lines.  Then the dedications could diverge.

     To pursue  the syntax  question, let's assume that the L-C cable had as
its righthand "wall" a  plane  of  around  twenty  thousand  L-C  lines each
representing  a   word-stem  onset-tag   in  the  auditory  memory  channel.
Obviously, I am establishing  a syntax-gulf  between the  L-C cable  and the
auditory  memory  channel.    Instead  of  directly  accessing  the auditory
engrams, I am  positing  lengthy  lines  over  which  the  syntax-system can
exercise some control.
     Strangely enough,  my concept  of AND-gating  is re-emerging.  I want a
way for the syntax system to control each logicoconceptual word line whether
as a  class or  as a  specific.   The problem is that each of the 20,000 L-C
lines will  probably  have  multiple,  even  multitudinous  outputs  over to
historical engrams in the auditory channel.  Therefore it becomes imperative
for syntax to control the vertical L-C line itself rather  than the numerous
horizontal fetch-lines.   So  we must  set up  a system where, sure, the L-C
line can be accessed and be  ready to  fire over  into auditory  memory, but
where an  enabling (and sequencing) input from syntax must be present if the
L-C line is to fire.
     Felicitously, once we require  an AND-gate-type  input from  syntax, we
allow the  process also  to work backwards, in a way.  Looking for a subject
or object of a verb, by blanket AND-gating, syntax can  prime the  L-C cable
to fire the L-C line of whatever word is solely or most decidedly active.

Nolarbeit Theory Journal                                          3 MAY 1979

   M  O---|                  /     _________________________________________
       ___|   Cerebellum    /     |
   u  O __|                /      |
       / _|               /-------'
   s  O / |              /--------,
       / / \            /         |  Motor Memory Activation Channel
   c  O / / \          /\         |_________________________________________
       / / / \        /\ \
   l  O / / / \      /  \ \
       / / / / \    /    \ \       _________________________________________
   e  O / / / / \  /      \ \     |
       / / / /   \/        \ \____|
   s  O / / /               \_____
       / / /                      |
      O / /                       |  Concept Nodes
       / /                        |_________________________________________
      O /
      O        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

        |  |                       _________________________________________
        |  |                      |
        |  |____                  |
        |       \_________________|
        | EAR_____________________
        |   |                     |
        /  /                      |  Auditory Memory Channel
       |__/                       |_________________________________________
                                                         ___/             \
                                                     ___/                  |
                                                 ___/ ______     ______    |
                                             ___/    |      |   |      |   |
                                         ___/       /|  MV  |---|  NP  |   |
                    syntax cable        /   _____  / |______|\  |______|   |
             ==========================|   |     |/           \  ______    |
             ==========================|   |  S  |             \|      |   |
             ==========================|   |_____|\   ______    |  V   |   |
                                        \___       \ |      |   |______|   |
                                            \___    \|  NP  |\   ______    |
                                                \___ |______| \ |      |   |
                                                    \___       \|  NP  |   |
                                                        \___    |______|   |

                ========================================================  \
               ========================================================    |
              ========================================================     |
             ========================================================     /
             \                  logicoconceptual cable               \   /
     __           ___________
    /  \\        /           \______________________________________________
   /    \\      |
   | EYE |\_____|
   \    //\_____
    \__//       |               Visual Memory Channel
                |             ______________________________________________

                                                                  3 MAY 1979

     The firing  of an  L-C line  may not  have to be strict AND-gating with
strictly two inputs.  Instead, it may be a kind of summation  or integration
process where  the second  input just pushes it to threshold, but where even
strong primary inputs might suffice to cause firing apart from syntax.
     One way to achieve the sequencing desired of  syntax or  an S-structure
would be to have a system in which control-lines fed into one another.  That
is to say, each line could be both a control line for  the L-C  cable and an
input line to its successor.
     I am now beginning to visualize a hierarchy of the "syntax-cable" lying
above and dominating the L-C cable.  However, the L-C cable is  different in
that it  does not have internal sequences.  Fibers of the syntax cable would
use "backwards-blanketing" to prime for firing  whole classes  such as nouns
or verbs in the L-C cable.
     So  we  can  visualize  a  surface-structure  level of the syntax cable
resting right above the L-C cable.   This  surface structure  holds a series
of,  say,  seven  syntax  lines.    Each  such  syntax-line  is in itself an
elongated abstract memory fiber.   It  has multitudinous  historical one-way
connections to the L-C cable class which it governs by backwards-blanketing.
It is not important now whether it goes directly to  all the  members of the
class or  to an  intermediate collective  fiber.  The seven syntax lines are
chained together in a successive way.  Now, I don't want to rush the firing-
sequence, so  I think  I should introduce a moderating mechanism to let each
word get sent into pronunciation and actually get activated before  the next
word is  crammed down the pipeline.  It is one task to activate the words in
the proper sequence, and it is another, equally important task  to await the
successful  activation   of  each   preceding  word  before  initiating  the
activation of each succeeding word.
     I would like the ready-for-next-word signal to come out of the accessed
auditory memory channel and into the syntax-cable, perhaps in the form of an
ultimate-tag  fed  onto  a  special-purpose  abstract  bus  coming  from all
ultimate-tags.   For the  moment, I  am ignoring the interstitial problem of
     Anyway, I see the need now  to hierarchize  the insides  of the syntax-
cable.   Let the  bottom level,  just above  the L-C  cable, be the properly
sequenced surface-structure.  Then let other levels pyramid upwards to go to
the S-apex of the sentence-tree.
     Note that  I have finally found a way to fit in the dimensionality of a
transformational-grammar tree-structure.   First  the logicoconceptual cable
rests like a flat wall of around twenty thousand fibers between, say, visual
perception and the auditory memory channel.  But when I want to  pyramid the
S-structure of  the syntax-cable  over the  flatness of the logicoconceptual
cable, I take the liberty of imagining that the flatness of the L-C cable is
rotated through  ninety degrees  so as to interface with the bottom plane of
the S-structure.  But actually these cables can just as  well be  thought of
as round  and as  internally jumbled,  so I  make up the following Nommultic
guideline:  The internal dimensionality of  a quasi-neuronal  cable does not
matter with  respect to  the external  dimensionalities which  the cable can
enter into.
     My reasons for  hierarchizing  the  syntax-cable  are  not  yet totally
clear.   It is convenient to get the tree-structure built in already now.  I
suspect that the syntax cable must be so  hierarchized so  that later  I can
plan in  how transformations will occur.  For the moment, I want to theorize
that the ready-for-next-word signal will come in at  the apical  S-level and
go down  all branches  at once  so as  to move  the firing locus over by one
     For weeks now I have been imagining a syntax-tree and trying to  fit it
into my  general scheme of things based on the diagram of 28MAR1979.  So now
I see it as a pyramidal epiphysis to a rotated plane.

                                                                  4 MAY 1979

                    Preparing to Assault the Inflection Problem

     This morning on Seattle's Pier 51 I have been reading back over the NTJ
from  4APR1979  onwards.    I  want now to record certain side-ideas without
necessarily following a specific track of thought.
     Yesterday it became especially clear that  my present  theorizing calls
for elements  of verbal thought to surface in consciousness in the following
way.  We consciously  perceive a  lot of  quick sideways  loops made  by the
grammar system  through or  in and  out of the auditory memory channel.  The
grammar  system  strings  together   word-stems  and   inflections  to  form
sentences.    Those  phonetic  elements, the word-stems and inflections, are
actually stored and operated upon within the auditory  memory channel.   All
the complex linguistic processing goes on within the grammar system, and yet
the focus of linguistic processing slips  in and  out of  auditory memory as
the sentence-elements are strung together.
     Having thought  up the  idea of  a "linguistic  focus" in the preceding
paragraph, I get the idea of an imaginary  little ball  or bead  being moved
around as  the focus of linguistic control.  For instance, when the control-
focus moves into the auditory memory  channel to  flow through  a word-stem,
the rest  of the process has to wait until the control-focus comes back out,
perhaps in the form of an  ultimate-tag designating  the end  of the engram.
But of course, no little black bead is bouncing back and forth in and out of
the auditory  channel.   Instead, the  grammar system  is undergoing various
internal states, one of which involves accessing an auditory engram and then
waiting for a return-signal before resumption of operation.   Of  course, it
is not  yet certain that return-signals exit the auditory channel, but it is
presently convenient to think so.
     This  recent  work  on  the  grammar  system  has   been  quite  novel.
Previously I  was designing  systems of  information-flow where  one flow of
information did not govern another.  For my perception and motor channels, I
was simply  deciding what the basic automatic routing would be.  Now for the
grammar system  I  have  begun  to  design  systems  of  control,  where one
mechanism (syntax)  must govern  the procedures of other mechanisms.  I have
had to  adjust  my  thinking  to  handle  combinatorial  flows  where widely
disparate inputs yield hybrid outputs, as for instance in the case of syntax
governing word-recall.  At  some times,  I have  had to  think about  a line
representing  a  specific,  and  at  other times about a line representing a
whole class.  I have had to think about ways to control both types  of lines
without violating their logical integrity.

     My  long-standing  "pull-string"  theory  of  transformational  grammar
probably has to do with the selection of which transformation  will operate.
By "pull-string"  I meant  that the  very route  of access  to the sentence-
structure would determine or select the transformation.   The basic criteria
are the  elements in  a normal,  untransformed sentence-structure.  When the
mind seizes upon any such element, the element can possibly act as  a "pull-
string" to  yank even  the weirdest syntactic transformation into operation.
For instance, if the mind seizes  upon  an  element  which  it  is presently
regarding  as  a  direct  object,  such  a  seizure  might  yank the passive
transformation into operation.  Haste or urgency in  expression might compel
many kinds of deletion-transformations.

                                                                  5 MAY 1979

                       (Function-Cable Plus Ultimate-Tag) Times

                    Inflection-Cable Yields Appropriate Inflection

     It is  shortly after midnight and I have decided to sit down and try to
figure out at least a rudimentary instance of inflection.  Let's say that in
the first declension of a Latin-type language we are dealing with inflection
as to whether a noun is subject or direct object of a verb.
     First of all,  I  suspect  that  my  so-called  "function-vector"  is a
function  of  the  syntax  system.    That  is  to say, the S-structure, not
perception, determines whether a noun is construed as subject or object.  If
a noun  is going to be direct object instead of subject, then it will be led
into by  a different  transformation, a  different form  of the S-structure.
I'm not  absurdly saying  that perception  plays no  role at all; I'm saying
that the information (of subject or  object) is  transmitted more  by how we
perceive than by what we perceive.
     Let  me  review  how  the  concatenated surface-structure will operate.
Each node  on it  "backwards-blankets" a  whole class  of potential fillers.
Theoretically, an  individual filler thus gets released over to the auditory
memory channel, where it  will activate  an engram.   The  grammar system is
meanwhile poised  to receive  an ultimate-tag  out of  the auditory channel,
which tag will send a blanket "next-signal" down the S-apex.
     It therefore follows  that  all  ultimate-tags  feed  into  an abstract
memory  line  which  can  pass  the control-focus back to the syntax-system.
Such a state of affairs is not difficult or unpleasant to imagine.  In fact,
it may be a way of causing sentences to arise in the first place.
     However, such  ultimate tags  must also carry the burden of seeking out
inflection.  Now, I don't yet know what  my hoped-for  solution is  going to
be, but  I do  know the  available inputs for this black-box mechanism.  One
input is the nature of the syntax-node that  has prompted  the engram-fetch.
Somehow that  information has  to be kept available so that it can influence
what happens  inflection-wise to  the fetched  engram.   The other available
input is  inherent in  the nature  of the fetched engram.  Somehow, over the
history of the organism, it must have slowly or quickly come to  be the case
that, from  engrams of  the particular fetched stem, ultimate-tags would not
only  activate  the  return-control  bar,  but  they  would  also  prime for
activation  a  declension-peculiar  slate  of  possible  case-endings  to be
selected depending upon the  "function-vector"  emanating  from  the syntax-
node.   In other  words, all ultimate-tags from a certain declension have to
go and "half-activate" or "poise-activate" first a collective  abstract line
and through  it a set of abstract lines, each holding multitudinous specific
cross-over lines into the  auditory memory  channel, where  they activate an
     Now the  problem remains  of how to get the syntax-node function-vector
information over to  the  single  line  in  the  poise-activated  cluster of
abstract inflection-lines.   Note  that each abstract line has multitudinous
concrete cross-over lines.
     So far that function-vector is just kind of hanging there.   It doesn't
go into the L-C cable, because it isn't needed there.
     Of course,  we could  set up an abstract "function-cable."  The syntax-
cable would be "trained"  to set  the status  of the  function-cable at each
time when  the syntax-cable were firing one of its function-valent nodes, or
even any node.  Yes, the  surface-structure nodes  could become "hard-wired"
to trip  the function-cable  with each node-firing.  Then the function-cable
in turn sends out specific-case blanket-signals to all  possible declension-
clusters of case-lines.  Well now, dare I cry "eureka"?
     If  this  tentative  solution  works,  it  has  been  achieved  by some
methodologically noteworthy inclusions in the system.  It seems as  though I
just throw  in one  or several  abstract lines  whenever I want to create an
isolation-buffer between two mechanisms.   I don't think  that I  would want
the syntax-nodes directly to access and trip the declensional case-clusters.
Anyway, it makes more  sense  first  to  centralize  and  then  centrally to
distribute the control lines.
     It is  also noteworthy  that I have had two outputs issue from a single
syntax-node.  One output  blanket-accesses part  of the  L-C cable  so as to
flush out  a word-recall.   The other output now sets the abstract function-
cable,  which in turn trigger-blankets all associated case-lines  regardless
of declension.  There  is  perhaps a third output from the surface-structure
syntax-node telling the next node that it will fire when co-triggered by the
signal percolating in from the ultimate-tag return-control bar.
     Let's  go  over  now  how  words will be fetched and their inflectional
endings be put on.  The syntax-node of  the surface-structure  sends out two
signals.   The first  signal, a kind of recall-vector, blankets a portion of
the logicoconceptual cable containing all the  abstract vocabulary-lines for
a certain  part of  speech.   If one  of those  abstract lines has been pre-
poised from perception, it now tries to activate all or the freshest  of its
concrete cross-over  lines.   At least one concrete cross-over line succeeds
in activating an engram in the auditory memory channel.  That engram  is now
blipped consciously  throughout the auditory memory channel.  Without pause,
its ultimate-tag is activated and outputs to two  destinations.   No, wait a
minute;  it  does  not  go  to  the  return-control bar, it goes only to the
cluster of abstract case-ending-lines  peculiar to  its declension.   It can
not  fire  a  case-line  yet,  because  it  does  not  know  which  case  is
appropriate; so it merely pre-poises all its cases.   Meanwhile,  the second
signal from  the syntax-node  has unerringly  gone into the "function-cable"
and  activated  an  abstract  collective  bar  which  in  turn  branches out
distributively to  pre-poise all  appropriate case-lines of all declensions.
Of course, it is the grammatically same case in all  the declensions.   Once
the two  pre-poisings from  syntax and  ultimate-tag come together, they co-
operate to  select one  specific abstract  case-ending line,  from which the
concrete cross-over  lines now  reach into  the auditory channel to activate
the inflectional engram.  At the end of the inflectional engram, now finally
the  ultimate-tag  outputs  solely  to  the  return-control  bar, to let the
syntax-cable know that the next node can now generate the  next word  in the
     It  has  been  convenient  to  make  groupings  of related lines in the
abstract memory and call the groupings "cables."   I can  group together the
various  clusters   of  abstract   inflectional  lines  and  call  them  the
"inflection-cable."  The inflection-cable  is  totally  under  the selective
pre-poise control  of the function-cable, which is itself directed or set by
the node-lines of the syntax-cable.
     By the  way, does  it seem  true that  perpendicular concrete-lines are
necessary to  interconnect abstract  lines?  Does it also seem true that the
multitudinous concrete-lines with their re-affirmation lines are the vehicle
of the mechanism of habituation-learning?
     I  feel  bold  enough  to  start theorizing that even plurality-signals
could work their way through the grammar system by much  the same mechanisms
as I  have already  employed today.   Number-signals would come from the L-C
cable  and  they  would  "start-poise"  either  the  function-cable  or  the
inflection-cable.    Of  course,  with  number  you  also get the problem of
agreement between subject and  verb.   Maybe it  would be  good to  have the
number-vector go  from the  L-C cable  to the function-cable, where it could
perhaps be used to affect the number of both subjects and verbs.

                                                                  8 MAY 1979

   /^^^^^^^^^^^^\                                          /^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\
  / Visual       \               ______                   / Auditory       \
 | Memory Channel |             /      \  ultimate-tag   | Memory Channel   |
 |                |            / syntax \<---------------|---------------\  |
 |                |            \  node  /       ______   |               |  |
 |                |             \______/------>/      \  |               |  |
 |     round-about| connection     |          /function\ |               |  |
 |    /-----------|-------------\  |flush     \ cable  / |               |  |
 |    |           |             |  |vector     \______/  |     ______    |  |
 |    |           |            _V__V_               |    |    /      \   |  |
 |   _|___        |           /      \ recall-vector|    |   / stored \  |  |
 |  /     \  re-af|firmation /logico- \-------------|----|-->\  stem  /  |  |
 | /percept\<-----|-------->/conceptual\ (onset-tag)|    |    \______/   |  |
 | \       / line |         \ cable    /            |    |         |     |  |
 |  \_____/       |          \________/       ______V_   | ultimate|-tag |  |
 |                |                          /        \<-|---------'     |  |
 |                |                         /inflection\ |     ________  |  |
 |                |                         \  cable   /-|--->/        \ |  |
 |                |                          \________/  |   /  stored  \|  |
 |                |                                      |   \inflection/   |
 |                |                                      |    \________/    |

                                                                  9 MAY 1979

                    Ideas on the Habituation of Grammar

     It may be premature for me  to start  attacking the  problem of grammar
habituation, because  I still  have important problems in deciding just what
there is that should be habituated.   For  instance, I  have the  problem of
habituating the  various transformations  of sentence-structures.  But I may
be able to list the various ingredients and then devise a kind of "universal
habituator" for abstract memory channels.
     I  will  probably  have  to  get  down  into quasi-neuronal function to
achieve habituation.  In my model,  I don't  want to  use the  growth of any
portions of  neurons, unless  I am  forced to.  I would rather use the post-
growth logical  interconnection of  neurons that  have already  grown into a
sort of tabula-rasa network.
     The  unusual  thing  here  is  going  to  be  the  tenuousness  of  the
habituating influence:  language-patterns of experienced,  adept speakers as
perceived by a neophyte.
     I may  try first  to plan the habituation of a simple, normal syntactic
structure as found in the diagram of 3MAY1979.
     I should keep in mind three important functions  of neurons:   positive
transmission, inhibition, and frequency-coding.  Indeed, I was most eager to
mention inhibition  just now,  but then  frequency-coding occurred  to me as
also worthy  of mention.   Then  the idea  hit me,  after I  wrote the first
sentence of this paragraph, that I could perhaps  use frequency-coding  as a
way of letting emphasis on a pattern be a way of habituating the pattern.  I
should just keep this idea in mind.
     I must also consider the right degree of play-off between genetic hard-
wiring and habituated learning.
     When  an  infant  is  first  saying  nouns  to refer to percepts, I can
imagine a primitive S-structure causing each instance of  the enabling  of a
firing-link from a perception channel over to the auditory engram.  In other
words, the pyramidal S-structure acts like  an element  of volition, perhaps
only  by  operating  whenever  attention  is directed to things that will be
verbalized.  For present purposes, we can assume that the S-structure either
always tries to operate or is involved subconsciously by some such mechanism
as attention or volition.
     In establishing the logicoconceptual cable, it  seems safe  to theorize
that first  the perpendicular recall-lines develop, going from perception to
the auditory channel.  We can then think of a  mass of  L-C fibers pervading
and inhibiting the recall-lines.  The L-C fibers could come in for all nouns
as a part-of-speech class.  It would then be the normal dormant  function of
the L-C  fibers to  inhibit the  noun-recall lines.   Activation  of the L-C
fibers would disinhibit, but not activate, the noun-recall-lines.
     The recall-lines and the L-C fibers would be running at right angles to
each other.  Each recall-line would adopt the L-C fiber or fibers closest to
and inhibiting the recall-line  as the  incipient logicoconceptual  line for
that recall-line and its related percepts, both historical and future.
     Now  we  run  into  the  problem  of  the  re-affirmation lines.  A re-
affirmation line  from visual  perception is  a normal  associative tag that
goes  from  the  visual  channel  over  to the L-C cable but not necessarily
directly over to the auditory channel.  We could think of the  L-C cable for
nouns  as  being  essentially  flat.   The recall-line associative lines are
already present but dormant before the advancing front  of visual perception
and memory  gets down  the channel  to those  lines.   A new percept through
anocatamnesis  stimulates  a  pristine  logicoconceptual  line,  during  the
absence of  inhibition.   It is  rather easy  for us to say by way of design
that the extremity-fresh associative-tag recall-line will now form  a rather
permanent connection  with whichever  pristine logicoconceptual  line is now
being supratraversially stimulated.  Since the  fresh associative  tag flows
over a  theoretically flat  array of  logicoconceptual lines,  it can easily
bond with the proper line among all the  lines.   Furthermore, this  idea of
re-affirmation is  not necessary  for the  one-time function  of the grammar
system, but rather it  serves constantly  to update  the system  and perhaps
even to allow gradual changes.
     Now   we   have   made   clear   a   technique   of  "habituating"  the
logicoconceptual lines based on  the idea  that the  recall-line associative
tags  are  single-shot,  use-only-once  bonding-devices.  It's a habituation
system which is essentially pre-hard-wired.
     The logicoconceptual fibers for nouns can be controlled as a class.  So
far, we are saying that they work by resting-state inhibition.  That is, the
L-C fibers will not access auditory memory unless disinhibited.
     The same sort of  associative-tag system  that reaches  from the visual
channel to  the L-C  cable should also in turn reach from the L-C cable into
auditory memory.
     Lines that go from  percepts to  fetch words  are "onset-tags," because
they fetch  the word at its beginning.  If a disinhibited L-C line fetches a
word, it is through anocatamnesis.   Now, the  auditory channel  is a serial
memory.   We might  as well  envision it  as flat,  so that extremity-fresh,
unused onset-tags can be bonded from  the flat  L-C cable  over to  the flat
auditory channel.  We plan that this system shall re-affirm a word each time
it is thought.  The information  of the  phonemic series  of the  word shall
duplicate  itself  at  the  freshest  extremity  of the auditory memory as a
temporal series of nodes.   Of  course, our  grand design  from 5MAY1979 for
inflections  specifies  that  word-engrams  shall have ultimate-tags.  These
ultimate-tags would be needed  just for  recognizing heard  words, let alone
facilitating grammar.   The  question is,  during re-affirmation, can an old
ultimate-tag be passed forward to become a new ultimate-tag?  If it  can be,
it would  not be  done in  isolation; that is, the new ultimate-tag would be
created (bonded) only if it had  a place  to go  to outside  of the auditory
channel.   The trouble is, we are now getting into re-affirmation lines that
have to be link-bonded at both ends, although I suppose even the visual ones
were that way.
     What I  suppose we  could do is to have the ultimate-tag be re-affirmed
only after its destination had been re-affirmed.   In other  words, wherever
the  historical  ultimate-tag  went,  it  would be to some kind of abstract-
memory line, such as in an inflection cable or a  return-control bar.   With
regard to the auditory channel, the ultimate-tag is an output line.  It is a
juncture from the last phoneme in an engram to an outgoing associative tag.
     I have thought of a reason why it may be  better to  have ultimate-tags
be re-affirmed through their destinations rather than through their sources.
If we did it through their sources in the auditory  memory channel,  then we
might  get  interference  from interstitial ultimate-tags residing somewhere
higher in the channel at the end of syllables that chanced to  be components
of a word that we are dealing with.
     Still, I  am uneasy with the prospect of slippage of the exact bondage-
point where the ultimate-tag terminates an engram.  There may  have to  be a
kind of ultimate-tag generating-system in which an ultimate-tag issues forth
from any phoneme followed by a pause, a  non-phonemic interlude.   Actually,
every  temporal  node-level  of  the  auditory  memory  channel could have a
tabula-rasa potential ultimate-tag, but perhaps only  re-affirmed ones would
get into  the grammar system.  Anyway, if we ignore the prospect of slippage
for a while, we can proceed while counting on re-affirmation by destination.
     When a fiber of the auditory memory channel is serving  as a departure-
point for  a pristine  ultimate-tag, that  tagging might cause that fiber to
remain activated long enough for the bonds of re-affirmation to form at both
ends of the new extremity-fresh ultimate-tag.

                                                                 10 MAY 1979

                    Ideas on a "Universal Class-Habituator"

     Actually, what  I started  trying to  design yesterday  is a "Universal
Class-Habituator," or "UCH."   The idea  is to  habituate classes  of things
into a  syntactic structure, and then specific elements activated within the
classes will follow the  habituated pattern  so as  to create  a grammatical
     I think I might be able to devise a science of universal habituators as
a help in designing one.  (If I may speak facetiously, it would be nice even
to have a "meta-habituator.")  The science can develop if I specify a lot of
things about habituators and their design.
     The term "classes," in the sort  of  automaton  which  I  am designing,
refers  to  elongated  abstract-memory  lines,  each  of  which  can  singly
represent a whole class of specifics.  So, even though  these abstract lines
might  be  hierarchized  in  a two-dimensional array, their elongation means
that they always have that extra dimension which is that of time.
     One idea which I  have gotten  in this  field of  habituator-science is
that of  a certain reciprocity between a class and its specific elements.  I
want to use this reciprocity to make a rather novel  suggestion about  how a
mind might  habituate a pattern of classes:  A mind sets up a proper example
of a target pattern using  specific  elements  from  the  classes,  and then
proceeds  to  habituate  the  pattern  through  a  process of re-affirmative
repetition.  This suggestion is based upon the reciprocity-notion that, in a
way, you can get at each class by getting at any one of its elements.  In my
work of the earlier days of this month, I developed the idea that all active
vocabulary items  peculiar to  a language  are bundled into separate classes
according to their possible  grammatical  functions,  so  that  they  can be
controlled by syntactic nodes.  If the items are bundled, it may be possible
temporarily to use a specific element  to get  hold of  the whole  bundle in
     Another habituator-science idea is that it may be necessary to solidify
or consolidate each habituated  instance of  abstract interconnection before
proceeding to  a new  habituation.  Or, more generously, it may be necessary
just to solidify each  level of  habituation before  proceeding to  a higher
     It  may  be  a  general  rule in habituator-science that inter-abstract
habituation must both occur and be  solidified  by  means  of  the so-called
multitudinous perpendicular  concrete lines, otherwise known as "associative
tags" or "re-affirmation lines."  But  we then  have a  problem figuring out
how the  first concrete  line gets strung from one abstract line to another:
it evokes the image of a spider trying to spin a web.
     A couple of other, distant possibilities arise for  first habituations:
the splitting  of a  single abstract line to yield two divergent but related
ones; and the joining of abstract lines first by (educated)  chance and then
subsequently by re-affirmation.
     I  would  now  like  to  return  to  yesterday's meandering ideas while
keeping in mind the above ideas on "habituator science."

     It may be necessary to  theorize  that  the  auditory  channel  has the
ability to  "fuse together"  a reasonably  short series  of sounds.  A fused
series could then be fetched by an onset tag, be activated in full, and then
come  to  a  natural  halt,  with  a  built-in  tendency to bond-generate an
ultimate-tag.    With  such  fusion,  we   might  avoid   interference  from
interstitial  ultimate-tags.    The  fusion  might  be  inaugurated whenever
sufficiently intense sounds are recorded in a rapid and unbroken series.  Or
the fusion might be controlled by an attention-mechanism.  Such fusion might
allow nominative cases to be  treated  differently  and  more  directly than
oblique cases.   The  fusion could  work by concatenating node-slices of the
channel.  Recall could cause a new fusion at the extremity of the channel.
     So far, we have  been trying  yesterday to  design how  an infant would
habituate first  nouns and  then verbs.   We used re-affirmative associative
tags to let noun-recall-lines accrete onto logicoconceptual fibers in a flat
array of abstract memory.
     We can  now envision a single, rudimentary abstract line serving as the
primordial line of the first nascent  sentence-structure.   Without worrying
about  how  thick  or  thin  that  line  is, let us envision it as the first
linguistic control-line employed by the infant.  We know how infants like to
point at  a thing  and blurt out the word that they have learned as the name
of the thing.  Such use of isolated nouns is what we are presently trying to
describe and explain.
     We might  as well  draw up  plans for  a two-tiered volition system for
verbalization.   One  volition  line  will  access  a  sentence-structure to
generate verbal  thought, and the other will both generate thought and cause
it to be spoken aloud.  In other words, what  I am  trying to  do is refrain
from  designing  the  S-structure  in  a  vacuum.    If  it  is  part of our
"habituator-science"  that  single  abstract  lines  must   be  accessed  by
multitudinous concrete  lines, then  we had  better make provisions for that
process at the pyramidal top of any large or small S-structure.
     It is beginning to look as  though  the  physical  flow  of "candidate"
abstract lines will be provided genetically.  Thus the infant's first quasi-
syntactic control-line will already be  available  in  the  general vicinity
where it is needed.
     What I  have not  yet decided is whether or not there will be epitaxial
layering of the flat arrays in the abstract  memory channel.   This decision
may matter,  if it matters whether the infant's first control-line is at the
highest or lowest level.
     Anyway, we want to  use a  kind of  "random dynamics"  (q.v.) method to
start the  infant blurting out its first nouns.  I suppose that we can first
acknowledge and then ignore that random-dynamics mechanism by shoving it off
into  the  motor  areas.    But  it  will cause the first laying-down of the
concrete-fibers going from the speech-control and  thought-control (mirabile
dictu) volition-lines over to the S-structure.
     I suppose  it is perfectly harmless to imagine the infant's first noun-
control-line as being at a middle level, rather than at a highest  or lowest
level.  Then we have the option of building either upwards or downwards.
     Notice that  we have  required the S-structure to be subject input-wise
to a flat associative-tag array, just as we  did in  the case  of the visual
and auditory memory channels.  Two days ago I was reading in the Engineering
Library of the University  of Washington  that the  cortex of  the brain, if
laid  out  flat,  would  measure  approximately  fifty  centimeters by fifty
centimeters by two millimeters.  If  the human  brain can  be thought  of as
flat,  then  I  am  encouraged  when  I  find  myself  designing such a flat
     The class of logicoconceptual lines for  nouns develops  control of all
the recall-lines  for nouns.   Although  it might  have been easy to let the
first noun-recall-lines operate individually  in motor-control  of nouns, we
want to shift the control upwards to the rudimentary S-structure.  So we are
speculating that the first control from above operates  downwards to inhibit
the function  of the  recall-lines below.   As  I recall,  such operation is
considered to be typical in the brain:   lower functions  tend positively to
operate, unless inhibited from above.
     So we  might have  to envision a kind of "spread-out cell" ("SOC") that
operates  vertically  so  as  to  let  a  superior   abstract-line  exercise
widespread collective  control over  all the  logicoconceptual noun-lines in
the flat array below.  Actually, the SOC-cells above could also come  from a
(superior) flat array, as long as they always acted as a group.
     If we  design a  built-in tendency  for downwards  inhibition to occur,
then we have a natural,  unawkward  control-link  which  the  rudimentary S-
structure can  easily gain  access to.   So when the infant's rudimentary S-
structure fires downwards through the  SOC-lines,  it  disinhibits  the flat
array of logicoconceptual noun-lines.

     We  have  next  to  figure  out  how verbs would come into the infant's
system.  We want the infant to learn  to say  such things  as "Bird  fly" or
"Train go."
     Verbs will  have one  ingress into the auditory memory channel, in that
the infant will certainly hear a  lot of  verbs, even  if he  or she doesn't
understand them.   Verbs  will start to be learned when some sort of initial
link-up is made between perception and the stored sound of a verb.
     Over this past winter I did  a lot  of theorizing  on the verb-problem.
Here is where I want the logicoconceptual cable to really do its work.
     Perhaps I  can create a new flat array in the L-C cable, as a place for
verbs.  Let's say that the verb-array lies  below the  noun-array.  However,
the verb-array  has no  concrete lines  coming in  directly from perception.
Instead, the verb-array gets its inputs  through multiple  contacts with the
noun-array above it.  Now, the verb-array is a flat array of abstract lines.
Each abstract verb-line develops associative-tag recall-lines  over to verb-
words stored  in the  auditory channel.  Instead of a concrete-line reaching
"leftwards" into  perception, each  verb-line will  have a  kind of concrete
"trailer" line  that goes underneath the (superior) noun-array for its whole
breadth.  Of course, each verb-line will have multitudinous such "trailers,"
as  re-affirmative  lines  along  the  time-dimension.    Now, each inferior
trailer-line can make contact with any number of superior noun-lines.   Thus
the noun-lines  can "vote" to select a verb-line.  The most appropriate verb
can be selected, perhaps  through frequency-coded  propagation, by whichever
verb-line got  the most positive-votes and the fewest inhibitions.  You see,
we could design it so that a trailer-line, getting some  but not  all of its
requisite nodes  filled, would  be inhibited somewhat by each unfilled node.
Thus a simple verb of few, but fully filled, inputs could override a complex
verb of many, but some unfilled, inputs.  Of course, a complex verb of fully
filled, many inputs would override a simple verb  of fully  filled, but few,
     Now, the  need for  these trailers  to have access to the full superior
noun-array poses some question as to where the actual logicoconceptual verb-
lines should be placed so as not to get in the way of the trailers.
     Notice that  this system seems to allow the neophyte over time to learn
refinements in the selection of verbs, via the re-affirmative function.
     Wherever the logicoconceptual verb-lines are located, we next  have the
problem of how to control them as a class.

                                                                 11 MAY 1979

               More Ideas on Grammar Habituation in Infants

     The  idea  that  higher-level  functions  in  the human brain typically
govern lower-level functions by inhibiting them may prove useful if we think
of  this  phenomenon  as  an  evolutionary  building-block in the genesis of
complex systems.  Specifically, we have the idea that percepts  will tend to
recall words.   Then  we are going to inhibit the recall from on high.  Once
we establish inhibition as the normal state of affairs, we  acquire positive
control through negation of the inhibition.
     Yesterday  I  was  getting  the  idea  that processes which I have been
thinking of as from top to bottom may actually be upside-down in  the cortex
of  the  human  brain.    That  is,  I have been designing syntactic control
structures as governing flat  arrays of  data-flow located  on lower levels.
All  these  putative  structures  may  actually  be upside-down in the human
cortex, so that  the  relatively  more  significant  control  structures may
occupy an inner, more centralized position as opposed to the relatively less
significant associative arrays.   This  is  a  tentative  prediction  of the
Nommultic  theory  that  is  possibly susceptible to empirical verification.
Anyway, for the nonce I will continue in my present mode so that I can think
of structures as being both superior in control and superior in location.
     Reading over yesterday's work, I get the idea that the logicoconceptual
cable may be stratified into as many layers  as there  are parts  of speech.
It might not be good for me to lend credence too soon to such a formulation,
but I can always re-arrange it.   Even  if there  are part-of-speech strata,
the visual  and auditory  channels would  probably not have multiple strata.
If there are part-of-speech strata, I  suppose that  superior disinhibition-
lines would  send down  disinhibition "runners"  from above.   It is not yet
clear whether the disinhibition "descender-runners" would  physically access
only a  distinct stratum  while actually  permeating all the strata.  Growth
would have happened locationally, while learning would happen dynamically.
     It may  be  advisable  to  establish  a  notion  that  various neuronal
networks occupying a given volume can be highly transparent and permeable to
one another.  Although I have been relying upon orthogonality  in my design,
I have tended to design networks as physically separate, lest they interfere
with one another.  Thus I  planned certain  arrays as  being flat,  and then
perhaps stratified, while I kept in mind how things would fit together.  But
now I have to keep in mind that such caution might not  be necessary  if the
arrays  and  networks  can  physically  intermingle  while  preserving their
logical integrities.
     Anyway, I am on the verge of adding in the control of verbs in infants.
Yesterday I  designed how  the logicoconceptual  verb-array could be a layer
right below the noun-array (or even  a more  general array).   If  we assume
that the  noun-array was  set up  first temporally, then we can have it over
and done with when it is time to establish superior  control over  the verb-
     The noun-array  came to  be controlled as follows.  Horizontal volition
runners activate the rudimentary, single S-line.  This S-line rests amid the
SOC-cells that descend to counterinhibit the logicoconceptual noun-lines.
     Let's say  the infant  gets pretty  adept at  blurting out nouns and is
starting to learn verbs.  The activation of counterinhibiting SOC-cells down
to the  verb-array will be causing verbs to be spoken.  We can imagine that,
from the original S-line for nouns,  to  which  volitional  fibers  had been
reaching, now additional associative fibers will be advancing further in the
same direction as the volitional fibers  had  been  going,  and  these newly
activated associative  fibers will  be bond-attaching  to a collective cable
that abstractly flows through and controls the SOC-cells for verbs.
     So now we have  designed that  horizontal volition  will activate first
the  noun  S-line  and  then  the  verb S-line.  The verb S-line develops as
something which automatically follows the noun  S-line in  time.   But now I
want to  do something which differentiates the volition signals for the noun
S-line and the verb S-line.  You see, the mind must try to say both types of
words, nouns  and verbs,  immediately at  once.  So the volition system will
try to slow down and differentiate.   My  insight  here  is  that  the flat,
horizontal, volitional  sentence-inputs will  wander up one level higher and
that in response a higher S-line will be  established.   The original, lower
volitional fibers  will cease  to be  true volition and will now function as
return-lines  carrying  the  information  that  the  subject-noun  has  been
expressed and that it is now the turn of the predicate-verb to be expressed.
So therefore those return-fibers will  go  to  the  verb  S-line,  which has
remained  low  while  the  controlling  noun S-line has shifted up one level
along with the volitional fibers.
     These arrangements may not be exactly correct, but the general  idea of
the  insight  is  clear:    Let  volition  wander upwards and let the former
volition-fibers become informational return-lines.

     Today's earlier work was done on Pier 51.  The  last several paragraphs
actually took  some mental  effort and  I was  pacing around a bit trying to
hold on to the train of thought and seeking the  right sentences  to express
my thought.   But  I finally  had enough written down so that I felt I could
safely leave the continuance for this evening or tomorrow morning.  However,
after I  left off  writing, the  "insight" deepened considerably and now, in
the evening, I feel that I may have a major structural development.
     The deeper insight involves  closing today's  loop of  control-lines on
top, counterinhibition-lines  going down  the side, recall-lines back across
the bottom, and then ultimate-tags back up to the top again, so  that a very
dynamic square or rectangle is created.  I have not thought out this hollow-
square scheme in great  detail, but,  once the  idea occurred  to me  at the
conclusion  of  this  afternoon's  writing,  I  began  to  visualize several
possible major features of the scheme.
     The idea is to have the  whole generative  grammar system  operate as a
kind of  hollow square.  (My next sentence may sound facetious, but there is
sincerity in it.)  If we  visualize looking  at the  square from  the future
back  into  the  past,  the  flow is counterclockwise.  The logicoconceptual
cable is at the bottom left, and  the  auditory  memory  channel  is  at the
bottom right.  Habituation of syntactic sentence-structures is to take place
across the top of the square.  The  control-nodes will  be at  the top left,
and volition will be coming in at the top right.

Nolarbeit Theory Journal                                         14 MAY 1979

            _____                                    __________
           /     \                                  |          |
          /       \<--------------------------------| Volition |
          \   S   /                                 |__________|
  Sentence \_____/
  Structure   |
              |                _____                 _____
              |               /     \  B            |     | return-control
              +------------->/ Verb  \<-------------| R-C | line
              |              \       /              |_____|
              |               \_____/                 /|\
            A |                  |                     |
             _V____              |                     |
            /      \             |                   __|__
           / Noun   \<-----------+                  |     |
           \ Phrase /<-----------|------------------| R-C |
            \______/  C          |                  |_____|
              |                  |                    /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\
              |                  |                     |   |   |   |   |
  Noun        O                  O      Verb           |   |   |   |   |
  Spread-    /|\                / \     Spread-        |   |   |   |   |
  Out Cells / | \              O   O    Out Cells      |   |   |   |   |
           /  |  \             |   |                   |   |   |   |   |
          O   O   O            O   O                   |   |   |   |   |
         /   / \   \           |   |                   |   |   |   |   |
        O   O   O   O          O   O                   |   |   |   |   |
       /   /     \   \         |   |                   |   |   |   |   |
      O   O       O   O        O   O                   | ultimate-tags |
     /   / \     / \   \       |   |                   |   |   |   |   |
    O   O   O   O   O   O      O   O                   |   |   |   |   |
   /W\ /W\ /W\ /W\ /W\ /W\     |   |                   |   |   |   |   |
  |||||||||||||||||||||||||   /W\ /W\                  |   |   |   |   |
 logicoconceptual noun-lines ||||||||| recall-lines  ______________________
 ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo========================/                      \
                            verb-lines               auditory memory channel

                                                                 17 MAY 1979

                    The Comprehension of Natural Language

     When  a  sentence  comes  in  to  be  understood,  it  is, so to speak,
"captured" by the  auditory  memory  channel.    The  mind  will  attempt to
understand the  sentence immediately, but, if an error is made, the sentence
still remains in memory for additional attempts at understanding it.
     Usually, the mind  tries  to  understand  a  sentence  as  it comes in,
without waiting  for the  end of  the sentence before processing the initial
elements.  I personally  have had  many sporadic  instances in  which I have
raced ahead  too quickly in taking meaning out of sentences, with the result
that I have had to readjust  my comprehension  as the  rest of  the sentence
came in.   I  have even  made erroneous comprehensions by quickly processing
just the first few syllables of a word, such as a compound  noun.   I assert
that I  was correctly  processing what  I heard  up to each point, but I was
often surprised when a sentence kept coming in in a way that  invalidated my
initial  comprehension  of  the  incomplete sentence.  In several surprising
instances  I  have  comprehended  the  (incomplete)  utterance  and  started
thinking  out  a  reaction  to  it,  seemingly  in the natural interval as a
speaker was poised between syllables of  a word.   Actually,  I was probably
allowed  the  interval  measurable  by  the  amount  of time it took for the
corrective syllables to register.  My point is, that processing  advances as
each morpheme comes in and is recognized.  Some morphemes therefore convey a
temporary ambiguity for the brief time that those morphemes have been spoken
but  not  the  immediately  following  morphemes.    Of  course, the falsely
comprehended, incomplete utterance can be completely free of ambiguity.  For
now, I  will call  this ambiguity "subset-ambiguity," because, during a very
brief interval, a subset of the morphemic string is erroneously  but validly
processed as if it were a complete and independent utterance.
     The  following  scenario  shows  how  subset-ambiguity  might  operate.
Suppose a traveler  returns  to  his  home  town  after  a  period  of being
incommunicado.    Hungry  for  news,  he  is  greeted  upon  arrival  by  an
acquaintance whose countenance seems to grow sad and troubled at  seeing the
traveler.   The acquaintance  says, "Oh, my poor friend, I was so very sorry
to hear about the sudden death  of  your  brother  Tom's  racehorse."   This
example is  rather extreme, but it illustrates two things.  Firstly, various
initial subsets of the sentence can obviously be comprehended in  such a way
as to  describe a  catastrophe, namely  the death of the brother.  Secondly,
the example shows how expectancy or uncertainty may  play a  role in  how an
utterance is comprehended.
     It will  become necessary to reflect upon whether expectancy plays only
a psychological and epistemological role,  or  also  a  role  in  syntax and
     Anyway, I  am at  the point  now where I want to start theorizing about
how syntax and grammar operate in the comprehension of language.   I  have a
general guideline  in mind.  Whatever language-comprehension is, it involves
the establishing of the proper associative connections among the elements of
a perceived  utterance.   Merely to  deposit a  sentence in memory is not to
know the information contained  within  the  sentence:    witness  a talking
     Is it  possible that  expectancy or urgency may use frequency-coding to
strengthen the associative "valence" of an  important sentence?   Frequency-
coding might  be used  to enhance  permanently the associative bonding of an
associative tag.
     An incoming sentence can  drastically change  and update  our knowledge
about the  world or  the universe.  Let's discuss change in our knowledge of
familiar elements  from the  external world.   Our  associative knowledge is
clustered about  the words  naming the  elements.  Thus the same word for an
element may exist at many different points within the stream of the auditory
memory  channel.    However,  those  different points are accessible through
internal associativity up and down the auditory channel itself.   Of course,
that  internal  associativity  establishes  only  identity  (or perhaps also
similarity), not the information-rich  relationships  among  separate words.
Other than  by temporal  contiguity, separate words can not be associatively
related within the auditory channel alone.   Within  my Nommultic  theory as
developed  so  far,  separate  words  can be related only by the associative
tags, of which there are two types in the auditory  memory channel:   onset-
tags and  ultimate-tags.   I am now reserving judgment about all the various
features of the onset-tags and ultimate-tags.
     I am getting the idea that it is possible that  there are  two ways for
extraparietal association among separate words of the auditory channel.  The
first way would be through the avenue of  one of  the other  senses, such as
vision.   For example, a visual scene could serve to associate many separate
words describing things within the scene.  The  second way  would be through
associations brought  about in language-comprehension.  The question arises,
can  the  comprehension-mechanism  manipulate  associations  without getting
entangled  in  them?    I  suspect  that  it can, by being abstract.  When a
sentence, either fresh or stale, is run through the comprehension-mechanism,
associations  are  generated  which  remain  as  a  momentary  part  of  the
historical record of that moment  in  the  history  of  the  organism.   The
sentence  itself,  whenever  re-activated,  goes  through the comprehension-
mechanism and re-establishes  the  "momentary  but  permanent" associations.
(Wouldn't it  be awful  if we  had to  re-activate each original sentence of
knowledge in order to make use  of the  information in  the sentence?)   The
more important  a sentence  is, the  more frequently we are likely to run it
through the comprehension-mechanism so as to associate it quite broadly with
our general knowledge.
     The  next   question  is,  can  the  comprehension-mechanism  lay  down
associations among separate words in a  word-to-word fashion  so that  it is
not immediately necessary to go into the other sensory channels or even into
the auditory channel in  a nonverbal  way?   (For all  I know,  perhaps this
wonderful performance  is what it can only do.)  Although it may thus string
words  together  into relationships,  the  meaning  (and  subsequent logical
generativity)  of   the  string  depends  upon  the  associativity  of  each
constituent word out  among  the  total  sensorium.    If  words  are strung
together but  there is a paucity, a dearth, of sensory information about the
words, then it will be difficult for richly specific mentation to ensue.
     A clue is developing  now  as  to  what  provides  the  "motivation" or
impetus   for   sentence-generation   (thought-generation).     An  angular,
crankshaft-like process operates.  When one  sentence, whether  from outside
or   inside,   goes   through   the   comprehension-mechanism,   associative
relationships  are   established  among   words  regardless   of  the  prior
associative import of the words.  However, that prior import can immediately
come into play as a kind of logical tension which prompts the  generation of
new sentences.   Thus  the mechanism  of syntax and grammar mediates thought
all up and down the system, and the verbal product  of thought  is deposited
at the freshest extremity of memory.

                                                                 18 MAY 1979

     As  the  first  word  of  an  utterance  comes into the auditory memory
channel, the mind commences processing that word through its grammar-filter.
Obviously, just  as I did with sentence-generation, I will want the incoming
sentence to submit  to  the  control  of  a  syntactic  structure.    I will
disregard  the  problem  of  psychological  expectancy by imagining that the
incoming sentence is being perceived  in  relative  isolation,  so  that the
hearer does not know what to expect.
     If each  word in the vocabulary of the language could serve as only one
part of speech, then, clearly,  we  could  use  that  part  of  speech  as a
criterion or  selector for  entry into any of multiple syntactic structures.
We could then concentrate on  the  inter-related  concerns  of  function and
     Perhaps I should establish a principle of widest-possible spread-out in
the through-filtering of a perceived word  into the comprehension-mechanism.
I have in mind a pair of English sentences such as the following:
          "This man likes music."
          "This man I like."
In  accordance  with  the  (presently  emerging)  "saturation principle," an
initial English noun-phrase, such  as "this  man" above,  should try  to run
through  all  fitting  and  available  syntactic structures, in a process of
being impeded on branches where things  don't fit.   A  syntactic path which
absorbs  the   whole  utterance   "wins  the  day,"  so  to  speak,  because
associativity saturates and continues from the  winning path,  while it dies
out along any obstructed branches.
     I would  now like to suggest that ambiguity can be seen in the light of
the saturation-principle.  An  utterance is  ambiguous as  long as  it fully
traverses two  separate syntactic  paths unto naturally ending destinations.
Notice that this description of ambiguity also covers the "subset-ambiguity"
mentioned yesterday, because subset-ambiguity is fleetingly ambiguous, until
post-subset morphemes carry the true and  full utterance  to the  end of the
true  path.    Now,  is  there  a  problem  of  going  back  and negating or
invalidating the momentary subset-ambiguity?  I suspect that  such a problem
does not exist, because there is only a momentary disturbance insofar as the
hearer's  psychological  belief-structure  is  momentarily  shaken   by  the
erroneous comprehension.   The  belief-structure is a self-adjusting network
of extremely free associativity.  An  erroneous comprehension  stemming from
ambiguity  can  therefore  just  ripple  away or be cancelled out within the
"panpsychic" belief-structure.
     In the language-learning of an organism, comprehension must actually be
learned before  generation can be learned.  In recent weeks I have worked on
generation first, because it lent itself  to analysis.   I  knew that  I had
much  to  finish  in  the  theory  of  generation,  but yesterday I suddenly
realized that  I  might  as  well  move  into  comprehension,  if  it seemed
presently  easier.    So  yesterday I started with sweeping generalizations,
because I hoped thereby to move deftly in upon the  quasi-neuronal switching
functions  at   the  heart   of  comprehension.     I  expect  to  make  the
comprehension-process more or less a reversal of the  generation-process.  I
am not yet sure whether I will have to create the analog of a two-way street
with separate lanes, or  whether the  generation/comprehension flow  will be
bidirectional along  the same transmission lines.  It is quite possible that
the various associative recall-tags  will be  bidirectional, but  that there
will have to be separate,  co-mirroring  syntactic structures for generation
and   comprehension.    Whereas  inflectional  endings  had  been  added  on
by  syntax-nodes  in  the  generation-process,  inflectional endings  in the
comprehension-process  will probably serve  to  guide  words  to  the proper
syntax-nodes, during the saturation-process.
     I may  use "neuron-fatigue"  as a  way of  shifting through the variant
possibilities  for  comprehension   of   an   ambiguous   utterance.     Any
malappropriate, initial  explication of  an ambiguity would slow down in its
firing on secondary or postsecondary comprehension-passes,  so as eventually
to yield  in favor  of a fresher, perhaps more appropriate explication.  You
see, it is important that comprehension not have  to be  consciously labored

                                                                  6 JUN 1979

                 Disinertiativity through Transabstractivity

     I need two clear and succinct terms to describe two important processes
in the mind.
     I think the first term  will  be  "transabstraction."    A non-thinking
central  nervous  system  can  be  quite  efficient  at receiving inputs and
bridging them over to the various  outputs.    However,  depending  upon the
relative level  of evolution  of the  CNS, the bridging of inputs to outputs
will probably have to be rather direct and in strict registry.  On the other
hand, in  a mind capable of abstract thought, the conscious mind has all its
outputs freely at its disposal.  Even if the outputs are kept in registry at
lower  levels  (of  reflex  or  habituation),  the  conscious  mind  has  an
overriding particularistic control of the outputs.  The mind can prolongedly
contemplate its  options for output, and then freely select and initiate the
desired motor activity.  Likewise the conscious mind has free  access to its
permanent  experiential  memory  stretching  back through its lifetime.  The
concept of ego, ensconced within the conscious mind,  wanders freely  up and
down the memory channels, creates new verbal thought, and freely reviews its
options  for  motor  initiation.      Perhaps   I   should   use   the  word
"transabstractivity"  to  refer  to  the free linkability of practically all
data and information within the thinking conscious mind.
     The second term which  I need  will probably  be "disinertiativity," to
describe the  mind's process  of potentiating the action of previously inert
objects.  Many things, such as the  surface  of  the  moon  of  Earth, would
remain  extremely   inert,  were   it  not  for  the  transabstractional  or
transabstractive disinertiativity of the mind.   This process  was discussed
in  the  Nolarbeit  of  28JUN1975.    Transabstractivity  in  disinertiation
releases the logical tensions potentially existing between inert objects.

                                                                 14 JUL 1979

                    The Implicit Mechanism of Attention

     The distinction  between  inherent  and  solely  operational qualities.
When we build a transabstractive mind, as described so far by the Nolarbeit,
many of  its  functions  are  designed  explicitly  into  the  system.   For
instance, it  shall be  able to associate memories and to habituate rules of
grammar.  However, I am beginning  to suspect  that there  may be additional
functions which  become available  even though we did not try to design them
into the  system.    My  first  idea  of  what  to  call  them  is "implicit
functions," but I wish I had a more descriptive term.  Anyway, the idea here
is that these unexpected implicit functions  spring into  being just because
we  have  built  such  a  powerful  transabstractive  system.   Although the
examples which I am going to present may be erroneous, the idea may still be
valid.    First  of  all,  there  may  be  some  really  unexpected implicit
phenomena, such as the ability to dream, to sleepwalk, or  to be hypnotized.
But what  I had in mind first was the possible explanation of a mechanism of
     In trying to design  the uppermost  intellectual level  of a conscious,
thinking mind,  I have  operated on  a plane where there must be freedom and
nothing but freedom.  That is to say, the fact, that the  design was  of the
very highest  level of  a thinking  mind, has  perhaps certain consequences.
One consequence is perhaps that the  design  at  the  top  is  actually much
simpler and  less complicated  than many  systems operating at lower levels,
such as perhaps in the cerebellum.  [See Albus in  BYTE, July,  1979.]  Such
simplicity  would  perhaps  be  due  to  the  rationale that freely thinking
consciousness  must  of  necessity  be  quite  isolated  and  protected from
possible interference  from lower  levels.   If lower levels must interfere,
they should interfere only in  special  or  extreme  circumstances,  such as
those of instinctual drives or serious dangers.
     It  may  be  that  a  mechanism  of  attention results unexpectedly and
implicitly  from  the  design   of  the   topmost,  transabstractive  level.
Attention would  work in  the following  manner.  We all know that we can be
attending  to  one  voice  among  many,  and  end  up  really   hearing  and
understanding only  that voice  to which we "paid" attention.  Well, part of
Nommultic theory says that  we actually  heard and  retained as  engrams the
whole milieu  of sounds, but that only those sounds were remembered to which
access was gained and maintained via associative tags.   (Now,  as ideas are
beginning  to  dawn  on  me,  will  it  be the idea of selective fixation of
associative tags, or  the  idea  of  the  importance  of  the  employment of
reaffirmation tags?)   This explanation of attention may have to go hand-in-
hand with development of ideas about  language-comprehension.   Anyway, when
we are  listening to  one speaker  among, say, three speakers, we came to be
listening to that  speaker  by  a  process  of  association,  and  we remain
listening  to  and  attentive  to  that speaker by a process of association.
Perhaps, then, any vortex of associativity actually constitutes  a so-called
"mechanism of attention."
     If we  have been attending intensely to a phenomenon in our perception,
then far back into our memory channels there are instances  of associativity
going on  with respect  to aspects  of our  attention.  As each new slice of
perception is perceived, it is  associated,  not  just  with  other incoming
perceptions by simultaneity, but also with recall-fetched memories that have
quickly moved to the freshest extremity of the memory channel.  Thus  a past
engram-slice becomes  duplicated at the freshest extremity, and this process
enables attended  percepts  quickly  to  become  associated  with  vast past
experience.    After  all,  each  duplicated engram-slice is now like a node
present in two places at once.
     Since association is happening so intensively to each previous slice of
the attended  perception, each  fresh slice  is avidly  taken up by the same
state of affairs.  Of course, if we  hear something  shocking or surprising,
we  may   stop  paying   attention  as  our  thinking  drifts  away  through
associations from that which shocked or surprised us.
     How can I say that  associative  attention  puts  us  into  a  state of
expectancy,  expecting  more  of  the  same  from  whatever  has  seized our
attention?  Well, I can make use of  my old  friend, the  concept of neuron-
     As fresh  and old  engram-slices are  being associated with what we are
(probably with one main  sensory  channel)  paying  attention  to,  many old
engram-slices are  going into  semi-activation but  then losing out to those
engram-slices which reach full  activation.   Then neuron-fatigue eliminates
the fully  activated engram-slices,  but leaves many semi-activated memories
in  a  sufficient  state   of   residual   activation   as   to  constitute,
psychologically,  a  state  of  expectancy.    The mind is expecting certain
associations simply because it is readier to make  them than  others.   So a
mechanism of  attention is implicit when you build a conscious, intelligent,
associative, transabstractive mind.

                                                                 21 NOV 1979


     We can simplify the attack  on  language-comprehension  by  imagining a
society of  minds that  enjoy the  generativity of  only one syntactic tree:
subject - verb - direct object.  We can say that the  language contains only
nouns and verbs.

     Actually,  language-comprehension  will  start  whenever the perceiving
mind seizes upon an initial  morphemic  word  as  fitting  into  any  one of
perhaps many syntactic lead-offs.

     From now  on here I want to posit a logicoconceptual cable for purposes
of comprehension.  Let us reflect as though the comprehension L-C cable were
separate from  the generation  L-C cable,  and then  later we  can see if we
would want both L-C cables to be one and the same.

     When the initial word of  a  sentence  is  perceived,  it  goes  to the
freshest extremity  of the auditory channel.  As it filters down through the
auditory channel, it will stimulate some one ultimate-tag, or group of same-
word ultimate-tags,  most strongly.   That one ultimate-tag, with or without
its fellows, will "supratraversially" access and activate a conceptual fiber
in the  logicoconceptual cable  for comprehension.   Reaffirmation will then
occur  as  the  new  ultimate-tag  of  the  fresh  auditory  engram, through
simultaneity,  attaches   itself  to  the  same  abstract  fiber  which  was
supratraversially stimulated in the L-C cable.   Thus  updating, and perhaps
even initial language-learning, occur.

     Now,  what  good  does  it  do  the incoming word to have stimulated an
abstract  fiber  in  the  comprehension  L-C  cable?    Well,  that  process
tentatively establishes the part of speech of the word, because the abstract
fibers of the L-C cable are layered (bundled)  according to  part of speech.
Note that nothing has been established as to the grammatical function of the
word, such as subject or direct object.  Function will  be determined either
by interpretation (based perhaps on word order) or by clues from inflection.
     Now  let's  say  that  a  second  word,  such as a verb, comes in.  The
incoming verb will access and reaffirm an abstract  fiber in  the verb-layer
of the  L-C cable.   Then  a second  noun, a direct object of the verb, will
access and reaffirm a second abstract  fiber in  the noun  layer of  the L-C
cable.  Of course, the comprehension-processing of the first noun as subject
will have to have taken place  quickly already  so that  no confusion occurs
between the two nouns.
     Now, this  sort of  sentence states  a relationship involving two nouns
and a verb.  The sentence can convey  knowledge of  the relationship.   Mere
activation and  reaffirmation of L-C cable abstract fibers do not set up the
internal representation of the  relationship carried  in the  sentence.  The
relationship  is  carried  by  the  syntactic structure of the sentence, and
therefore  the  relationship  must   be  reconstructed   internally  through
activation  and  reaffirmation  of  a  syntactic  structure  residing in the
"syntax cable" of the abstract memory channel serving comprehension.
     Let's  looks  at  that   dynamic  bundle   of  potential   meaning  and
information,  the  verb.    So  far  we  have  merely  accessed  an abstract
conceptual fiber representing the concept of the verb.  In  the experiential
history  of  the  organism,  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  the  verb must
henceforth (either long or briefly) be  associated both  to the  subject and
the direct  object.   In other words, the direct object acquires some of the
semantic data underlying the verb.  But the direct object is epitomized only
as a  morphemic word  occurring here and there in the experiential stream of
the auditory memory channel.  Those happenstance morphemic-word loci are not
going to  be the  fastening point  to which semantic data coming from a verb
are now henceforth tied as a result of comprehension of  the sentence.   No,
those  auditory   engrams  are   too  phantom-like;  instead,  the  abstract
conceptual fiber for the direct object  will be  the steadfast  point to and
from which  all semantic  connections are made.  The auditory memory engrams
are just a means of rapid access to the abstract conceptual fiber.
     The abstract conceptual fiber for a noun can lead semantically  to data
stored  in  all  five  sensory  memory  channels.    Thus, when the semantic
background of a noun is invoked,  perhaps during  time-extended or lingering
comprehension, all sorts of associations fan out into the memory channels of
all  the  senses.    Then,  within  the  individual   memory  channels,  the
comparator-effect allows circuitous re-entry back into the abstract domain.
     In the  case of  verbs, there  is an  escalation away from the five raw
sensory memory channels.  The abstract conceptual fiber  for a  verb has its
fanning-out  "feeler-apparatus"  which  has  hold  of  the  semantic bundles
underlying the verb.
     Dare I say the following?  When semantic contact is  to be  made from a
verb  to  its  subject  and  direct  object, the quasi-reaffirmation process
causes the feeler-apparatus of the verb to connect to its subject and to its
direct object.  Of course, the reaffirmation process works only when the two
things to be affirmed have been stimulated separately.  It  is the syntactic
structure  of  the  syntax  cable  which  will  proffer  abstract  fibers as
candidate elements for the feeler-apparatus to take hold of and  affirm.  It
is semantically  essential that  the syntax  cable guide these affirmations,
because other plausible guides, such as juxtaposition of word-order, are not
reliable or  strict enough.   So inflection guides the syntax cable, and the
syntax cable guides the affirmative constructions  of relationship,  and the
resulting structures constitute the new condition of knowledge engendered by
the comprehension of the sentence.
     It is possible, during reflective thought, that an  abstract conceptual
fiber may  perhaps "vibrate" in concert with its dually sensory and semantic
background out among the various sensory memory channels.  Suppose  that one
concept is  momentarily of supreme importance and interest to the mind.  The
abstract fiber of that concept will be undergoing heavy use.  It will not be
important of  itself, but  rather its situational ambience will be making it
important.    Thus,  over  and  over   again,  the   conceptual  fiber  will
semantically project out into the psychic ambience, and the psychic ambience
will circuitously rush back to the important fiber.  Meanwhile, all sorts of
words will  be coming  to mind in a brainstorm of verbal mentation.  Some of
the words and psychic  currents  will  trigger  generation  of  sentences of
thought.  In fact, when a sentence is generated, it immediately goes through
the above described comprehension-process,  so  that  its  peculiar semantic
relationship  can  be  reaffirmed  through  syntactically guided structuring
within the logicoconceptual cable of comprehension,  which cable  may or may
not be the same cable as that of generation.
     The  generating   of  a   sentence  is   the  verbal  expressing  of  a
relationship.  Before generation of the  sentence, the  relationship is only
pregnantly available  to the  mind.   If the  mind is  generating a sentence
about what it is perceiving externally, then the relationship is coming from
without  the  mind.    Such  an  external  relationship  can be very clearly
perceived and yield a strong formulation  as a  sentence.   However, suppose
that a  sentence is  being generated  as a  result of internal meditation or
reflection.  Then a new relationship is about to be discovered and  is about
to  come  into  expression  in  the  sentence.    Or  perhaps  merely an old
relationship is about to be reiterated.   At  any rate,  the about-to-emerge
relationship is  pregnantly available  within the interior psychic ambience.
Logical "tension" builds up and finds release in  the generation  of the new
sentence.  Such logical tension can come from one new external fact entering
a mind.   If one bombshell of a fact enters a mind,  then the equilibria  of
many old relationships can be disturbed, so that a vortex of thought quickly
flares up and slowly subsides.
     On the one hand, generation of a sentence  sets up  a relationship, but
it  is  the  immediate  comprehension  of  the new sentence that affirms the
relationship and leaves a  structured memory  trace of  it.   The fortuitous
network of associations that generates the sentence does not have to show up
again unchanged  as that  network which  remains structured  in memory after
comprehension  of  the  sentence.    Typically, a very tenuous network might
generate the sentence, and then, after immediate comprehension,  there might
remain  a  network  as  a  structure  carrying a broader and fuller semantic
impact.  That is to say, a tenuous,  fleeting relationship  finds expression
in a  sentence, but  thenceforth the  full impact of the relationship stands
formalized in the sentence, ready to operate strongly each time the sentence
is  run  through  comprehension.    The  shift  in  semantic  impact between
generation  and  comprehension  of  a  sentence  is  perhaps   where  mental
creativity arises.   The fortuitous network that generates a sentence is not
in itself creative, or  is  it?    Well,  we  could  say  that  the initial,
fortuitous   seizing   upon   the   relationship  is  creative  because  the
relationship was perhaps never perceived before.  And each time that the new
sentence is  run through  the mind,  the success  of the creativity can show
itself, because new aspects of the  relationship can  be realized  with each

                                                                 23 NOV 1979

     In the  months that  I have  been thinking now and then about language-
comprehension, I have been concerned with  determining just  what "trace" is
left after  a sentence has been comprehended.  Quite early it was clear that
there would have to be an episodic trace  of the  sentence as  a sequence of
sounds in  auditory experiential  memory.   However, it is now seeming clear
that the  purely  sensory  recording  of  the  sentence  in  auditory memory
probably plays  little role  in the organism's structure of knowledge.  Even
if the words and  morphemes of  the sentence  have their  full complement of
onset-tags and  ultimate-tags, those  tags just  lead to abstract conceptual
fibers in the abstract memory.    The  import  of  the  sentence  is  in the
relationship  which  it  asserts  among  the  concepts.  We might say that a
sentence adjusts the background of all its concepts.  Although  primitive or
rudimentary  concepts  may  be  rooted  in  sensory  memory, more complex or
abstract concepts  are probably  rooted in  a structure  of relationships to
other concepts.
     The concept  of a  transitive verb is probably strictly furcated into a
set of relationships with subjects and  a set  of relationships  with direct
objects.   During comprehension,  each set is probably attached on the basis
of syntax or inflection.  Each transitive verb implies attachments  based on
relationship.  A verb as a concept is comprised in its relational history.
     The temporal  progression of  conceptual knowledge  is constantly being
"woven" as  verbal thought  momentarily specifies  the varying relationships
among concepts.
     A  comprehensional  relationship  of  a  concept  cannot  ultimately be
distinguished  from  its  semantic  "definition."    However,  the  semantic
definition  is   like  the   statistical  "average"   of  all  the  previous
relationships  of  the  concept.    When  an  incoming  sentence  asserts  a
relationship, the  heavy preponderance  of past relationships is used in the
process of  comprehending the  sentence, and  at the  same time  the gist or
scope  of  past  semantic  definition  can henceforth be slightly altered if
there  is  any  novelty  in   the   newly   asserted   relationship.     The
comprehensibility  of  a  concept  grows  each  time  the  concept  is newly
comprehended.  Either a standard meaning  is  reinforced  once  again,  or a
shift in meaning is adduced.
     If someone  tries to  use a  verb in an improper way, then the asserted
relationship will not be believed.  A believed relationship will be affirmed
in subsequent  associative thought,  but a discredited relationship will die
out for lack of reassertion.
     The picture which I  am  painting  here  is  perhaps  hard  to believe.
Thousands  of  unitary  abstract  fibers  hold  the concepts in a mind.  The
rudimentary concepts are defined in terms of sensory memory, and the complex
concepts are defined in terms of one another, or of rudimentary concepts, or
of sensory memory.  The actual attachments of relationship to  a concept are
effected by  means of  the myriad concrete associative tags which are singly
available to the conceptual  fiber at  each pulsed  moment of ratiocination.
The length,  the long  dimension of  the abstract conceptual fiber signifies
its temporal aspect and its changeability over time.
     Any new relationship is understood in terms of potentially all previous

                                                                 26 NOV 1979

     It  is  really  quite  a  claim to state that intelligent consciousness
operates not in the sensory memory  channels, but  in an  immense conduit of
single-concept fibers.  It is quite a jump from orderly, even rigid, sensory
memory into the stick-forest of conceptual fibers.  At first blush, it might
sound ridiculous to assert that a stick-forest of fibers can think.  But the
thinking results from or as the interconnections among the fibers.
     In this light, I would like to mention copulative verbs such as "be" or
"become."   It looks  as though verbs are going to have to have "portals" or
partitions for at least subject and direct object, if not  also for semantic
attributes of  the action  expressed by the verb.  It is possible that there
could be two main  classes of  the semantic  tags attached  to a verb-fiber:
subject-linkable  tags  and  object-linkable  tags.   When a verb-concept is
invoked, those two linkage-classes have to be assigned.  When  the action of
a verb upon a direct object is comprehended, what supposedly happens is that
the object-linkable tags become  linked to  whatever concept  is momentarily
the direct object.
     The momentariness  of interconceptual  taggings is  very important.  It
may be that the tags are extraordinarily strong only when first established.
     When a non-transitive, copulative verb  such  as  "be"  or  "become" is
used, what  we probably get is the unimpeded through-linkage of the subject-
portal to the quasi-object-portal.  The  various forms  of the  English verb
"to be"  are limited  in number,  and each form probably has its own concept
fiber.  During comprehension,  the syntax  cable probably  causes tagging of
the  subject-fiber  to  the  verb-fiber  and of the verb-fiber to the quasi-
object-fiber.  Once these  tags  have  been  set  up,  the  subject-fiber is
recentissime linked,  via the rather meaningless verb-form, to its predicate
nominative as a quasi-object.  Now,  the  linking  by  the  syntax  cable is
momentary  and  transitory,  but  these  affirmatory  links  are  permanent.
Henceforth, invocation of that  one-time  subject-fiber  must  also  tend to
cause invocation  of that  one-time predicate nominative.  But I think I see
now that the residual cross-linkage must  not go  via the  verb-fiber of the
form  of  "to  be."    No,  the  verb-fiber  only  established  the linkage.
Thereafter, the verb-fiber must  be free  to service  other accounts,  so to
     Suppose that the mind comprehends and believes the sentence, "John is a
midget."  Henceforth, the concept-fibers for "John" and "midget" should both
be capable  of invoking each other.  Each of the two major fibers has become
like a subtag to the other.  There  is no  interference from  the verb-fiber
for the  word "is,"  because it  did not  really attach  anything of its own
nature to either the subject or the predicate nominative.  Thus forms of the
verb "to  be" serve  as manipulative or copulative instruments of the syntax
     The next question is, what associative linkage-tags are  established by
a transitive  verb?   I just got an interesting idea about the complementary
roles perhaps played by abstract memory and sensory memory.   I would hazard
a  guess  that  a  transitive  verb  does  not  establish  a tripartite link
involving subject, verb,  and  direct  object.    During  comprehension, the
syntax cable  establishes various  links through  simultaneity.  However, it
looks as though the links to the verb have to be directional in nature.
     Suppose that the only abstract  link  established  between  subject and
direct  object  is  that  of  simultaneity.   In other words, the subject is
linked to the subject-portal of the verb, and the object-portal  of the verb
is linked  to the direct object, but there is no direct, permanent link, via
the verb, between subject and direct object.  There ought not to be any link
via the  verb, if  the verb  is to  operate independently.   But the various
words are linked to the auditory memory channel by simultaneity.
     We can view the comprehension-process in  the light  of dimensionality.
The  work  of  the  last  year  or  two  has tended to map out a very simple
dimensionality, namely:  that past experience is along  one dimension, while
all  present  experience  takes  place  on  a plane or slice which processes
information along pathways lying  at right  angles to  the dimension  of the
past.   This idea  of a  single plane  or slice for present experience keeps
things  simple  by  allowing  an  indefinite  number  of  slices  of present
experience to  be added on as time passes.  Each slice of present processing
can be interacting with memory and control traces  lying anywhere  along the
past dimension,  but past  slices are never altered, and new connections are
made only in the plane of each fresh, momentary slice.  Information can flow
in  and  out  of  past  slices, but past pathways are basically unalterable,
except for the possibility that shifts due to  neuron-fatigue can  shift the
routing of information.
     So there  we have  the picture.  The preterite mind is a firm structure
of belief and knowledge, and only the present  extensions of  that structure
can admit  of change.   When we comprehend a sentence in the present, we are
just reweaving the ties among fibers parallel to the past dimension.
     The grammar of a sentence operates through the syntax cable  to tell us
what connections to make among the concepts named in the sentence.

                                                                 28 NOV 1979

     Probably the  most substantial concept in a mind is the concept of self
or ego.  It is almost taxing to concede or realize that  this present theory
of  the  mind  requires  the  concept  of  ego to be physically located as a
unitary fiber in the abstract memory  channel.   We can  try to  justify the
elongation of  the "punctum"  of ego  by saying that a concept has to remain
relatively constant over time.  So even if we did not think of a  concept as
a unitary  point, we  would be  forced into positing and attaching a unitary
line or fiber to achieve continuity or constancy  over time.   For instance,
if we tried to think of a concept as a ringlet of points joined into a rough
circle, we would still have to  attach a  unitary fiber  somewhere so  as to
carry the  concept out  of the past and into each new moment of the present.
So the concept of ego  is  one  fiber  among  many  in  the  abstract memory
     The ego-fiber has both experiential and linguistic associations.  In my
writing of this year I have distinguished between the single  abstract fiber
and its numerous "concrete" associative tags.  In a way, the tags are really
"concrete" because they are  laid down  by a  concrete happening  in present
experience.     At  any   rate,  I  may  have  to  introduce  a  concept  of
"neuroresistance" to keep an abstract fiber  separate and  buffered from its
concrete tags.  Let us say that an abstract fiber has no neuroresistance and
that each concrete tag has some small  but  important measure  of resistance
to signal-propagation.  The idea  is not  to slow signals down,  but to gate
them.   We don't yet care whether the resistance  is  in the lines or at the
     Once we have the idea of  neuroresistance, we  can develop  the idea of
"proximolocality."  Whenever several associative lines happen to converge on
any  point  or  locus,  a  process  of  summation  gives  added  or enhanced
significance to  that point.  For instance, a signal reaching it will branch
out in multiple directions.  If associative lines had no neuroresistance due
to either  time or  distance, then any point in a network would be logically
the same as any other point.  Indeed, that situation is what we want  for an
abstract fiber, which is just an elongated point.  But for associative links
we want differences to  arise in  the conceptual  import of  various points.
Ratiocination  proceeds   under  the   constraint  of  time.    By  dint  of
"proximolocality," a dense, concentrated point  can  briefly  function  as a
unit appreciably  distant from its surrounding points.  Now, I am describing
a topography as if  it were  in a  flat plane.   It  is hard  to imagine the
physical  accretion  of  indefinitely  many associative links onto a thereby
dense point in a single slice of topography.   So  we use  myriad successive
slices that  function logically as if they were, in many but not all ways, a
single slice.  The  abstract  fibers  ensure  that  there  is  no resistance
between the slices, and the associative links introduce enough resistance so
that points can become conceptually distinct.
     Now, there is a  certain complementarity  having to  do with  whether a
concept  is  associated  to  abstract  fibers  or sensory memory fibers.  An
ultimate measure of the  power of  a neuronal  mind lies  in its  ability to
discriminate,  to  detect  differences.    The  linguistic  use  of  a large
vocabulary relies upon the ability  to  discriminate.    "Quaeritur":   Does
abstract ratiocination tend to merge concepts or to differentiate them?
     The primary  and ultimate differentiation comes from the sensory memory
channels.    Many  of  the  concepts  in  the  abstract  memory  channel are
associated with  words stored  in the auditory memory channel.  Those unique
words themselves are a means of sharp discrimination.  The  conceptual word-
fibers  receive  discriminating  information  from  all  the  sensory memory
channels.  Thus words of a reasonably concrete nature are  sporadically kept
differentiated by the senses.
     However, highly  abstract words have no direct reference to the sensory
memory channels.  The  abstract notions  are not  perceived directly  by the
senses, they  are only  comprehended in  thought.   Since we assume that all
thought has its roots in the senses, we  expect to  find that  even the most
abstract of  concepts are  just built  up through  association with the more
concrete concepts.
     A baby could assemble a concept of ego around the concept-fiber for its
own  name.    Then,  for  sentence-generativity, it could gradually link its
self-concept to the abstract fiber controlling the word "I" in  the English-
speaking auditory  memory channel.   Thus  we have  a rationale by which the
acme of conceptual density can gradually  travel  among  the  points  of the
stick-forest  of  the  abstract  conceptual  plane.  No matter what abstract
fiber the baby originally  uses  to  gather  information  about  itself, the
incipient use  of language will formalize a specific linguistic fiber as the
center of the ego-concept.  Subsequent  reaffirmations will  consolidate the
primacy of the linguistic fiber.
     Is  it  possible  that  some  concepts  can  operate only via syntactic
relationships?   Take an  abstract concept  such as  "honesty" or "courage."
What associations  will lead away from the word-fiber?  For one thing, there
will be associations to specific episodes when the  word was  used.   But it
was used for an idea rather than a direct perception.
     We do not necessarily have to design into a mind the stipulated ability
to entertain an abstract concept such as "honesty."   Instead,  a linguistic
mind may have the implicit ability to handle such concepts.  Suppose that we
designed a linguistic mind to handle  concrete perceptions  and words naming
them.   What would  such a mind do with words naming abstract concepts?  For
one thing, the mind would implicitly be able to record each word in audition
and to set up an abstract conceptual fiber to govern the stored word.
     My   claim   that   abstract   concepts   can   operate   only  on  the
transabstractional level is reinforced  if we  agree that  such concepts are
never  introduced  to  the  individual  by  any  other route than the quasi-
transabstractional  route  of  language.    I  mean,  abstract  concepts are
introduced through  the domain  of language,  and that  domain is where they
always remain.  How primitive  people  would  first  develop  and  name such
concepts, is another question.

                                                                  3 DEC 1979

                            The Vault of the Mind

     Lately I've been taking pains to specify notions which I should keep in
mind as I continue  my design  for artificial  intelligence.   For instance,
there is  the notion  of neuronal  prodigality, by  which I should never shy
away from positing a structure just because it seems to use an  awful lot of
neurons.   Prodigality is both legitimate and mandatory if there is no other
way to get the job done.
     Today I want to discuss the notion of the vault of the mind.   Over the
last two  years I  have often  entertained the notion that the thinking mind
seems to be separated from the physical universe  by an  almost impenetrable
     Among the  floating ideas  in the academic literature is the idea about
how small is the largest number which the mind can know directly.  I suppose
that that  number is less than eight, and around three.  It has a bearing on
how the mind perceives aggregates with many parts.  My feeling is  that that
small  number  of  knowable  elements  serves  us as an indispensable bridge
between the vault of the mind and the universe-at-large.
     I have  lately had  the following  line of  thought about  concepts.  A
certain  amount  of  perception  of  the  physical world is necessary to get
language going in the  mind.   Language involves  variety, so  there must be
variety in  that physical  experience.  But aspects of language operate both
away from and towards variety.  When language makes a concept out  of things
and names  them, it is merging variety into unity.  The environment ought to
contain the raw material for a variety of  concepts, so  that not everything
merges into unity under the scrutiny of mind.
     Now, somehow  in the  acquisition of language, the mind becomes capable
of thinking up new concepts and thereby increasing internally the variety of
its  concepts,  the  basic  set  of  which  had  had originally to come from
external sources.  I want to link this  notion of  conceptual fecundity with
the notion  of "proximolocality,"  the notion  that local densities arise on
the conceptual plane.  We want to examine the mechanism  by which conceptual
variety is increased within the mind.
     I hypothesize that variety is increased by the formulation of sentences
of thought.  A  concept,  although  unitary  in  its  comprising  nature, is
nothing  more  than  a  focus  of  relationships.   To establish or change a
concept, you must establish  or  change  the  relationships.    When logical
tension  builds  up,  a  sentence  flashes  into  being  as a statement of a
possibly old or possibly new relationship.
     Now, what  is logical  tension?   Suppose that  associative activity is
frequently accessing  two (or  more) loci at the same time on the conceptual
plane.  Those loci thereby organize themselves as ingredients for  a nascent
sentence.   If the two points can be thought of as points emanating tension,
we can think of a  diffuse  percolation  of  associativity  between  the two
points.   The diffusion touches points satisfying the input requirements for
selection of a verb.  But once  the  verb  is  activated  in  a  sentence of
thought, the  relationship is  no longer  diffuse; it  is now direct via the
     Now, a few days back I was unwilling to say that any recorded link from
subject to  direct object actually went through the verb.  However, we might
use the notion of simultaneity-freezing to make sure in the future that each
verb  gets  associated  with  its  one-time  (same-time)  subject and direct
object.  If the simultaneity-freeze establishes one direct link from subject
to verb  and another  direct link  from verb  to object, then any subsequent
associative quasi-recall of the  event should  cause the  verb to  spring to
mind  properly  embedded  in  a  sentence of thought somehow paralleling the
original sentence.
     I say "quasi-recall" because we are not in the sensory  memory channels
where  true  recall  occurs.    We  are making "quasi-recall" of assimilated
information.  The verb is still free and independent.  However, if  the verb
is accessed by a subset of the elements of the simultaneity, then all of the
elements will receive an impetus towards coming into play.
     Notice that this discussion bypasses those phonetic records  of thought
laid down in the auditory memory channel.  The phonetic records are unwieldy
and unnecessary.    The  thought  occurred,  and  henceforth  the conceptual
mappings are  altered.   The phonetic  channel can  serve to communicate the
thought or to record the exact wording, if necessary.
     The conceptual plane is a vast topography containing  tens of thousands
of  concepts.    The  mind  is  pregnant with innumerable possible thoughts.
Suppose that the conceptual plane mirrors relationships actually existing or
potentially existing  in the  external world.   The mental expression of all
possible relationships can not happen all at once.   As  the mind cogitates,
it produces  some relationships  which can then serve as the building-blocks
for further relationships.  Variety need not be  reduced through cogitation,
it can be enhanced and embellished.
     So a certain initial population of concepts has to arise along with the
use of language.  But then the mind  with language  becomes free  within its
"vault"  to   think  transabstractively   about  any  available  element  of
knowledge.  When I say "free," I mean  that the  broad flows  and forces are
free to  converge in  passing at  any conceptual point on the network of the
vast topography.  The  mind  could  even  set  up  for  itself  the  task of
examining all available points one after another.
     The notion  of the  vault of  the mind  has to  do with the presence or
absence of certain concepts within  the  mind.    The  initial  concepts are
probably the  least easy  to establish,  because the mind is so alien to the
physical world.  But,  as the  mind quickens  within its  vault, it operates
ever more  freely within  its own  realm of  ideas.   Words, a form of code,
belong truly to the immaterial world  of ideas  rather than  to the physical
     Once  the  vault  of  the  mind  has  been  established during infancy,
incoming  communications  via  language  tend  to   reinforce  the  abstract
uniqueness  of  each  concept.    Suppose  that  the  mind  hears a sentence
purported to define or explain a certain concept.  That sentence relates the
target  concept  to  various  other  concepts.    The  sentence is itself an
abstraction, and it manipulates  abstractions, namely,  its component words.
Being  a  statement  of  the  relationships among concepts, a sentence is an
abstraction of abstractions.  However, each abstraction as  a concept  has a
dynamic interactive potential.  Belief and knowledge have accreted onto each
     During comprehension, the semantic import of a sentence  is absorbed by
the conceptual  topography of  the comprehending mind.  The credence granted
to a  sentence during  comprehension is  a function  of the  very process of
associative absorption  of the sentence.  A mind is free to accept or reject
any statement.  A few weeks  ago I  was having  difficulty figuring  out the
differences in  comprehension of sentences believed and not believed.  I was
wondering how a mind could knowingly take in a lie,  comprehend it,  and not
suffer  damage   to  the   conceptual  apparatus   of  the   mind.    But  a
transabstractive mind tends to guarantee full  dissemination of information.
At any  time that the comprehension of an obvious lie is operating somewhere
on  the  conceptual  plane,  at  the  same  time  the  massive  operation of
verisimilitude is  operating elsewhere  on the plane and in contravention of
the lie.  The lie does not enter the conceptual plane in an isolated way; if
it did  so, it  might not  be recognized  as a lie.  Whatever logic brands a
statement  as  untrue  also  maintains  the  status  quo  of  belief  during
assimilation of the semantic content of the statement.

                                                                  5 DEC 1979

                     Phrases, Methods, and Categories

     For some time I have been wondering how the mind might use some sort of
analog of "forward looking radar" to work the proper modifications  upon the
initial elements  of phrases  which are  going to culminate in a noun at the
end.  For instance,  in English,  how does  the mind  know to  put "this" or
"these" in  front of  some adjectives followed by a noun?  Yesterday I had a
possible insight based  on  the  German  phrase,  "An  der  schoenen, blauen
Donau."   The problem  has long  been quite  poignant to  me with respect to
German, because the mind has to select the proper gender for an article well
in advance  of the  utterance of  the noun.   Then adjectival endings depend
upon whether or not  the article  was even  used.   From my  own speaking of
German  acquired  in  my  teenage  years,  I feel that my mind unconsciously
launches into the correct form of article for an upcoming noun.
     Yesterday's explanation involves the  slice  of  conceptual topography.
Suppose that  a German prepositional phrase is going to be constructed.  The
main element must necessarily be the  noun  at  the  end.    The transitory,
associative "valence"  of that  noun looms large in the topography.  That is
to say, the ongoing thought processes of association are just  about to push
that noun into conscious realization in a sentence of thought.  However, the
noun is not being associated to in isolation.  The very nature  or character
of the association is about to be expressed by the preposition.  The article
and the adjectives are also being  associated  to  in  conjunction  with the
associative build-up of valence on the conceptual noun-node.  What I have in
mind is that the syntax cable will seize  upon the  noun-node as  a starting
point but that there will first be a backwards motion away from the noun and
in search of a  definitely primal  element from  which the  process can then
turn around  and go  forwards through  conscious activation  of the properly
modified words in the auditory memory channel.  In other words, the article-
node  of  the  syntax  cable  has  to  be addressed or dealt with before the
forward swing of the sentence-construction can proceed.  There is  a mixture
of  inflectional  information-flow  along  two  routes.    Only declensional
information goes through  ultimate  tags  in  the  auditory  memory channel.
Information as to the case, number, and gender of, say, an article has to be
dealt with before the point is  reached  where  auditory  ultimate  tags are
involved.   The gender  of a  German noun is somehow closely associated with
the concept-node of the noun.  The singularity or plurality  of number  is a
pervasive concept  that comes  into play in the associative embroglio of the
nascent phrase.  The  case  required  by  the  preposition  is  either fixed
conceptually or  chosen conceptually.   We end up with a group of conceptual
variables that are all going to interact before the conscious  forward swing
ensues.   The fact  that some  of these concepts are pervasive, while others
are unique, will bear upon the dimensionality of my solution to the problem.
     Now I would like to discuss my current methodology.  Lately I have been
working  on  language-comprehension.    On  several days I have written long
sequences of rambling thought.  Such verbiage may  not seem  valuable in its
own right,  but it  has value  within my method, which is to go back at many
points in the future and look for the germination of ideas that are ready to
bear fruit.  The backdrop of so much verbiage is meant as a fertile panorama
to react against creatively.
     If my general ideas  about an  abstract conceptual  channel are  on the
right track, then I hope gradually to become able to work from a position of
initially rough completeness.    That  is,  if  I  am  developing  a correct
structural  framework  for  the  inner  workings of the mind, I should start
finding certain  felicitous  results.    For  one  thing,  it  should become
possible successfully  to turn my attention to minor but bothersome details.
Successful accommodation of various details will bode well  for the validity
of the  general theoretical structure.  New work should come more easily and
more  quickly  if  a  correct  theoretical   framework  is   yielding  me  a
comprehensive overview.
     I would  like eventually  to join  the worldwide circle of minds and to
author two sorts of publications  on  my  project:    a  factual, technical,
highly  descriptive  and  specific  exposition  of  my  results,  and a more
searching, questing generalization of all  the  philosophy  involved  in the
project.  You have to produce the hard results for the first kind of book to
earn the right to expatiate in the other kind of  book.   Under the  idea of
the generalization-style  of book  I have in mind "The Phenomenon of Man" by
Teilhard de Chardin.  Such a book is rich in general ideas and does not have
to present the specific solution to all our problems.
     My  project  has  been  broadening  out  lately  because  I  have begun
collecting certain categories on index cards:  AI Notions, AI Questions, and
Brain Information.   Gradually  I want to acquire an overview in those three
areas.  If I tabulate my guiding  notions,  I  may  be  able  to  apply them
better.     At  present   they  include   such  notions  as  dimensionality,
disinertiativity,  prodigality,  and  transabstractivity.    I   might  just
arbitrarily list  the accumulated categories at certain times in this theory
journal.  By tabulating the questions,  I should  enhance my  control of the
project in many ways, such as in furthering the internal cohesiveness of the
theoretical  structure.    By  accumulating  cards   with  units   of  brain
information, I  hope to  conceptualize a  mapping-out of the brain so that I
can look  for the  physical manifestations  of the  things about  which I am